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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis presents three studies related to the effects of liquidity on financial markets. The 
first topic explores the relationship between funding liquidity and credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads. Using panel estimations, this study provides evidence that a tightening of funding 
liquidity increases spreads, effect which is three times larger in magnitude for high-CDS 
entities compared to low-CDS firms. Moreover, this paper highlights the impact of the ‘CDS 
Small Bang’ regulatory changes, especially the introduction of fixed coupons which induced 
upfront fees for trading CDSs. We find that after the introduction of the fees, funding 
liquidity changes have a much larger and more significant impact on CDS spread changes.  
The second study presents an empirical investigation of the theoretical predictions 
of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) connecting funding liquidity with market liquidity 
and volatility and an extension of these linkages to CDS spreads. Specifically, in a European 
context, this paper documents that: (i) funding conditions co-move with illiquidity, volatility 
and CDS spreads, (ii) during tight funding conditions, illiquid, volatile and high-CDS spread 
securities become particularly illiquid, (iii) a tightening of funding liquidity increases CDS 
spreads, this effect being stronger if funding conditions were already constrained, (iv) a 
deterioration of funding liquidity decreases contemporaneous returns, and (v) funding 
shocks are priced in the cross-section of illiquidity-sorted portfolios. 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
The third study examines the relationship between monetary policy and stock 
liquidity, in the context of the U.K. market. In line with the inventory paradigm of market 
microstructure and theories linking capital constraints with market illiquidity, this study 
documents that a contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy reduces (increases) stock 
liquidity. Moreover, this study finds that the effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity 
depends on the liquidity proxies chosen, decreases with firm size, increases with firm 
volatility, and is stronger during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Background of the study 
The liquidity of financial markets is a central theme of financial research which has attracted 
increased attention in past decades. Liquidity is a complex concept, encompassing multiple 
aspects. One of these dimensions is market liquidity or the ease of trading a security.  
Multiple sources of illiquidity exist. Firstly, illiquidity can arise from the presence 
of transaction costs such as order processing costs and brokerage fees, costs which are 
incurred every time a security is bought or sold. Secondly, illiquidity can occur due to search 
frictions relating to difficulties in locating a counterparty for trades. This type of illiquidity 
is especially encountered in over-the-counter markets, as there is no central marketplace 
where trading is executed. Thirdly, illiquidity can arise due to private information, whereby 
buyers and sellers are concerned that their counterparty has additional information to what 
is known publicly which may lead them to lose money on a specific trade. Lastly, illiquidity 
may occur due to demand pressure and inventory risk. Demand pressure occurs when traders 
want to trade a security quickly, but their natural counterparties are not immediately 
available. In this case, the trader may trade with a market maker, who is ready to act as a 
counterparty for the trade, providing liquidity to the market. However, as the market maker 
bears the risk of changes in the value of the security while he holds the asset, he requires 
compensation for his exposure. Market makers thus charge a higher price to security buyers, 
the ask price, and a lower price to security sellers, the bid price. The difference between the 
two, known as the bid-ask spread, represents the cost that the market maker demands for 
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supplying liquidity to the market. Amihud et al. (2005) presents a survey of these sources 
of illiquidity and their impact on trading within financial markets.  
The various sources of liquidity imply that market liquidity is an elusive and multi-
faceted concept, several liquidity measures needing to be approximated to reach a more 
complete picture of liquidity. Therefore, market liquidity can refer to aspects such as 
immediacy, depth, breadth, tightness and resiliency (Kyle, 1985; Sarr and Lybek, 2002). 
These characteristics can be summarized as follows: immediacy refers to low transaction 
costs, depth relates to a market in which plentiful orders exist, breadth infers that numerous 
and large orders can be executed with low impact on prices, tightness refers to low 
transaction costs for executing trades, while resiliency refers to the speed at which liquidity 
recovers from shocks (Sarr and Lybek, 2002; Vayanos and Wang, 2013). 
 Moreover, the different sources of liquidity led to the development of two bodies of 
theoretical market microstructure literature. The first of these investigates information-
based models (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley 
and O’Hara, 1992) whereby market makers charge a fee that compensates them for any 
potential adverse selection costs they may face by entering a trade with a counterparty that 
owns private information. The second strand of theoretical market microstructure research 
examines inventory-based models (Demsetz, 1968; Stoll, 1978a; Amihud and Mendelson, 
1980; Ho and Stoll, 1981) whereby market makers have a central role as liquidity providers 
and require compensation for holding inventory as they face risks relating to changes in the 
value of their holdings and time required to clear their positions, due to mismatches in the 
arrival of buyers and sellers.  
 Empirical studies highlight the importance of illiquidity for asset prices. In this 
respect, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) examine the effect of illiquidity on stock returns, 
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documenting that returns are increasing and concave in transaction costs, as measured 
through the bid-ask spread. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) investigate the relationship 
between monthly stock returns and measures of illiquidity extracted from intraday data, 
evidencing that returns are positively related to price impact, while Brennan et al. (1998) 
and Datar et al. (1998) provide further evidence of a positive relation between expected 
returns and illiquidity.  
More recent papers examine the variation of illiquidity through time, its effects on 
expected returns and role within asset pricing. To this end, Amihud (2002) finds that, both 
across stocks and over time, expected stock returns increase in illiquidity, while market 
illiquidity lowers contemporaneous stock prices. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) document 
that high liquidity risk stocks earn abnormally high expected returns, while Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) develop a model illustrating that liquidity risk influences expected returns 
through three covariances: between stock return and aggregate illiquidity, between stock 
illiquidity and market return and between stock illiquidity and market illiquidity. Other 
studies, such as Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) and Hasbrouck (2009), find weaker evidence 
that illiquidity is a priced risk factor. The effects of liquidity and liquidity risk have also 
been studied in the context of the bond market by Lin et al. (2011) and Bongaerts et al. 
(2017). Moreover, in the context of the credit default swap (CDS) market, Das and Hanouna 
(2009) evidence a positive relationship between stock illiquidity and CDS spreads, 
Bongaerts et al. (2011) derive a pricing model incorporating liquidity risk and derivatives, 
and go on to find that a liquidity premium is earned by the CDS protection seller, while 
Coro et al. (2013) and Pires et al. (2015) document positive relationships between CDS 
spreads and CDS market illiquidity and individual CDS liquidity, respectively. 
 A separate literature strand investigates the degree of co-movement in the liquidity 
of securities, known as commonality in liquidity. Since the first pieces of evidence of 
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commonality in liquidity, documented by Chordia et al. (2000), Huberman and Halka 
(2001) and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) in the context of the U.S. market, the literature on 
commonality in liquidity has investigated this effect on several markets and provided 
multiple insights as to what triggers the co-movement. These include demand-side 
explanations such as correlated trading behaviour of institutional investors (Koch et al. 
2016) and level of institutional ownership (Kamara et al. 2008) and supply-side 
explanations focusing on trader leverage, provision of liquidity and funding liquidity 
(Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Comerton-Forde et al. 2010; Hameed et al. 2010; Kahraman 
and Tookes, 2017). The latter studies highlight the influence of another type of liquidity, 
namely funding liquidity, on the liquidity and co-movement in liquidity of individual stocks.  
 Funding liquidity represents another dimension of liquidity and is defined by 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) as the ease with which traders can obtain funding to 
finance their operations. Theoretical models suggest that, as trading requires capital, when 
funding liquidity is constrained, traders become unwilling to take on new positions, 
especially large positions in high-margin securities, dampening market liquidity and 
increasing volatility (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; 
Vayanos and Wang, 2012; Kondor and Vayanos, 2016). Moreover, as margins increase with 
market illiquidity, following a funding shock, market liquidity decreases even further, 
leading to higher margins which, in turn, further tighten funding liquidity (Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen, 2009). Therefore, market liquidity and funding liquidity are closely connected 
and mutually reinforcing. The model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) also provides 
new testable predictions. In this respect, their model suggests that: funding liquidity shocks 
affect market liquidity and volatility more so when funding is already constrained, funding 
constraints can explain commonality in liquidity and flight-to-quality, funding liquidity 
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negatively affects contemporaneous returns and generates an expected return spread 
between high and low illiquidity securities.  
Empirical work on the links between market liquidity and funding liquidity and their 
implications is rather thin and recent.  In the context of the U.S. market, Fontaine et al. 
(2016) finds strong evidence in favour of the predictions outlined in Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009), documenting that, following a funding shock, assets display commonality, 
flight to quality and lower contemporaneous returns. Moreover, they provide evidence that 
funding shocks have a stronger impact on illiquidity and volatility when funding is tight, 
and securities with higher covariance to funding shocks display a larger risk premium. Jylha 
(2015) finds that funding liquidity affects market liquidity following a U.S. based pilot 
programme that induced a reduction in margin requirements, while Adrian et al. (2017) 
documents that funding liquidity and market liquidity are strongly correlated only during 
times of market stress. In the context of the European market, Drehmann and Nikolaou 
(2013) find that funding liquidity risk is inversely related to market liquidity using a data 
set consisting of all bids in the ECB main refinancing operation auctions between June 2005 
and October 2008, while Moinas et al. (2017) note that a relaxation of funding constraints 
improves bond market liquidity.  
Monetary policy, through its effects on the cost of borrowing funds, can also be 
related to funding liquidity. In this sense, an expansionary (restrictive) monetary policy 
measured through a decrease (increase) in short-term interest rates, reduces (tightens) 
constraints for margin borrowing, therefore improving (dampening) the funding liquidity of 
participants in the market (Fernandez-Amador et al. 2013). Considering the linkages 
between funding liquidity and market liquidity, monetary policy should also affect the 
liquidity of stocks traded. Few previous studies linking monetary policy to illiquidity exist 
and their results are mixed. In the context of the U.S. market, Fujimoto (2003) employs a 
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vector autoregressive approach and finds that the influence of monetary policy on liquidity 
is significant only before the mid-1980s. Chordia et al. (2005) document that monetary 
policy expansions impact liquidity only during crisis periods. Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) 
and Jensen and Moorman (2010) provide strong evidence supporting the positive effect of 
monetary policy expansions on market liquidity, while Chiu (2014) finds that monetary 
policy shocks do not significantly impact market liquidity. In the context of the European 
market, Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) provides compelling evidence of a positive 
(negative) effect of expansionary (contractionary) on stock liquidity, while in the context of 
the U.K. market, Florackis et al. (2014) finds that the impact of monetary policy on returns 
is significantly stronger for the most liquid stocks and that trading activity and trading costs 
increase on Monetary Policy Committee meeting days.  
 
Objectives and contributions 
This thesis presents three studies examining the effects of funding constraints on different 
financial markets. A first investigation is with regards to the effect of funding illiquidity 
changes on credit default swap (CDS) changes. The second study represents an empirical 
examination, in a European context, of the theoretical predictions of Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) and an extension of these predictions to the CDS market. The third study 
examines the effects of U.K. monetary policy on stock liquidity.  
 The first objective of this thesis is the examination of the effect of funding 
constraints on the corporate CDS market, by investigating the impact of changes in funding 
liquidity on CDS spread changes. The rationale for the existence of a relationship between 
funding liquidity changes and CDS spread changes is closely related to liquidity. A 
tightening of funding constraints induces CDS dealers to face higher inventory costs and 
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higher costs of hedging their positions. As a result, the capacity of dealers to take sides in 
new CDS contracts and supply liquidity to the market is impaired (Tang and Yan, 2008). 
Moreover, a funding liquidity contraction induces CDS traders to steer away from risky 
assets, thus reducing the liquidity of the CDS market (Kamga and Wilde, 2017). The 
resulting decrease in CDS market liquidity due to tightening of funding constraints 
determines CDS protection sellers to require a premium for bearing the added illiquidity, as 
per the findings of Bongaerts et al. (2011), resulting in an increase in CDS spreads. 
Moreover, following June 2009, a set of convention changes for trading CDSs in the 
European market, collectively known as the ‘CDS Small Bang’ were implemented. One of 
the innovations brought about by the new regulatory changes is the introduction of fixed 
coupons for trading CDSs and the exchange of a fee between CDS buyers and sellers for 
trading CDSs unless the CDS spread of the reference entity on the inception date of the 
contract is exactly equal to one of the fixed coupons, the size of the fee depending on how 
far away the CDS spread is from the fixed coupon (Markit, 2009). A similar set of 
convention changes, the ‘CDS Big Bang’, was previously implemented in the context of the 
U.S. market. In a contemporaneous study to the present paper, Wang et al. (2017) examine 
the impact of funding constraints brought about by the introduction of a fee for trading CDSs 
following the CDS Big Bang and document that the new convention changes increase CDS 
market illiquidity and volatility. We hypothesize that the added fee for trading CDSs after 
the introduction of the CDS Small Bang, creates an additional funding cost which would 
increase CDS spreads through the effect on CDS illiquidity and volatility. Moreover, 
following the findings of Pires et al. (2015) that most explanatory variables impact more 
strongly CDS spreads of entities in top quantile of the CDS distribution, we differentiate 
between high and low default risk entities and examine whether the impact of funding 
constraints is larger for high-CDS spread entities.  
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Results suggest that funding illiquidity changes have a positive relationship with 
CDS spreads and that this effect is larger in magnitude and significance following the 
introduction of the upfront fees. Moreover, this effect is approximately three times larger 
for high default risk entities, compared to low CDS firms. Therefore, the paper attributes 
the increased effect, in terms of magnitude and significance, of funding illiquidity changes 
on CDS spread changes to the introduction of upfront fees for trading CDSs, following the 
‘CDS Small Bang’ conventions. 
The contributions of the first paper are two-fold. Firstly, we contribute to the 
literature investigating the effects of funding constraints on financial markets (Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen, 2009; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Gromb and Vayanos, 2010) by 
documenting that funding illiquidity changes positively impact CDS spread changes 
through their influence on CDS illiquidity and volatility. Secondly, we contribute to the 
growing literature examining the determinants of CDS spreads (Tang and Yan, 2008; 
Ericsson et al. 2009; Greatrex 2009; Annaert et al. 2013) by documenting that CDS spreads 
are sensitive to changes in funding illiquidity and that the effect of funding illiquidity on 
CDS spreads is larger in magnitude for high-default risk securities.  
The second study empirically investigates the theoretical predictions postulated by 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and addresses a gap in the literature with respect to the 
impact of funding illiquidity on market illiquidity, volatility and returns in the cross-section 
of European stocks, while also extending these linkages to CDS spreads. European evidence 
on the relationship between funding liquidity and market liquidity is particularly thin, and 
no European study specifically explores the predictions of the Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009) model. Moreover, considering that the levels of funding liquidity in the European 
and U.S. markets exhibit certain dissimilarities, especially between mid-2011 and mid-
2012, the investigation of the impact of funding liquidity on European stocks’ 
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characteristics (returns, illiquidity, volatility) emerges as an interesting avenue of research.  
Furthermore, as CDS spreads convey information relating to the underlying entities’ stock 
liquidity (Das and Hanouna, 2009) and volatility (Ericsson et al. 2009), this paper tests 
whether the impact of funding shocks on illiquidity and volatility, which have been 
empirically documented in the context of the U.S. market by Fontaine et al. (2016), extend 
to CDS spreads.  
The paper brings original contributions to the literature investigating the effects of 
funding constraints on the cross-section of stock returns in several respects. Firstly, by 
newly using, in the context of studies investigating the cross-section of stock returns, a 
sample of firms which are part of the European iTraxx index containing entities with the 
most liquid CDSs and sorting these stocks into portfolios according to their illiquidity, 
volatility and CDS spread levels at the end of the previous year, this paper specifically tests 
and documents that funding conditions co-move with illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads; 
a contraction of funding conditions therefore increasing illiquidity, volatility and CDS 
spreads. Secondly, results also show that the most volatile portfolios see their illiquidity 
increase the most, highlighting a flight to quality effect. However, evidence that entities 
with the widest CDS spreads see their illiquidity increase the most is rather weak. Thirdly, 
the study extends previous U.S. based findings that a funding shock increases stocks’ 
illiquidity and volatility to a higher extent when funding is already constrained by 
documenting that a similar effect is found for CDS spreads, spreads widening following a 
funding shock especially when funding liquidity is tight. Fourthly, by distinguishing 
between positive changes in funding illiquidity (tightening of funding constraints) and 
negative changes in funding illiquidity (relaxation of funding constraints), the paper newly 
documents that only a worsening of funding conditions negatively impacts 
contemporaneous returns, while an improvement in funding liquidity has no significant 
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effect on contemporaneous returns. Lastly, this study documents the presence of funding 
risk premium in the cross-section of stock returns, funding shocks generating a return spread 
between the most and least illiquid portfolios of 1.21% annually, a spread which is 
considerably lower compared to previous evidence provided by Fontaine et al. (2016) for 
the U.S. stock market which found a spread in returns of between 4.25% and 5.30% 
annually.  
The objectives of the third paper of this thesis are the investigation of the presence 
of an effect of U.K. monetary policy, measured through short-term interest rates, on stock 
liquidity and whether the magnitude of this relationship changes during the 2007-2009 
financial crisis or depends on firm characteristics such as size and volatility. The motivation 
for investigating this topic stems from the mixed results found by previous papers on the 
relation between monetary policy and stock liquidity, the presence of such a relationship 
depending on the time-frames and markets studied. In the context of the U.K. market, only 
Florackis et al. (2014) address this relationship in an event study documenting that there is 
a significant increase in trading activity and a smaller increase in trading cost on Monetary 
Policy Committee meeting days. We use a different methodology, akin to Fernandez-
Amador et al. (2013), and employ panel estimations to investigate this relationship. Using 
this approach, we can also document whether the magnitude of the ‘monetary policy – stock 
illiquidity’ relationship depends on factors such as firm size and volatility.  
The rationale for the influence of monetary policy on stock liquidity stems from two 
sources. Firstly, according to the inventory paradigm of market microstructure (Demsetz, 
1968; Stoll, 1978a) stocks’ liquidity would increase if market participants perceive a low 
risk of holding assets and financing their holdings is not expensive. Since monetary policy 
affects both the perceived risk of holding securities as well as the cost of financing, 
monetary policy should also affect stock liquidity. Secondly, the literature associating the 
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effects of funding constraints on liquidity (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) suggests 
that following a contraction of funding, traders find it difficult to meet margin requirements 
and shift their investment strategies, dampening the liquidity of the market. Under this 
framework, an expansionary (restrictive) monetary policy, through a decrease (increase) in 
the cost of financing, reduces (increases) margin borrowing constraints, improving 
(decreasing) market participants’ funding liquidity, thus improving (dampening) stock 
liquidity. Moreover, this paper hypothesizes that the effect of monetary policy is larger for 
small stocks and volatile stocks. The rationale for a size effect stems from study of Amihud 
(2002) documenting that small stocks are more sensitive to changes in illiquidity, while 
large (more liquid) stocks are less affected. Similarly, a volatility effect is expected to occur 
since following a decrease in funding liquidity, which can be interpreted through a monetary 
tightening, illiquidity increases the most for volatile stocks as a flight-to-quality effect 
occurs, investors shifting their allocations towards safer investments (Vayanos, 2004; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).  
Results confirm our hypotheses. Firstly, we find evidence that an expansionary 
(restrictive) monetary policy improves (reduces) stock liquidity. Moreover, by examining 
interaction terms between monetary policy and, in turn, market capitalization and volatility, 
we confirm previous findings of Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) in the context of the 
European market that the effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity is stronger for small 
firms and newly document that the ‘monetary policy – stock liquidity’ relationship is 
increasing in stock volatility. By disentangling the effects of the financial crisis from the 
rest of the sample, we also find new evidence that the effect of monetary policy on stock 
liquidity is generally more significant during the recent financial crisis, highlighting the 
relevancy of monetary policy in alleviating the large drops in liquidity brought about by the 
2007-2009 financial crisis. This study also illustrates the importance of investigating 
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multiple aspects of liquidity, results showing that the ‘monetary policy – stock liquidity’ 
relationship is significant only when liquidity is measured via price impact of transaction 
measures, such as the Amivest liquidity ratio and the percentage of zero return days.   
 
Thesis structure 
This thesis comprises of three studies investigating the effects of funding constraints on 
several markets. These studies are presented within the next three chapters. The final section 
of the thesis presents the conclusions of the thesis and potential avenues for future research.  
 The first chapter investigates the relationship between funding illiquidity changes 
and CDS spread changes in the context of the European market. Using a panel data approach 
on a sample of companies included in the European iTraxx index comprising of entities with 
the most liquid CDSs between January 2008 and March 2013, this chapter documents that 
a tightening of funding liquidity widens CDS spreads after controlling for firm-specific 
credit and liquidity variables as well as macroeconomic factors previously documented to 
influence spreads. Moreover, by differentiating between high and low default risk entities, 
as measured by their CDS spread levels, the study evidences that high-CDS spread firms 
display a sensitivity to funding illiquidity changes which is three times larger than that of 
low-CDS spread firms. Moreover, this paper illustrates the influence of a set of convention 
changes collectively named the ‘CDS Small Bang’ affecting the European CDS market after 
June 2009 and, more specifically, the introduction of fixed coupons which led to the 
introduction of upfront fees for trading CDSs. In line with the hypothesis that the 
introduction of upfront fees generates an additional funding cost relating to trading CDSs, 
this study documents that after the introduction of upfront fees, funding illiquidity changes 
have a larger and more significant impact on CDS spread changes.  
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 The second chapter represents an empirical study of the theoretical predictions 
outlined by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) linking funding liquidity with market 
liquidity and volatility and extends these predictions to CDS spreads. The rationale for 
investigating these effects on CDS spreads stems from their sensitivity to both illiquidity 
and volatility. Newly using in the context of studies investigating the cross-section of stock 
returns a sample of firms containing the most liquid CDSs and after sorting these stocks into 
portfolios according to their year-end illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads, this paper 
provides the first European evidence confirming the predictions of the Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) model. The first piece of evidence provided is that funding conditions co-
move with illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads, a tightening of funding liquidity leading 
to increased illiquidity, volatility and wider CDS spreads. Secondly, the paper shows that 
during tight funding conditions, illiquidity increases more for the most illiquid and volatile 
portfolios. Thridly, this study evidences that a funding contraction increases CDS spreads, 
this effect being larger and more significant if funding conditions are already tight. Fourthly, 
this study finds that only a deterioration of funding liquidity negatively impacts 
contemporaneous returns, while an improvement of funding conditions has no significant 
effect on returns. Lastly, the study finds evidence that funding shocks are priced in the cross-
section of illiquidity-sorted portfolios, generating an annual return spread between the most 
and least illiquid securities of 1.21%.  
 The third chapter examines the relationship between monetary policy and stock 
liquidity in the context of the U.K. market between January 1999 and December 2015. In 
line with theories linking capital constraints with market liquidity (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002) and the inventory paradigm of market 
microstructure (Stoll, 1978a), this paper documents that an expansionary (contractionary) 
monetary policy, as captured through lower (higher) short term interest rates, improves 
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(decreases) stock liquidity. This effect is significant when measuring liquidity through price 
impact of trades measures, but insignificant when evaluating other facets of liquidity such 
as traded volume and trading costs. Disentangling the effects of the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis from the rest of the sample, this study finds that the ‘monetary policy – stock liquidity’ 
relationship is generally larger in magnitude and more significant during the crisis period, 
although some evidence of this relationship outside the crisis period is also presented. 
Moreover, by using interaction terms between monetary policy and, in turn, market 
capitalization and volatility, this paper documents that the effect of monetary policy on stock 
liquidity decreases with firm size and increases with firm volatility.  
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Chapter 1: Funding Liquidity 
Changes as a Determinant of Credit 
Default Swap Spread Changes 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Credit default swaps (CDS) emerged on the financial scene in 1994 being pioneered by JP 
Morgan. A CDS works in the same way as an insurance contract, by providing protection 
against the default of a reference entity. However, differently from traditional insurance 
contracts, CDS contracts are traded over-the-counter and, more recently, on organised 
exchanges. Secondly, unlike traditional insurance contracts, CDS buyers and sellers do not 
have to own any of the debt obligations to which the CDS contracts relates to (Blanco et 
al. 2005; Stulz, 2010). The CDS market developed steadily in the first years after the 
introduction of CDS contracts and has seen a period of unprecedented growth in the mid-
2000s, with the gross notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts rising to 
approximately $57 trillion by June 2008 according to the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). Tang and Yan (2008) argue that this growth stemmed from the need of 
banks and insurance companies to hedge their bond and loan exposures and from the 
willingness of hedge funds to use CDSs as a tool for speculating on credit risk.  However, 
after the onset of the global financial crisis raised concerns over the growth and relative 
uses of CDSs, the CDS market contracted, reaching a notional amount of $24 trillion by 
June 2013, according to BIS. 
Early studies on credit default swaps (e.g. Longstaff et al. 2005), considered that 
CDS spreads, which represent the premiums paid by the CDS buyer to insure against the 
default of the reference name, contain only information relating to the credit risk of the 
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reference entity. However, more recent studies highlighted the importance of liquidity 
components such CDS liquidity (e.g. Tang and Yan, 2008; Bongaerts et al. 2011; Coro et 
al. 2013; Pires et al. 2015) and individual firm equity liquidity (Das and Hanouna, 2009) 
in explaining CDS spreads.  
In this paper, we newly study whether funding liquidity changes, defined as changes 
in the ease with which traders can acquire funds and finance their operations, impact CDS 
spreads changes. A tightening of funding constraints impairs the capacity of dealers to 
take sides in new CDS contracts as they face higher costs of hedging their positions and 
higher inventory costs (Tang and Yan, 2008). This argument is supported by Kamga and 
Wilde (2017) who consider that a funding liquidity contraction drives CDS traders to 
steer away from risky assets, thus reducing the liquidity of the CDS market, in line with 
the theoretical model proposed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Furthermore, 
confirming these predictions, Junge and Trolle (2015) construct a measure of CDS market 
liquidity which correlates strongly, among other factors, with funding liquidity, and find 
that liquidity risk is priced in the cross-section of single-name CDS returns. The above-
mentioned studies suggest that funding liquidity positively impacts CDS market liquidity. 
However, as shown, among others, by Bongaerts et al. (2011) and Coro et al. (2013), 
CDS spreads are highly sensitive to changes in CDS liquidity, a deterioration of CDS 
liquidity increasing CDS spreads, as CDS protection sellers require a premium for 
illiquidity. Therefore, we would expect funding illiquidity changes to positively impact 
CDS spread changes through their effect on CDS illiquidity.  
Moreover, in a contemporaneous and highly related study to ours, Wang et al. 
(2017) investigate the effect of the introduction of upfront fees for trading CDSs in the 
context of the CDS Big Bang (a set of regulatory reforms introduced in the U.S. market 
in April 2009) on CDS market liquidity and CDS spread volatility. They go on to find 
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that after the introduction of the regulatory reforms, a higher funding cost reduces market 
liquidity and increases CDS spread volatility. A similar set of protocol changes, 
collectively named the ‘CDS Small Bang’, was introduced in the European market on 20th 
June 2009 to facilitate standardization and central clearing. Before the protocol changes 
came to effect, trading of CDS contracts was done at a coupon rate that fixed the contract 
value to zero on the inception day, no upfront fee needing to be exchanged (Wang et al. 
2017). Among other regulatory changes, the CDS Small Bang conventions restrict 
coupon rates to be fixed at 25bps, 100bps, 500bps and 1000bps (Markit, 2009). However, 
the introduction of fixed coupons gave rise to upfront fees that need to be exchanged 
between CDS buyers and sellers, the size of the fee depending on how far away the CDS 
spread level is from the fixed coupons at which the contract settles (Wang et al. 2017). 
Periods when funding is tight should thus more strongly negatively affect CDS spread 
liquidity after the implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulations, due to the need of 
paying additional upfront fees for trading CDSs. The resulting decline in CDS liquidity 
would then be transmitted onto CDS spreads as CDS traders require a premium for 
illiquidity. 
Furthermore, motivated by the findings of Pires et al. (2015) that most explanatory 
variables display a much stronger relationship with CDS spreads of high-CDS spread 
firms, compared to low CDS spread firms, we newly investigate whether changes in 
funding illiquidity have a larger and more significant effect on high-CDS firms, compared 
to low-CDS spread entities. We investigate these relationships on the entire sample as 
well as on two sub-samples corresponding to the periods preceding and following the 
implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulatory changes. We expect high-CDS spread 
firms to be more affected by changes in funding illiquidity as they carry more default risk 
and a tightening of funding liquidity would lead these entities closer to the default barrier 
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compared to low-CDS spread firms. Moreover, on average, high-CDS spread firms are 
more likely to have a CDS spread further away from one of the fixed coupons introduced 
after the CDS Small Bang. Therefore, a higher fee would need to be exchanged between 
CDS buyers and sellers for contracts written on high-CDS reference entities, leading to a 
greater reduction in individual CDS liquidity and a higher CDS spread.  
Therefore, the hypotheses examined in this study can be summarized as follows: 
Firstly, we argue that a tightening (relaxation) of funding liquidity increases (decreases) 
CDS spreads through its effect on CDS liquidity. Secondly, we suggest that the effect of 
funding liquidity changes on CDS spread changes is stronger in the post-June 2009 
period, due to the introduction of an upfront fee that is exchanged between CDS buyers 
and sellers, unless the CDS spread level of an entity is exactly equal to one of the fixed 
coupon payments. Thirdly, we hypothesize that high-CDS spread firms display more 
sensitivity to changes in funding liquidity than low-CDS spread firms.  
We test our hypotheses using monthly data on a sample spanning the period 
between January 2008 and March 2013, using a balanced panel of CDS spread changes 
of entities which are part of the European iTraxx index (containing the most liquid single-
name CDSs) and associated firm-specific credit and liquidity variables as well as 
macroeconomic factors which have been previously documented to affect CDS spreads. 
The funding illiquidity measures employed, namely the three-month European TED 
spread measure (EuTed) and the three-month Euribor-Eurepo spread (EuRepo), are 
related to interbank interest rates and reflect the cost of acquiring funds to finance 
operations. To test whether the magnitude and significance of the impact of funding 
illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes increases after the introduction of the CDS 
Small Bang, we split our sample in two subsamples (January 2008 – June 2009 and July 
2009 – March 2013) and re-run our analysis on these two subsamples. Coincidentally, 
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this sample split also isolates the crisis period from the post-crisis period. Therefore, we 
can simultaneously investigate whether the effect of funding liquidity changes on CDS 
spread changes is different during the recent global financial crisis as compared to the 
post-crisis period. When evaluating the effects of funding illiquidity changes on CDS 
spread changes we also differentiate between high-CDS spread entities and low-CDS 
spread entities and examine whether the relationship is stronger in magnitude and 
significance for high-CDS spread (higher default risk) firms compared to low-CDS 
spread (lower default risk) firms.  
Results suggest that changes in funding illiquidity have a significant positive effect 
on CDS spreads, in line with the hypothesis that a tightening of funding liquidity 
determines CDS protection sellers to reduce the supply of contracts in the CDS market 
as they incur increased inventory and hedging costs, reducing CDS market liquidity (Tang 
and Yan, 2008). Moreover, we find that changes in funding illiquidity have a three times 
larger effect on high-CDS entities as compared to low-CDS entities, in line with previous 
findings of Pires et al. (2015) that most explanatory variables have a larger impact on 
high-CDS entities, compared to entities which carry less default risk. Furthermore, by 
splitting our sample in two sub-samples corresponding to the pre-CDS Small Bang 
period, which overlaps with the crisis period, and the post-CDS Small Bang period, which 
can also be interpreted as the post-crisis period, we find that funding illiquidity changes 
positively affect CDS spread changes much more significantly and to a much higher 
magnitude in the post-CDS Small Bang period, in line with our expectations. Finally, by 
examining the results for the explanatory variables used in our models, we document a 
strong time-varying behaviour of the impact of different explanatory variables on CDS 
spread changes, with CDS illiquidity changes and risk-free rate changes having a stronger 
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effect during the crisis period, while stock returns and market volatility have a stronger 
effect in the post-crisis period.  
Through this study, we contribute to two strands of literature. Firstly, we add to the 
literature investigating the effects of funding constraints on financial markets (e.g. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Gromb and Vayanos, 
2010; Comerton-Forde et al., 2010). Most notably, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) 
theorize that under certain market conditions, such as when capital availability is scarce, 
a deterioration of funding liquidity negatively impacts investors’ willingness and ability 
to invest in high-risk securities as they add on more risk, thus leading to reductions in 
market liquidity and increased volatility. Moreover, the resulting reduction in market 
liquidity further increases the sensitivity of market liquidity to future funding liquidity 
changes. Secondly, by documenting that funding illiquidity changes affect CDS spread 
changes, this paper contributes to the growing literature investigating the determinants of 
CDS spreads (e.g. Blanco et al. 2005; Tang and Yan 2008; Ericsson et al. 2009; Greatrex 
2009; Coro et al. 2013; Annaert et al. 2013; Galil et al. 2014; Pires et al. 2015). Research 
examining the determinants of CDS spreads (and CDS spread changes) has gone a long 
way in explaining CDS spreads, from early studies attributing the level of the CDS spread 
of an entity only to credit risk variables (e.g. Longstaff et al. 2005, Zhang et al. 2009) to 
ascribing part of the CDS spread variability to liquidity components and market-wide 
variables (e.g. Bongaerts et al. 2011; Coro et al. 2013; Galil et al. 2014; Pires et al. 2015). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 1.2 describes the data and 
variables used in our analysis, section 1.3 describes the models employed, section 1.4 
presents the empirical results, section 1.5 presents robustness checks performed, section 
1.6 discusses the policy recommendations that can be extracted from our results, while 
section 1.7 concludes.  
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1.2 Data 
Our dataset combines two main sources, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
From the former we source data on CDS spread mid, bid and ask quotes as well as market 
rates on the three-month Euribor rate and German Government BuBill maturing in three 
months.1 From the latter, we source stock market data such as bid, ask and adjusted close 
stock prices for the reference entities on which the CDS contracts are written. 
Macroeconomic interest rate data such as the ten-year and three-year Euro-area Government 
Benchmark bond yields, stock market index and market wide implied volatility are also 
collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The three-month Eurepo rate is collected from 
the European Money Market Institute database.  
The dataset covers a period of 63 months, from January 2008 to March 2013. The 
sample starts in January 2008 to preserve the number of firms in our sample due to data 
availability on CDS quotes as well as associated stock market data on reference entities. 
The companies selected are all the non-financial companies included in the European iTraxx 
index on March 2013 (index roll 19)2.  The Markit iTraxx Europe index comprises of 125 
investment-grade entities with the most liquid single-name CDSs in the European market. 
The constituent list includes 100 non-financial firms and 25 companies that operate in the 
financial sector. Previous studies using data from the iTraxx Europe index include 
Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) which examine the 
determinants of the CDS indices, Berndt and Obreja (2010) who use index data to construct 
                                                            
1 Das and Hanouna (2009) and Nashikkar et al (2011) also use CDS information obtained from Bloomberg 
in their analyses of determinants of CDS spreads and CDS bond-basis, respectively.  
2 The European Markit iTraxx index constituent list is reviewed with respect to liquidity and investment 
grade of entities every six months, with one index roll occurring in March and one in September. To 
preserve the number of companies in our cross-section, we also include any entities which were listed as part 
of the Markit iTraxx index as of March 2013, but which have been previously part of the Markit iTraxx 
Crossover Index encompassing the 75 most liquid sub-investment grade entities due to a rating downgrade 
event occurring during our sample period. It is worth noting that throughout the time frame of the study, the 
constituent list of the European iTraxx index changes are minor. This observation is also highlighted by 
Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) who find only neglectable effects of index roll changes on spread changes.   
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a factor mimicking economic catastrophe risk and Junge and Trolle (2015) who construct a 
new measure of CDS market liquidity and analyse whether liquidity risk impacts expected 
CDS returns. 
Following Bai and Wu (2016), we restrict our sample to non-financial entities due 
to the important differences in terms of regulation, funding methods, corporate governance, 
agency problems, capital structure, leverage levels and calculation of distance-to-default 
measures between financial and non-financial firms highlighted by De Haan and Vlahu 
(2016) and Duan and Wang (2012). Furthermore, amongst others, Alexander and Kaeck 
(2008) provide evidence that several variables that affect CDS spreads of non-financial 
entities do not impact spreads of companies from the financial sector. Following the 
recommendations outlined in Coro et al. (2013), we further restrict our sample to include 
only CDS contracts that satisfy the following conditions: the CDS contract maturity is five 
years, the most-liquid CDS maturity (Meng and Gwilym, 2008), contracts are denominated 
in Euros, and the underlying debt is senior-unsecured. Finally, we only select entities for 
which we can source stock market data for the entire time-series from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. Unfortunately, data on identity of buyers and sellers, volume of transactions, 
market depth and buy and sell orders is not available. Data on these variables would be a 
useful complement to an analysis of the impact of funding liquidity on CDS spreads due to 
the interconnectedness between market liquidity and funding liquidity documented, among 
others, by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
Restricting our data using the above-mentioned filters yields us a balanced panel of 
76 European entities observed throughout a period of 63 months. In line with Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001), Coro et al. (2013), Galil et al. (2014) and Pires et al. (2015) we 
conduct our empirical analysis using monthly data, as CDS contracts are known to not trade 
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frequently. In his analysis, Zhu (2006) finds that only 20% of days in his sample period 
contain valid CDS quotes.  
 
1.2.1 Credit default swaps 
The size of the CDS market has seen large fluctuations throughout time. Figure 1.1 
plots the gross total notional amounts of single name CDSs and investment-grade single-
name CDSs over time. Single-name CDSs have seen a period of high growth in the 2000s 
reaching a peak of 33.4$ trillion in June 2008, according to data from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). However, despite their many advantages in making 
financial markets more efficient, following the financial crisis many observers have 
highlighted the potential negative impact of CDSs on financial stability, CDSs being 
associated with losses and uncertainty at some institutions (Stulz, 2010). Consequently, 
according to BIS data, the outstanding notional amounts of single-name CDS have steadily 
decreased after June 2008, reaching 13.1$ trillion at the end of June 2013. Figure 1.1 also 
depicts that the proportion of single-name investment-grade CDSs to total single-name 
CDSs has largely remained constant, representing between 64% and 70% over our sample 
period. 
Figure 1.2 plots the evolution of average CDS spread levels (panel A) and CDS 
spread changes (panel B) over time. The solid lines represent averages for our entire sample, 
while the dotted lines represent averages for the top and bottom terciles of the respective 
distributions. We note a great deal of variation in both average CDS spread levels and 
changes throughout our sample period. Investigating panel A, we note that average spread 
levels fluctuated from highs of 253 bps in December 2008 to lows of 76 bps recorded in 
January 2008 and December 2009. Moreover, the average spread in the upper tercile of CDS 
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spreads displays even greater variation, reaching peaks of 445 bps in December 2008 and 
270 bps in September 2011 and lows of 104 bps in January 2008 and 108 bps in December 
2009. Examining panel B, we note that average CDS spread changes also display variation 
throughout our sample, from large negative changes of -57 bps in January 2009 and -35 bps 
in October 2011 to large positive changes of +73 bps in October 2008. The very large 
variation in average CDS spread changes for the top tercile of CDS spreads during the 
financial crisis is also remarkable, spreads widening by 138 bps in October 2008 at the peak 
of the crisis and shrinking by 98 bps and 96 bps in January 2009 and April 2009, 
respectively.  
In the empirical analysis, we focus on examining CDS spread changes, rather than 
CDS spread levels because, after examining stationarity via the panel unit root test of Levin 
et al. (2002), we cannot reject the null of a unit root for CDS spread levels, whereas spread 
changes are stationary.3  Moreover, as Ericsson et al. (2009) notes, CDS spread differences 
should be harder to explain than CDS levels. Therefore, by performing our estimations in 
first differences, we perform a stricter test of CDS determinants. For each month t and 
company i, CDS spread changes are calculated as the first difference of CDS spread levels 
from the last day of each month, as shown in equation (1.1): 
                                 𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 −  𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1                                      (1.1) 
By performing panel regressions using first differences of our variables, rather than levels, 
we contribute to the growing literature examining the determinants of CDS spread changes 
(e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001; Ericsson et al. 2009; Greatrex, 2009). 
 
                                                            
3 Previous studies investigating the determinants of CDS spread changes in the European market (Coro et al. 
2013; Annaert et al. 2013) and in the U.S. market (Galil et al. 2014) also found evidence of non-stationarity 
in CDS spread levels. 
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1.2.2 Funding liquidity 
Low funding liquidity leads CDS protection sellers to steer away from risky assets, thus 
decreasing the liquidity of the CDS market (Kamga and Wilde, 2017). This argument is 
supported by the findings of Tang and Yan (2008) who find that a tightening of funding 
liquidity determines dealers with excess inventory to face higher costs of hedging their 
positions and higher inventory costs, in turn affecting the supply of CDS contracts in the 
market. Separately, Junge and Trolle (2015) construct a measure of CDS market liquidity 
that correlates strongly, among others, with funding costs, and go on to find that liquidity 
risk is priced in the cross-section of single-name CDS returns. These arguments suggest that 
funding illiquidity affects CDS spreads through their effect on CDS market illiquidity. As 
shown by Bongaerts et al. (2011), Coro et al (2013) and Pires et al. (2015), CDS market 
liquidity, as well as individual CDS liquidity, are important determinants of CDS spreads, 
a decrease in CDS liquidity leading to a widening of CDS spreads.  
Furthermore, we expect funding illiquidity changes to have a stronger impact on 
CDS spread changes after June 2009, due to the implementation of the CDS Small Bang 
which brought about a set of convention changes to the European CDS market meant to 
improve central clearing (Markit, 2009). Before the CDS Small Bang convention changes 
came into effect, CDS contracts were traded at a coupon rate that set the contract value to 
zero on the start date of the contract, thus no upfront fee was needed (Wang et al, 2017). 
According to Markit (2009), one of the changes implemented through the CDS Small Bang 
is the implementation of fixed coupons (25bps, 100bps, 500bps and 1000bps). If the CDS 
spread for an entity at the date of the contract does not amount exactly to one of the 
implemented fixed coupons, upfront fees are exchanged depending on the CDS spread level, 
with the fees being larger the further away the CDS spread is from the newly established 
fixed coupons. Periods of tight funding should thus affect more strongly CDS spreads after 
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the implementation of the new regulations, due to the need of paying additional fees for 
trading CDSs which would decrease CDS market liquidity. These effects are closely tied to 
those documented by Wang et al. (2017) in relation to the CDS Big Bang, a similar protocol 
to the CDS Small Bang implemented in the U.S. market prior to the introduction of the CDS 
Small Bang in the European market. Wang et al. (2017) go on to find that the higher funding 
cost due to the introduction of upfront fees for trading CDSs reduces CDS market liquidity 
and increases CDS spread volatility. 
The above arguments suggest that we expect a positive relationship between funding 
illiquidity changes and CDS spread changes, effect which should be larger after June 2009 
due to the implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulations. We use two proxies to 
measure funding illiquidity. Firstly, we examine the European TED spread measure (EuTed) 
calculated as the difference between the three-month Euribor rate and three-month German 
Government BuBill. This measure can be considered a European equivalent of the widely 
used TED spread funding liquidity measure (Garleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Boudt et al, 
2017) in the context of the European market. Secondly, in line with Moinas et al. (2017) 
and Dunne et al. (2013), we investigate a funding liquidity measure relying on repo rates, 
namely the Eurepo spread (EuRepo) calculated as the spread between the three-month 
Euribor and three-month Eurepo rates. The Eurepo rate is collected from the European 
Money Market Institute database and represents the rate at which one prime bank offers 
funds in Euro to another prime bank, with the Eurepo General Collateral serving as the 
collateral in the transaction (Moinas et al, 2017). As suggested by Moinas et al. (2017), a 
higher Eurepo spread indicates higher risk aversion and a higher preference for cash.  
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1.2.3 Control variables 
We investigate the presence of a relationship between changes in funding illiquidity and 
CDS spread changes, while controlling for a set of additional firm-specific and macro-
economic credit risk and liquidity variables previously documented to impact credit spreads. 
The choice of control variables is inspired by the Merton (1974) model and by more recent 
studies documenting the influence of liquidity and macroeconomic factors on CDS spreads 
(e.g. Coro et al. 2013; Bongaerts et al. 2011; Annaert et al. 2013).   
 
1.2.3.1 Firm-specific credit risk variables 
1.2.3.1.1 Stock return  
The model introduced by Merton (1974) suggests that a decrease in a firm’s market value 
of equity leads to a higher probability of default for the respective firm. In line with Galil et 
al. (2014), we use monthly stock returns as indicators of changes in a firm’s market value 
of equity. We expect a negative relationship between stock returns and CDS spread changes 
as a decrease in stock returns would reduce the market value of equity and thus increase the 
probability of default of the firm, which would be captured through an increase in the CDS 
spread of the respective entity. Alternatively, following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), 
Blanco et al. (2005), Cremers et al. (2008) and Greatrex (2009), a firm’s stock return can be 
considered a high-frequency measure of leverage. Under this hypothesis, a decrease in stock 
returns would increase the market value of leverage, increasing the probability of default 
and CDS spreads. Additionally, following Annaert et al. (2013) stock returns can be 
considered a measure of a firm’s future prospects. A decrease in stock returns would 
increase the default risk of firms, leading to higher CDS spreads. Therefore, we expect a 
negative relationship between a firm’s stock return and CDS spread changes.  
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1.2.3.1.2 Stock return volatility 
In the framework of Merton (1974), higher firm value volatility increases the probability of 
reaching the default threshold. Therefore, higher firm value volatility would increase the 
CDS spread of an entity. However, firm value volatility is unobservable, but can be 
approximated through the historical volatility of stock returns (Alexander and Kaeck, 2008; 
Ericsson et al. 2009; Annaert et al. 2013). Following Annaert et al. (2013), monthly 
volatility is measured as the monthly historical standard deviation of daily stock returns over 
the past month.  
 
1.2.3.2 Firm-specific liquidity variables 
1.2.3.2.1 Scaled equity bid-ask spread 
Das and Hanouna (2009) develop a hedging mechanism evidencing that illiquidity costs 
from the equity market are transmitted to CDS spreads. In this framework, CDS contract 
sellers actively hedge their positions and the cost of hedging increases with transaction 
costs, measured through the scaled equity bid-ask spread (Das and Hanouna, 2009). CDS 
sellers would therefore attempt to recover the added cost of hedging their positions through 
a higher CDS spread. Therefore, we would expect a positive relationship between equity 
illiquidity and CDS spreads. Following Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Das and 
Hanouna (2009), we use the scaled equity bid-ask spread, measured as the difference 
between the ask and bid prices divided by the mid-point of the two, to proxy for equity 
illiquidity transaction costs.  
1.2.3.2.2 Absolute CDS bid-ask spread 
Tang and Yan (2008) and Pires et al. (2015) show that an important determinant of CDS 
spreads are CDS illiquidity costs. Moreover, Bongaerts et al. (2011) develop a model where 
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CDS returns depend on CDS transaction costs, a liquidity premium being earned by the 
CDS contract seller. These results are in line with the hypothesis that liquidity providers 
such as CDS contract sellers require a premium for illiquidity. Alternatively, considering 
CDS contracts to be similar to insurance contracts, Acharya and Johnson (2007) show that 
information asymmetries increase the insurance premium. Assuming that the CDS bid-ask 
spread can be considered a good proxy for information asymmetries in the market, as 
suggested by Pires et al. (2015), a higher CDS bid-ask spread should lead to a higher CDS 
spread. We follow Bongaerts et al. (2011) and Pires et al. (2015) and focus on the absolute, 
rather than the relative, bid-ask spread, as Pires et al. (2015) convincingly show that the 
absolute measure should be used in the context of the CDS market. The reason behind this 
choice is that, contrary to stock prices, CDS spreads are already expressed in a comparable 
way between entities (basis points per annum of the notional amount of the contract) and 
further dividing the CDS by the mid-quote could bias the comparison (Pires et al. 2015). 
 
1.2.3.3 Market-wide variables 
1.2.3.3.1 Risk-free rate 
The level of the riskless interest rate has been considered an important component of default 
probability since the model of Merton (1974). On one hand, the risk-free rate determines 
the risk-adjusted drift of firm value, an increase in rates decreasing the risk-adjusted default 
probability leading to a decrease in spreads (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Collin-Dufresne 
et al, 2001). Moreover, following Tang and Yan (2006), an increase in the risk-free rate 
positively affects economic growth prospects, leading to a decrease in default risk. These 
arguments suggest a negative relationship between the level of interest rates and CDS 
spreads. On the other hand, as Coro et al (2013) argue, higher interest rates can also suppress 
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growth through an increase in borrowing costs, such an effect being more prominent in a 
period of increased sovereign risk such as seen in the European market starting from late 
2009.  This would lead to a positive relationship between the risk-free rate and CDS spreads. 
Therefore, due to these two diverging arguments, we consider the relationship between the 
riskless interest rate and CDS spreads as undetermined, and investigate whether the effect 
of the risk-free rate on CDS spreads changes throughout the sample periods. We measure 
the risk-free interest rate as in Coro et al. (2013) through the Euro-area government bond 
with a maturity of 10-years. 
1.2.3.3.2 Term structure slope 
Among others, Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) suggest that 
an increase in the slope of the yield curve predicts economic growth and improves recovery 
rates. This leads to an expected negative relationship between the term structure slope and 
CDS spreads. However, a steepening of the slope could also reduce the number of positive 
net present value projects available to firms, leading to an increase in default probability 
(Galil et al, 2014). This argument indicates a positive relationship between the slope of the 
term structure of interest rate and the CDS spread. Therefore, as with the risk-free rate, we 
leave the expected relationship between the slope of the term structure and CDS spreads as 
undetermined and check whether the relationship changes within the different sub-samples 
investigated. The term-structure slope is measured through the difference between the ten-
year and three-year Euro-area Government bond yields.  
1.2.3.3.3 Market-wide volatility 
Market-wide volatility can be considered a measure of business climate, an increase in 
market-wide volatility indicating heightened uncertainty regarding economic prospects 
(Annaert et al. 2013; Greatrex, 2009). Therefore, as with firm-specific volatility, we expect 
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a positive relationship between market volatility and CDS spreads. We measure market 
volatility through the VSTOXX implied volatility index obtained from options written on 
the Euro STOXX 50 index.   
A description of the explanatory variables as well as a summary of the expected 
relationships between the changes in explanatory variables and changes in CDS spreads are 
presented in Table 1.1. 
1.3 Methodology 
To test the impact of funding illiquidity and other firm-specific and macroeconomic factors 
on CDS spread changes, we estimate the following set of multivariate regressions:  
M1: 𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
                               + 𝛽4𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                     (1.2) 
M2: 𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
                                + 𝛽4𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                            (1.3) 
M3: 𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
                                + 𝛽4𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                          (1.4) 
M4: 𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
                             + 𝛽4𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽6𝛥𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽7𝛥𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒_𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 +
                             + 𝛽8𝛥𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                (1.5) 
M5: 𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
                              + 𝛽4𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡 + 𝛽6𝛥𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡 +
                              + 𝛽7𝛥𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒_𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽8𝛥𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                              (1.6)                               
In models M1 – M5, the dependent variable is the monthly change in the CDS 
spread, while the explanatory variables are as described in Table 1.1. Model M1 estimates 
the impact of firm-specific credit and liquidity factors on CDS spread changes. In models 
M2 and M3, we augment M1 alternatively with the two funding illiquidity factors to 
examine the influence of changes in funding illiquidity on CDS spread changes when 
controlling for firm-specific determinants. Lastly, in models M4 and M5, we investigate the 
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role of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes when controlling for both firm-
specific and macro-economic variables that have been previously documented to impact 
CDS spread changes. Following Coro et al. (2013), models M1 – M5 are estimated using 
firm-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm to correct for autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity.  
We estimate models M1 – M5 on our entire sample of firms as well as on the top 
and bottom terciles (top and bottom 33%) of entities according to their CDS spread level. 
By performing these estimations, we can test whether CDS spread changes of high-CDS 
spread (high default risk) firms react differently to changes in funding illiquidity and other 
explanatory variables than low-CDS spread (low risk) firms. In line with previous findings 
documented by Pires et al. (2015), we expect the effects of explanatory variables on CDS 
spread changes of high-CDS firms to be larger in magnitude than on low-CDS firms, as 
negative shocks to either credit or liquidity variables would drive high-CDS entities, which 
carry more credit and liquidity risk, closer to the default barrier. 
Furthermore, we conduct a sub-sample analysis to isolate the effects of the crisis 
period and the effects of the regulatory changes introduced through the CDS Small Bang on 
June 20th, 2009. To this end, we split the sample in two sub-samples: a crisis period, from 
January 2008 to June 2009, which also coincides with the pre-CDS Small Bang period, and 
a post-crisis period, from July 2009 to March 2013, which also represents the post-CDS 
Small Bang regime4. We estimate models M1 – M5 during the two sub-samples separately 
using the entire sample of firms as well as the top and bottom terciles of entities according 
to their CDS spread level. We expect changes in funding illiquidity to have a more 
pronounced effect on CDS spread changes in the post-CDS Small Bang sample due to the 
                                                            
4 Galil et al. (2014) also consider June 2009 as the last month of the most intense phase of the Global 
Financial Crisis. 
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introduction of an upfront fee, which increases the funding cost for trading CDSs, reducing 
traders’ willingness to trade, leading to a reduction in CDS market liquidity and an increase 
in CDS spreads.  
1.4 Empirical results 
1.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables along 
with CDS spread and funding liquidity levels. Panel A presents summary statistics for the 
whole sample, while panels B and C present results for the crisis and post-crisis periods, 
respectively. All variables are calculated with monthly frequency. Investigating panel A, we 
note that the average CDS spread for the entire sample is 119.66 bps, while the mean 
monthly CDS spread change is 1.09 bps. We also observe large variations in the CDS spread 
levels between entities, the lowest CDS spread recorded being 20.53 bps, while the largest 
being 759.58 bps. Comparing the two funding liquidity measures, we note that EuTed has a 
larger mean value and displays higher volatility than EuRepo. Moreover, monthly changes 
in the EuTed spread are, on average, larger in magnitude than monthly changes in the 
EuRepo spread.  
Comparing the summary statistics between the crisis and post-crisis periods, 
displayed in panel B and panel C, respectively, we note that the average CDS spread as well 
as the monthly average CDS spread changes are larger in the crisis period, while the average 
monthly stock return is -2.93 percent in the crisis period compared to 0.60 percent in the 
post-crisis period. CDS volatility, CDS illiquidity as well as stock return volatility are also 
larger in the crisis period. Together, these statistics highlight the heightened default risk 
during the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis. In addition, during the crisis period, on 
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average, funding illiquidity is more than two times higher than in the post-crisis period, 
while mean monthly changes in funding illiquidity are larger.  
Table 1.3 presents time-series pairwise correlations between the explanatory 
variables included in our models. Panel A presents correlations observed throughout the 
entire sample, while Panels B and C illustrate the pairwise correlations during the crisis and 
post-crisis periods, respectively. The signs of the correlations between the explanatory 
variables broadly confirm our expectations. The largest correlation is observed between the 
two funding liquidity proxies (0.65 for the entire sample of dates, and 0.68 during the crisis 
period). However, these two variables are only included alternatively in the regression 
models. All other pairwise correlations are smaller than +/- 0.5, except for the correlation 
between  𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡 and 𝛥𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 during the crisis period (0.52).  
 
1.4.2 Results of regression estimations 
1.4.2.1. Results for the full time-series sample 
Table 1.4 presents the results of the multivariate regressions depicted in models M1 – M5 
for the entire time-series (January 2008 - March 2013). Panel A presents the results for the 
entire sample of firms, while panels B and C present the results for the sub-samples 
containing high and low CDS spread entities. We first draw our attention to panel A. Model 
M1 reflects the ability of firm-specific credit and liquidity variables to explain CDS spread 
changes. We find that stock returns and changes in volatility, equity bid-ask spreads and 
CDS bid-ask spreads are highly significant determinants of CDS spread changes as 
previously documented by Coro et al. (2013), Pires et al. (2015) and Das and Hanouna 
(2009). Stock returns have an expected negative relationship with CDS spread changes, 
while changes in volatility, equity bid-ask spreads and CDS bid-ask spreads evidence a 
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positive relationship with CDS spread changes. Together these variables explain 32% of 
CDS spread changes. In models M2 and M3, we augment model M1 with the two funding 
liquidity proxies separately. We find that the two funding illiquidity proxies, 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 and 
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡, are significant at the 1% significance level and have a positive relationship with 
CDS spread changes. This is in line with our hypothesis that a tightening of funding liquidity 
increases CDS spreads. The firm-specific variables remain highly significant and of the 
expected sign. Models M4 and M5 investigate the effect of funding illiquidity changes on 
CDS spread changes when controlling for both firm-specific and macroeconomic variables. 
We find that both funding illiquidity measures remain significant. The magnitude of the 
coefficients for funding illiquidity drops by more than a half when adding the 
macroeconomic variables, compared to the specifications in models M2 and M3. 
Investigating the macroeconomic control variables, we find that changes in risk free rate 
have a significant negative relationship with changes in CDS spreads, while changes in 
market volatility positively affect changes in CDS spreads. These results are in line with our 
hypotheses and with results from previous studies such as Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). 
Changes in the term structure slope do not have a significant impact on changes in CDS 
spreads. Models M4 and M5 explain 35% of CDS spread changes. The explanatory power 
of these models is 14% larger than that of a comparable model presented by Annaert et al. 
(2013) for a sample of CDSs between 2003 and 2010. We differ from the model presented 
by Annaert et al. (2013) by using monthly data compared to weekly data and by additionally 
testing for the influence of funding liquidity and equity illiquidity on CDS spread changes, 
while not examining the influence of the swap spread and corporate bond spread on CDS 
spread changes. 
Examining panels B and C of Table 1.4, we find that the effect of funding illiquidity 
changes on CDS spread changes is significant when investigating either high-CDS firms or 
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low-CDS firms, albeit the coefficient of 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡 is significant only at the 10% 
significance level in model M5 when investigating low default risk firms. The magnitude 
of the funding effect is approximately three times larger when investigating high-CDS 
spread entities compared to the funding effect on low-CDS spread entities. This highlights 
the fact that high-CDS spread (higher default risk) entities are more sensitive to changes in 
funding conditions compared to low-CDS (lower default risk) firms, consistent with the 
hypothesis that a tightening of funding liquidity would affect high risk firms more than low 
risk firms as investors shy away from riskier assets following a funding contraction 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). All the relationships between the explanatory variables 
and CDS spread changes remain significant and of the same sign compared to the estimation 
using the entire sample of firms, except for the equity bid-ask spread which is insignificant 
in the low-CDS spread subsample and the slope yield which is significant in the high-CDS 
subsample.  
 
1.4.2.2. The effect of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes during and after 
the Global Financial Crisis. 
Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 present the results of the multivariate regressions described in 
models M1-M5 during the Global Financial Crisis (January 2008 – June 2009) and after the 
Global Financial Crisis (July 2009 – March 2013), respectively. This subsample split also 
coincides with the periods preceding and following the implementation of the CDS Small 
Bang regulatory framework which took effect on June 20th, 2009. Within Table 1.5 and 
Table 1.6, panel A presents results for the entire sample of firms, while panels B and C 
present results for the high-CDS spread and low-CDS spread firms within the two 
subsamples, respectively.  
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Investigating Table 1.5, results suggest that funding illiquidity changes do not 
generally have a significant impact on CDS spread changes during the Global Financial 
Crisis period. We obtain statistically significant (at 10% significance level) and positive 
coefficients for the funding liquidity variables only when estimating model M3 for the high-
CDS spread sample and when estimating model M2 in the low-CDS spread sample. We 
consider that this result arises because during the financial crisis, tightening of funding 
liquidity led to a reduction in CDS market liquidity and individual CDS illiquidity which 
dramatically increased the explanatory power of individual CDS illiquidity on CDS spread 
changes relative to other structural or macroeconomic factors. Indeed, the magnitude of the 
effect of individual CDS illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes is two to three times 
larger during the crisis period, compared to the post-crisis period. A similar result is 
documented by Annaert et al. (2013) who find that CDS bid-ask spreads are more significant 
during the Global Financial Crisis period, compared to the pre-crisis period and that the 
explanatory power of CDS bid-ask spreads in univariate regressions grows from 0.30% 
before the crisis to 6.96% during the crisis. Exploring the results for the other explanatory 
variables during the crisis period, we note that stock returns and changes in CDS bid-ask 
spreads, risk free rate and term-structure slope are significant in all estimations. 
Interestingly, during the crisis period, we obtain larger adjusted 𝑅2 values, of up to 44%, 
when performing estimations on the low CDS spread entities suggesting that our 
explanatory variables explain better CDS spread changes of low-risk entities, contrary to 
previous findings. 
Examining Table 1.6, we note that funding illiquidity changes have a positive and 
significant (at 1% significance level) effect on CDS spread changes in the post-CDS Small 
Bang (post-crisis) period. This is in line with our expectation, since the introduction of an 
upfront fee to be paid for all CDS transactions when the CDS spread is not equal to one of 
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the fixed coupons introduced by the CDS Small Bang brings about an additional cost 
incurred by CDS traders which reduces their willingness to trade, reducing CDS market 
liquidity (Wang et al. 2017). In turn, this leads to a premium being demanded by CDS sellers 
to compensate for illiquidity, increasing CDS spreads (Bongaerts et al. 2011; Coro et al. 
2013). The size of the relationship is also economically significant. The effect of funding 
illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes is three to five times larger in size for high CDS 
firms compared to low CDS firms. We also document that stock returns and changes in 
volatility, CDS bid-ask spreads, slope yield and market volatility have a significant impact 
on CDS spread changes when investigating the entire sample of firms as well as in the high 
and low-CDS subsamples. Interestingly, changes in risk-free rate display a positive 
relationship with CDS spread changes. Although surprising at first, this result is in line with 
the hypothesis that an increase in risk free rates increases borrowing costs, thus suppressing 
growth as is the case in the European market after the end of 2009 (Coro et al. 2013). During 
the post-crisis period, we find that our models can explain a larger part of CDS spread 
changes when evaluating high-CDS firms. This is in line with the findings of Pires et al. 
(2015). We obtain adjusted 𝑅2 values reaching up to 41.74% for the entire sample of firms 
and 50.26% for high-CDS firms. However, our models perform worse in explaining changes 
in CDS spreads of low risk firms in the post-crisis period compared to the crisis period.  
1.5 Robustness checks 
To check whether we obtain a statistically significant change in the effects of funding 
illiquidity changes and of other explanatory variables on CDS spread changes during the 
crisis, when controlling for firm-specific and macroeconomic factors, we re-estimate 
models M4 and M5 but with the addition of a crisis dummy variable and interaction terms 
between all explanatory variables and the crisis dummy. The crisis dummy takes the value 
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of ‘1’ between January 2008 and June 2009 and ‘0’ otherwise. We estimate this model on 
the whole sample of firms and on the high-CDS and low-CDS subsamples, respectively. 
Table 1.7 reports the results. We confirm that the positive effect of funding illiquidity 
changes on CDS spread changes is significantly lower in the crisis period, while the positive 
relationship between CDS illiquidity changes and CDS spread changes is significantly 
larger in magnitude during the crisis period. Additionally, we find that changes in the 
riskless interest rate have a stronger negative relationship with CDS spread changes during 
the crisis period and that the positive relationship between changes in the term structure 
slope and changes in CDS spreads changes its sign and becomes negative during the crisis. 
This supports the mixed evidence found by literature regarding the effects of changes in risk 
free rate and changes in term structure slope on CDS spread changes. For example, with 
respect to the effect of changes in the term structure slope on spread changes, Galil et al. 
(2014) find a negative relationship between the two variables for a sample between February 
2002 and February 2013, while Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) document a positive 
relationship using a sample between 1988 and 1997. Taken together, these results suggest 
that the effect of funding liquidity as well as of other explanatory variables display a strong 
time-varying behaviour, as previously noted by Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Annaert 
et al. (2013).  
Adding to the explanatory variables employed in models M1 – M5, we also 
considered estimating the effect of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes when 
accounting for the market return, as in Annaert et al. (2013). To proxy for market return we 
used the return on the Euro Stoxx 50 stock market index obtained from Thomson 
Datastream. However, due to the very large negative correlation between market return and  
𝛥𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 (-0.72 for the whole sample and -0.80 in the crisis subsample), we chose 
to report results for models using only 𝛥𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 to avoid multicollinearity. In 
 
 
41 
 
unreported results, we note that there are no significant changes in the signs or magnitudes 
of the coefficients for the variables included in models M1 – M5, when replacing 
𝛥𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 with the market return.  
1.6 Policy recommendations 
The results of our analysis suggest that funding illiquidity changes are a significant 
determinant of CDS spread changes, especially during the period following the 
implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulatory framework in June 2009. While this 
result may be driven in part by the changing dynamics of the relationships between CDS 
spread changes and changes in firm-specific liquidity factors and macroeconomic variables 
during our sample, the strong positive relationship between funding illiquidity changes and 
CDS spread changes observed post-June 2009 may also be attributed to the introduction of 
an upfront fee for trading CDSs as fixed coupons have been rolled out. This creates a trade-
off between the main benefit of standardization which aims to reduce systemic risk and a 
rise in upfront funding costs (Wang et al. 2017). As suggested by Wang et al. (2017), the 
introduction of the new fee may lead to a reduction in CDS market liquidity and individual 
CDS liquidity for entities which have a CDS spread further away from the fixed coupon at 
the time of the transaction, which would then lead to an increase in CDS spreads, as 
suggested by Tang and Yan (2008) and Bongaerts et al. (2011).  These effects highlight the 
importance of considering funding liquidity effects when evaluating CDS spreads and 
standardization policies (Wang et al. 2017).  
 Furthermore, our results evidenced a pronounced time-varying effect of explanatory 
variables on CDS spread changes, finding also documented by Alexander and Kaeck (2008) 
and Annaert et al. (2013). Particularly during market downturns such as the 2008-2009 
Global Financial Crisis, CDS spread changes display a higher sensitivity to CDS illiquidity 
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and risk-free interest rates and a lower sensitivity to market volatility and funding liquidity. 
Therefore, it is important for regulators to constantly assess the relative importance of firm 
specific credit risk and liquidity variables as well as macroeconomic variables to extract the 
correct market ‘signals’ and implement appropriate policies (Annaert et al, 2013). 
1.7 Conclusion 
This study explored the effect of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes while 
controlling for other previously documented firm-specific and macroeconomic determinants 
of CDS spreads. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study exploring the effect of 
changes in funding illiquidity on CDS spread changes. Using panel estimations, we find that 
changes in funding illiquidity have a significant positive effect on CDS spread changes. 
This is in line with the hypothesis that a tightening of funding liquidity determines CDS 
protection sellers to reduce the supply of contracts in the market as they incur inventory 
costs and worry about the costs of hedging their positions (Tang and Yan, 2008). Moreover, 
we find that the effect of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes is larger in 
magnitude and more highly significant in the post-CDS Small Bang (post-crisis) period. In 
line with Wang et al. (2017), we attribute this relationship to the introduction of an upfront 
fee that needs to be exchanged between the CDS protection buyer and CDS seller unless the 
CDS spread of the respective entity at the time of the transaction is exactly equal to one of 
the four fixed coupons (25bps, 100bps, 500bps and 1000bps) implemented through the CDS 
Small Bang. Moreover, we find that the magnitude of the effect of funding illiquidity 
changes on CDS spread changes is larger for high-CDS entities compared to low-CDS 
entities. We also document a strong time-varying behaviour of the impact of different firm-
specific credit risk and liquidity variables, as well as macroeconomic variables, on CDS 
spread changes. To this end, we find that CDS illiquidity changes and changes in the risk-
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free rate have a stronger effect during the Global Financial Crisis, while factors such as 
stock return, market volatility and funding liquidity have a stronger effect in the post-crisis 
period.  
By analysing our results, we can suggest two policy recommendations. Firstly, 
regulators need to consider the effect of funding illiquidity on CDS spreads when proposing 
new policy frameworks, our results suggesting that the introduction of the CDS Small Bang 
upfront fee creates a trade-off between standardization and funding costs (Wang et al, 2017). 
Secondly, the time-varying nature of the relationships between our explanatory variables 
and CDS spread changes suggests that the determinants of CDS spread changes need to be 
regularly investigated so that appropriate policies can be put in place according to what 
factors drive CDS spreads in different periods.  
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Figure 1.1: Notional amounts outstanding of single-name CDS 
Figure 1.1 illustrates notional amounts outstanding of single-name CDS over time in 
trillions of U.S. dollars. The solid line plots the total gross notional amount of single-name 
CDS. The dashed line plots the gross notional amount of investment-grade single-name 
CDS. The shaded area delimitates the crisis period / pre-CDS Small Bang (December 2007 
- June 2009). Semi-annual data, between December 2007 and June 2013, obtained from the 
Bank for International Settlements statistical warehouse. 
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Figure 1.2: Average CDS spreads and CDS spread changes 
Figure 1.2 plots average CDS spread levels (Panel A) and CDS spread changes (Panel B) 
over time in basis points. The solid line presents average CDS spread levels (Panel A) and 
average CDS spread changes (Panel B) for the entire sample of firms. The dotted lines 
present average CDS spread levels (Panel A) and average CDS spread changes (Panel B) 
for the top and bottom terciles of the respective distributions. The shaded area delimitates 
the crisis period / pre-CDS Small Bang period (January 2008 - June 2009). Monthly data, 
between January 2008 and March 2013, obtained from Bloomberg. 
Panel A: Average CDS spread levels 
 
Panel B: Average CDS spread changes 
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Table 1.1: Description of variables explaining CDS spread changes 
Table 1.1 presents the explanatory variables used in panel regressions analysing CDS spread changes, their data source and predicted sign of the relationship 
with CDS spread changes. EMMI is the European Money Market Institute. 
Explanatory Variable Description Predicted Sign Data Source 
Stock_return Monthly stock return - Thomson Datastream 
          
ΔVolatility Change in the historical standard deviation of stock returns + Thomson Datastream 
          
ΔEquity_BAS 
Change in the (scaled) difference between ask and bid equity 
prices, divided by the average of the two 
+ Thomson Datastream 
          
ΔCDS_BAS 
Change in the (absolute) difference between ask and bid CDS 
prices 
+ Bloomberg 
          
ΔEuTed 
Change in the difference between the 3-month Euribor rate and 
the 3-month German Government BuBill  
+ Bloomberg 
          
ΔEuRepo 
Change in the difference between the 3-month Euribor rate and 
the 3-month Eurepo rate 
+ Bloomberg / EMMI  
          
ΔRisk-free rate Change in the 10-year Euro-area Government Bond Yield +/- Bloomberg 
          
ΔSlope_yield 
Change in the difference between the 10-year and 3-year Euro-
area Government Bond Yield 
+/- Bloomberg 
          
ΔMkt_volatility 
Change in the implied volatility as measured by the Euro Stoxx 
50 volatility index 
+ Thomson Datastream 
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics of the dataset 
Table 1.2 presents the mean, the median, the maximum, the minimum and the standard deviation (Std. Dev.) 
of the variables in our dataset. Panel A presents summary statistics for the entire sample (January 2008 - March 
2013). Panel B presents summary statistics for the pre-CDS Small Bang period which also coincides with the 
crisis period (January 2008 - June 2009). Panel C presents summary statistics for the post-CDS Small Bang 
period which also coincides with post-crisis period (July 2009 - March 2013). The statistics are calculated 
using a sample consisting of 76 non-financial companies included in the European iTraxx index. CDS 
represents the mid CDS spread (in basis points). ΔCDS is the monthly change in the mid-CDS spread (in basis 
points). Stock_return is the monthly firm stock return (in percentages). ΔVolatility is the change in the monthly 
volatility of stock returns (in percentages). ΔEquity_BAS is the monthly change in the scaled equity bid-ask 
spread. ΔCDS_BAS is the monthly change in the CDS absolute bid-ask spread (in basis points x 102). ΔEuTed 
is the monthly change in the European TED spread measure (3-month Euribor rate - 3-month German 
Government BuBill rate). ΔEuRepo is the monthly change in the European repo spread (3-month Euribor rate 
minus 3-month Eurepo rate). ΔRisk-free is the monthly change in the risk free rate (10-year Euro area 
government bond yield). ΔSlope_yield is the monthly change in the slope of the yield curve (10-year Euro area 
government bond yield minus 3-year Euro area government bond yield). ΔMkt_volatility is the monthly change 
the implied volatility of the EuroStoxx 50 index. 
Panel A: Whole Sample (January 2008 – March 2013) 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
CDS 119.664 95.165 759.580 20.533 82.691 
ΔCDS 1.091 -0.185 472.219 -257.884 33.678 
Stock_return -0.407 0.173 53.375 -66.988 8.890 
ΔVolatility -0.007 -4.050 2007.110 -1863.790 96.780 
ΔEquity_BAS 0.068 -0.077 890.640 -890.980 36.450 
ΔCDS_BAS 0.004 -0.039 28.114 -20.276 3.411 
EuTed 0.727 0.583 2.824 0.057 0.552 
ΔEuTed -0.012 -0.027 2.151 -1.029 0.362 
EuRepo 0.540 0.414 1.822 0.185 0.355 
ΔEuRepo -0.007 -0.008 0.663 -0.534 0.176 
ΔRisk-free -0.048 -0.043 0.411 -0.642 0.238 
ΔSlope_yield 0.016 0.007 0.621 -0.506 0.188 
ΔMkt_volatility 0.045 -1.194 20.290 -11.560 6.094 
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Table 1.2 – Summary statistics of the dataset - continued 
 
Panel B: Pre-CDS Small Bang period / Crisis period (January 2008 – June 2009) 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
CDS 134.504 98.447 759.580 20.533 109.702 
ΔCDS 3.667 1.988 389.983 -257.884 49.718 
Stock_return -2.929 -2.303 53.375 -66.988 11.465 
ΔVolatility 4.170 -5.270 2007.110 -1863.790 151.120 
ΔEquity_BAS 0.302 0.087 584.870 -571.160 25.940 
ΔCDS_BAS 0.266 -0.001 28.114 -20.276 3.840 
EuTed 1.172 0.928 2.824 0.479 0.774 
ΔEuTed -0.027 -0.075 2.151 -1.029 0.636 
EuRepo 0.813 0.736 1.822 0.394 0.398 
ΔEuRepo -0.012 -0.054 0.663 -0.534 0.279 
ΔRisk-free -0.051 -0.117 0.411 -0.642 0.272 
ΔSlope_yield 0.077 0.080 0.621 -0.296 0.217 
ΔMkt_volatility 0.677 -1.369 20.290 -9.233 8.166 
 
 
Panel C: Post-CDS Small Bang / Post-crisis period (July 2009 – March 2013) 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
CDS 113.398 94.392 572.741 24.65 67.188 
ΔCDS 0.061 -0.548 472.219 -253.347 24.414 
Stock_return 0.603 0.775 34.979 -62.260 7.385 
ΔVolatility -1.680 -3.810 379.150 -278.430 63.030 
ΔEquity_BAS -0.026 -0.122 890.640 -890.980 39.890 
ΔCDS_BAS -0.101 -0.058 21.311 -19.647 3.218 
EuTed 0.550 0.499 1.377 0.057 0.291 
ΔEuTed -0.007 -0.017 0.559 -0.249 0.146 
EuRepo 0.431 0.345 1.216 0.185 0.271 
ΔEuRepo -0.005 -0.008 0.335 -0.248 0.110 
ΔRisk-free -0.047 -0.039 0.382 -0.553 0.223 
ΔSlope_yield -0.009 0.002 0.406 -0.506 0.170 
ΔMkt_volatility -0.208 -1.044 11.030 -11.560 5.011 
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Table 1.3 - Time-series pairwise correlations of variables explaining CDS spread changes 
Table 1.3 presents time-series pairwise correlations of the variables used in panel regressions explaining CDS spread changes. Panel A presents correlations 
for the entire sample (January 2008 - March 2013). Panel B presents correlations for the crisis period (January 2008- June 2009). Panel C presents correlations 
for the post-crisis period. The correlations are calculate using a sample of 76 non-financial companies included in the European iTraxx index. Stock_return 
is the monthly firm stock return. ΔVolatility is the change in the monthly volatility of stock returns. ΔEquity_BAS is the monthly change in the scaled equity 
bid-ask spread. ΔCDS_BAS is the monthly change in the CDS absolute bid-ask spread. ΔEuTed is the monthly change in the European TED spread measure 
(3-month Euribor rate - 3-month German Government BuBill rate). ΔEuRepo is the monthly change in the European repo spread (3-month Euribor rate - 3-
month Eurepo rate). ΔRisk-free  is the monthly change in the risk free rate (10-year Euro area government bond yield). ΔSlope_yield is the monthly change 
in the slope of the yield curve (10-year Euro area government bond yield - 3-year Euro area government bond yield). ΔMkt_volatility is the monthly change 
the implied volatility of the EuroStoxx 50 index. 
Panel A: Whole sample (January 2008 – March 2013) 
ΔVolatility -0.24               
ΔEquity_BAS -0.03 0.04             
ΔCDS_BAS -0.16 0.05 0.03           
ΔEuTed -0.09 0.17 0.01 0.10         
ΔEuRepo -0.20 0.37 0.02 0.16 0.65       
ΔRisk-free 0.23 -0.03 -0.01 -0.18 -0.10 -0.07     
ΔSlope_yield -0.07 0.24 -0.01 0.11 0.07 0.30 0.23   
ΔMkt_volatility -0.38 0.40 0.02 0.16 0.37 0.46 -0.34 0.18 
  Stock_return ΔVolatility ΔEquity_BAS ΔCDS_BAS ΔEuTed ΔEuRepo ΔRisk-free ΔSlope_yield 
 
 
50 
 
Table 1.3 - Time-series pairwise correlations of variables explaining CDS spread changes - continued 
Panel B: Crisis period / Pre-CDS Small Bang period (January 2008 – June 2009) 
ΔVolatility -0.21               
ΔEquity_BAS -0.01 0.05             
ΔCDS_BAS -0.18 0.07 0.08           
ΔEuTed -0.13 0.23 0.04 0.13         
ΔEuRepo -0.21 0.45 0.04 0.11 0.68       
ΔRisk-free 0.20 -0.01 -0.05 -0.38 -0.13 0.04     
ΔSlope_yield -0.16 0.34 -0.01 0.10 0.06 0.31 -0.02   
ΔMkt_volatility -0.39 0.51 0.03 0.16 0.45 0.52 -0.16 0.48 
  Stock_return ΔVolatility ΔEquity_BAS ΔCDS_BAS ΔEuTed ΔEuRepo ΔRisk-free ΔSlope_yield 
         
 
Panel C: Post-crisis period / Post-CDS Small Bang period (July 2009 – March 2013) 
ΔVolatility -0.28               
ΔEquity_BAS -0.04 0.05             
ΔCDS_BAS -0.13 0.05 0.02           
ΔEuTed -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.07         
ΔEuRepo -0.23 0.17 0.02 0.24 0.55       
ΔRisk-free 0.27 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.09 -0.23     
ΔSlope_yield 0.06 0.14 -0.01 0.11 0.15 0.37 0.39   
ΔMkt_volatility -0.37 0.26 0.02 0.16 0.27 0.39 -0.47 -0.11 
  Stock_return ΔVolatility ΔEquity_BAS ΔCDS_BAS ΔEuTed ΔEuRepo ΔRisk-free ΔSlope_yield 
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Table 1.4: Determinants of CDS spread changes 
Table 1.4 presents coefficient estimates of panel regressions explaining CDS spread changes.  Panel A presents 
results for all sample of firms. Panel B presents results for high CDS spread firms (top tercile of firms CDS 
spreads). Panel C presents results for low CDS spread firms (bottom tercile of firms CDS spreads). The 
dependent variable is the change in the CDS mid-price. Stock_return is the monthly firm stock return. 
ΔVolatility is the change in the monthly standard deviation of stock returns. ΔEquity_BAS is the monthly 
change in the scaled equity bid-ask spread. ΔCDS_BAS is the monthly change in the CDS absolute bid-ask 
spread. ΔEuTed is the monthly change in the European TED spread measure (3-month Euribor rate - 3-month 
German Government BuBill rate). ΔEuRepo is the monthly change in the European repo spread (3-month 
Euribor rate - 3-month Eurepo rate). ΔRisk-free  is the monthly change in the risk free rate (10-year Euro area 
Government bond yield). ΔSlope_yield is the monthly change in the slope of the yield curve (10-year minus 
3-year Euro area Government bond yields). ΔMkt_volatility is the monthly change the implied volatility of the 
EuroStoxx 50 index. Regressions estimated using firm-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm 
to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Sample period: January 2008 
- March 2013. 
Panel A: Determinants of CDS spread changes – Whole Sample of firms 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Constant 0.66*** 0.74*** 0.80*** -0.12 -0.08 
    (16.48) (15.92) (15.73) (-0.78) (-0.49) 
Stock_return -1.03*** -1.02*** -0.99*** -0.80*** -0.79*** 
    (-10.66) (-9.71) (-10.08) (-7.63) (-7.50) 
ΔVolatility 5.75*** 5.36*** 4.71*** 4.07*** 3.91*** 
    (7.93) (7.60) (7.02) (5.85) (5.66) 
ΔEquity_BAS 3.33** 3.31** 3.34** 3.39** 3.38** 
    (2.04) (2.07) (2.09) (2.21) (2.21) 
ΔCDS_BAS 4.02*** 3.97*** 3.91*** 3.70*** 3.68*** 
    (11.82) (11.49) (11.22) (10.30) (10.23) 
ΔEuTed   6.50***   2.75**   
      (4.84)   (2.18)   
ΔEuRepo     17.23***   8.81*** 
        (4.72)   (2.91) 
ΔRisk-free       -17.58*** -17.85*** 
          (-5.80) (-5.87) 
ΔSlope_yield       2.34 0.89 
          (1.07) (0.45) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.62*** 0.56*** 
          (5.10) (5.38) 
N 4788 4788 4788 4788 4788 
Adj. R2 32.16% 32.63% 32.84% 35.41% 35.47% 
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Table 1.4: Determinants of CDS spread changes – continued 
Panel B: Determinants of CDS spread changes – High CDS firms 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Constant 1.05*** 1.22*** 1.35*** -0.63** -0.53 
    (12.99) (11.35) (12.23) (-2.00) (-1.62) 
Stock_return -1.37*** -1.35*** -1.27*** -0.96*** -0.94*** 
    (-8.79) (-9.71) (-7.96) (-5.49) (5.17) 
ΔVolatility 8.50*** 7.88*** 6.91*** 5.76*** 5.46*** 
    (7.68) (7.67) (8.22) (7.26) (7.11) 
ΔEquity_BAS 3.41* 3.30* 3.44** 3.55** 3.59** 
    (1.89) (1.94) (1.97) (2.19) (2.20) 
ΔCDS_BAS 4.07*** 4.01*** 3.94*** 3.61*** 3.58*** 
    (9.33) (9.14) (8.83) (8.18) (8.01) 
ΔEuTed   12.58***   6.29**   
      (3.95)   (2.02)   
ΔEuRepo     32.78***   19.46*** 
        (3.88)   (2.78) 
ΔRisk-free       -36.17*** -36.89*** 
          (-5.58) (-5.71) 
ΔSlope_yield       12.26** 9.10* 
          (2.36) (1.88) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.98*** 0.87*** 
          (3.32) (3.41) 
N 1638 1638 1638 1638 1638 
Adj. R2 33.88% 34.67% 34.97% 38.97% 39.10% 
 
 
Panel C: Determinants of CDS spread changes – Low CDS firms 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS M1 M2 M3 M4     M5 
Constant 0.39*** 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.09 0.1 
    (45.66) (24.72) (19.83) (1.31) (1.56) 
Stock_return -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.53*** -0.40*** -0.40*** 
    (-11.43) (-11.08) (-10.87) (-7.21) (-7.06) 
ΔVolatility 2.25*** 1.89*** 1.39** 0.72 0.65 
    (3.32) (2.82) (2.14) (1.17) (1.05) 
ΔEquity_BAS -0.04 0.16 0.26 0.78 0.68 
    (-0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.74) (0.64) 
ΔCDS_BAS 3.44*** 3.34*** 3.31*** 3.05*** 3.05*** 
    (13.30) (13.26) (13.35) (11.38) (11.41) 
ΔEuTed   4.65***   2.12**   
      (4.34)   (2.22)   
ΔEuRepo     11.26***   4.25* 
        (3.94)   (1.73) 
ΔRisk-free       -6.28*** -6.35*** 
          (-5.23) (-5.26) 
ΔSlope_yield       1.16 0.43 
          (0.87) (0.35) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.50*** 0.48*** 
          (6.81) (7.54) 
N 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 
Adj. R2 33.08% 34.42% 34.69% 39.32% 39.24% 
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Table 1.5: Determinants of CDS spread changes – Crisis period / Pre-CDS Small Bang period 
Table 1.5 presents estimates of panel regressions explaining CDS spread changes during the Global Financial 
Crisis period (Pre-CDS Small Bang period).  Panel A presents results for all sample of firms. Panel B presents 
results for high CDS spread firms (top tercile of firms CDS spreads). Panel C presents results for low CDS 
spread firms (bottom tercile of firms CDS spreads). The dependent variable is the change in the CDS mid-
price. The dependent variable is the change in the CDS mid-price. Stock_return is the monthly firm stock 
return. ΔVolatility is the change in the monthly volatility of stock returns. ΔEquity_BAS is the monthly change 
in the scaled equity bid-ask spread. ΔCDS_BAS is the monthly change in the CDS absolute bid-ask spread. 
ΔEuTed is the monthly change in the European TED spread measure (3-month Euribor rate - 3-month German 
Government BuBill rate). ΔEuRepo is the monthly change in the European repo spread (3-month Euribor rate 
- 3-month Eurepo rate). ΔRisk-free  is the monthly change in the risk free rate (10-year Euro area government 
bond yield). ΔSlope_yield is the monthly change in the slope of the yield curve (10-year minus 3-year Euro 
area Government bond yields). ΔMkt_volatility is the monthly change the implied volatility of the EuroStoxx 
50 index. Regressions estimated using firm-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm to correct 
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Sample period: January 2008 - June 2009. 
Panel A: All firms 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Constant -0.68 -0.57 -0.51 -2.43*** -2.39 
    (-1.28) (-0.98) (-0.98) (-3.56) (-3.73) 
Stock_return -0.83*** -0.82*** -0.81*** -0.63*** -0.64*** 
    (-5.48) (-5.30) (-5.46) (-3.60) (-3.52) 
ΔVolatility 5.92*** 5.73*** 5.40*** 4.18*** 4.16*** 
    (6.78) (6.62) (6.78) (4.56) (4.65) 
ΔEquity_BAS 4.32 4.23 4.26 4.17 4.12 
    (1.29) (1.28) (1.26) (1.29) (1.27) 
ΔCDS_BAS 6.26*** 6.22*** 6.23*** 5.49*** 5.48*** 
    (8.81) (8.52) (8.71) (6.56) (6.57) 
ΔEuTed   2.22   -0.46   
      (1.29)   (-0.32)   
ΔEuRepo     6.81   2.58 
        (1.54)   (0.53) 
ΔRisk-free       -25.75*** -25.86*** 
          (-3.50) (-3.37) 
ΔSlope_yield       12.20** 12.82** 
          (2.52) (2.49) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.48** 0.40* 
          (2.38) (1.75) 
N 1368 1368 1368 1368 1368 
Adj. R2 32.92% 32.95% 32.99% 35.25% 35.26% 
Table 1.5: Determinants of CDS spread changes – Crisis period / Pre-CDS Small Bang period - continued 
Panel B: High CDS firms 
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Dep. Var: ΔCDS M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Constant -0.45 -0.20 0.15 -4.12*** -3.86*** 
    (-0.35) (-0.14) (0.12) (-2.90) (-2.94) 
Stock_return -1.21*** -1.19*** -1.13*** -0.93*** -0.94*** 
    (-3.96) (-3.80) (-3.87) (-2.84) (-2.77) 
ΔVolatility 8.84*** 8.51*** 7.68*** 6.45*** 6.30*** 
    (5.75) (5.55) (6.42) (4.90) (5.01) 
ΔEquity_BAS 4.09 3.78 3.88 5.01 4.96 
    (1.40) (1.29) (1.26) (1.61) (1.54) 
ΔCDS_BAS 6.44*** 6.38*** 6.38*** 5.06*** 4.99*** 
    (6.54) (6.29) (6.38) (3.92) (3.81) 
ΔEuTed   5.20   0.15   
      (1.25)   (0.05)   
ΔEuRepo     19.92*   17.37 
        (1.77)   (1.44) 
ΔRisk-free       -55.71*** -57.81*** 
          (-2.97) (-2.92) 
ΔSlope_yield       26.02** 27.51** 
          (2.12) (2.10) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.78 0.39 
          (1.54) (0.70) 
N 468 468 468 468 468 
Adj. R2 33.39% 33.43% 33.68% 37.30% 37.54% 
 
Panel C: Low CDS firms 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Constant -1.00*** -0.92*** -1.00*** -1.52*** -1.56*** 
    (-4.05) (-3.34) (-3.71) (-4.42) (-4.47) 
Stock_return -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.39*** -0.36*** 
    (-5.27) (-5.03) (-5.32) (-3.21) (-3.12) 
ΔVolatility 2.97*** 2.69*** 2.90*** 1.34 1.41 
    (3.90) (3.51) (3.49) (1.28) (1.36) 
ΔEquity_BAS 3.12** 3.00** 3.12** 2.96** 3.04** 
    (2.12) (2.00) (2.12) (2.00) (2.07) 
ΔCDS_BAS 5.44*** 5.36*** 5.44*** 4.73*** 4.75*** 
    (5.57) (5.45) (5.55) (4.55) (4.59) 
ΔEuTed   1.73*   0.54   
      (1.73)   (0.50)   
ΔEuRepo     0.08   -5.11 
        (0.02)   (-1.49) 
ΔRisk-free       -9.03*** -8.90*** 
          (-3.17) (-3.08) 
ΔSlope_yield       4.52** 3.48 
          (2.00) (1.43) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.32* 0.47*** 
          (1.92) (3.59) 
N 450 450 450 450 450 
Adj. R2 41.39% 41.57% 41.25% 43.69% 43.99% 
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Table 1.6: Determinants of CDS spread changes – Post-Crisis / Post-CDS Small Bang period 
Table 1.6 presents estimates of panel regressions explaining CDS spread changes after the Global Financial 
Crisis period (Post-CDS Small Bang period).  Panel A presents results for all sample of firms. Panel B presents 
results for high CDS spread firms (top tercile of firms CDS spreads). Panel C presents results for low CDS 
spread firms (bottom tercile of firms CDS spreads). The dependent variable is the change in the CDS mid-
price. The dependent variable is the change in the CDS mid-price. Stock_return is the monthly firm stock 
return. ΔVolatility is the change in the monthly volatility of stock returns. ΔEquity_BAS is the monthly change 
in the scaled equity bid-ask spread. ΔCDS_BAS is the monthly change in the CDS absolute bid-ask spread. 
ΔEuTed is the monthly change in the European TED spread measure (3-month Euribor rate - 3-month German 
Government BuBill rate). ΔEuRepo is the monthly change in the European repo spread (3-month Euribor rate 
- 3-month Eurepo rate). ΔRisk-free  is the monthly change in the risk free rate (10-year Euro area government 
bond yield). ΔSlope_yield is the monthly change in the slope of the yield curve (10-year minus 3-year Euro 
area Government bond yields). ΔMkt_volatility is the monthly change the implied volatility of the EuroStoxx 
50 index. Regressions estimated using firm-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm to correct 
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Sample period: July 2009 – March 2013. 
Panel A: All firms 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Constant 1.15*** 1.32*** 1.27*** 1.31*** 1.51*** 
    (10.80) (11.52) (12.36) (9.29) (11.23) 
Stock_return -1.21*** -1.19*** -1.10*** -0.97*** -0.90*** 
    (-9.57) (-9.54) (-8.39) (-7.19) (-6.53) 
ΔVolatility 4.98*** 5.14*** 4.08*** 4.20*** 3.61*** 
    (5.68) (5.93) (4.47) (4.28) (3.80) 
ΔEquity_BAS 2.87** 2.84** 2.85** 2.86** 2.77** 
    (2.01) (2.12) (2.18) (2.17) (2.23) 
ΔCDS_BAS 2.76*** 2.67*** 2.43*** 2.59*** 2.40*** 
    (8.38) (8.30) (6.67) (7.44) (6.43) 
ΔEuTed   28.14***   21.64***   
      (9.51)   (7.57)   
ΔEuRepo     44.49***   47.00*** 
        (7.84)   (9.26) 
ΔRisk-free       1.55 7.43*** 
          (0.99) (4.22) 
ΔSlope_yield       -10.32*** -21.22*** 
          (-4.77) (-9.59) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.98*** 0.93*** 
          (6.38) (6.99) 
N 3420 3420 3420 3420 3420 
Adj. R2 33.84% 36.73% 37.46% 40.43% 41.74% 
Table 1.6: Determinants of CDS spread changes – Post-Global Financial Crisis period - continued 
Panel B: High CDS firms 
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Dep. Var: ΔCDS M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Constant 1.57*** 1.84*** 1.75*** 1.93*** 2.26*** 
    (16.37) (15.46) (17.04) (7.73) (9.02) 
Stock_return -1.66*** -1.59*** -1.42*** -1.20*** -1.05*** 
    (-12.98) (-12.63) (-11.09) (-9.88) (-8.50) 
ΔVolatility 7.46*** 7.92*** 6.12*** 5.81*** 4.69*** 
    (5.29) (6.16) (4.79) (4.86) (4.12) 
ΔEquity_BAS 2.93* 2.80** 3.01** 2.70** 2.74** 
    (1.88) (2.04) (2.07) (2.22) (2.23) 
ΔCDS_BAS 2.65*** 2.53*** 2.24*** 2.40*** 2.15*** 
    (9.33) (10.23) (8.24) (9.41) (7.96) 
ΔEuTed   47.99***   36.09***   
      (8.43)   (6.24)   
ΔEuRepo     75.68***   77.61*** 
        (14.68)   (14.54) 
ΔRisk-free       3.35 12.83*** 
          (0.84) (3.16) 
ΔSlope_yield       -11.86** -29.28*** 
          (-2.41) (-5.78) 
ΔMkt_volatility       1.79*** 1.78*** 
          (9.43) (9.04) 
N 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 
Adj. R2 39.33% 43.62% 44.43% 48.79% 50.26% 
 
Panel C: Low-CDS firms 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Constant 0.61*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.59*** 0.70*** 
    (8.36) (9.09) (9.78) (6.29) (7.55) 
Stock_return -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.50*** -0.39*** -0.35*** 
    (-8.57) (-8.64) (-8.64) (-6.72) (-6.60) 
ΔVolatility 1.81*** 1.84*** 1.07** 1.21** 1.01** 
    (3.44) (3.32) (2.32) (2.03) (2.00) 
ΔEquity_BAS -0.81 -0.11 -0.70 0.69 0.22 
    (-1.03) (-0.18) (-1.27) (0.89) (0.34) 
ΔCDS_BAS 1.42*** 1.38*** 0.98*** 1.24*** 1.00*** 
    (5.88) (5.96) (5.07) (5.31) (5.10) 
ΔEuTed   10.97***   6.54***   
      (5.64)   (3.78)   
ΔEuRepo     26.81***   28.43*** 
        (10.29)   (9.64) 
ΔRisk-free       1.20 4.62*** 
          (1.26) (4.58) 
ΔSlope_yield       -5.16*** -12.93*** 
          (-3.76) (-7.75) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.61*** 0.51*** 
          (12.30) (10.26) 
N 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125 
Adj. R2 21.60% 24.76% 31.39% 34.71% 41.34% 
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Table 1.7: Determinants of CDS spread changes with crisis period interaction effects 
Table 1.7 presents the determinants of CDS spread changes using panel regressions with crisis 
interaction effects. Panel A presents results for the entire firm sample. Panel B presents results for 
the hIgh CDS firms (top tercile of CDS spread distribution). Panel C presents results for low CDS 
firms (bottom tercile of CDS spread distribution). The dependent variable is the change in the mid 
CDS spread quote. Stock_return is the monthly firm stock return. ΔVolatility is the change in the 
monthly volatility of stock returns. ΔEquity_BAS is the monthly change in the scaled equity bid-ask 
spread. ΔCDS_BAS is the monthly change in the CDS absolute bid-ask spread. ΔEuTed is the 
monthly change in the European TED spread measure (3-month Euribor rate - 3-month German 
Government BuBill rate). ΔEuRepo is the monthly change in the European repo spread (3-month 
Euribor rate - 3-month Eurepo rate). ΔRisk-free  is the monthly change in the risk free rate (10-year 
Euro area government bond yield). ΔSlope_yield is the monthly change in the slope of the yield 
curve (10-year Euro area government bond yield - 3-year Euro area government bond yield). 
ΔMkt_volatility is the monthly change the implied volatility of the EuroStoxx 50 index. Crisis is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 during the global financial crisis period (January 2008 - June 
2009) and 0 otherwise. Regressions estimated using firm-level fixed effects and standard errors 
clustered by firm to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. * represents significance at 10% level, ** represents significance at the 5% level, *** 
represents significance at the 1% level. Sample period: January 2008 – March 2013. 
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Table 1.7: Determinants of CDS spread changes with crisis interaction effects - continued 
Dep.Var: ΔCDS Panel A: All sample Panel B: High CDS Panel C: Low CDS 
Constant 1.31*** 1.51*** 1.50*** 1.79*** 0.78*** 0.91*** 
    (6.87) (8.18) (3.41) (4.03) (6.11) (6.85) 
Stock_return -0.97*** -0.90*** -1.09*** -0.95*** -0.43*** -0.38*** 
    (-7.24) (-6.59) (-6.15) (-5.41) (-7.66) (-7.56) 
ΔVolatility 4.22*** 3.63*** 6.48*** 5.56*** 1.10* 0.69 
    (4.30) (3.82) (6.17) (5.64) (1.88) (1.34) 
ΔEquity_BAS 2.85** 2.77** 2.73** 2.72** 0.95 0.19 
    (2.18) (2.23) (2.21) (2.23) (1.33) (0.41) 
ΔCDS_BAS 2.59*** 2.41*** 2.47*** 2.23*** 1.72*** 1.39*** 
    (7.49) (6.47) (9.71) (8.28) (6.11) (5.85) 
ΔEuTed 21.65***   34.64***   8.78***   
    (7.60)   (5.98)   (4.58)   
ΔEuRepo   46.96***   74.55***   32.11*** 
      (9.30)   (13.93)   (9.46) 
ΔRisk-free  1.55 7.43*** -0.25 8.96** 2.86** 6.64*** 
    (0.99) (4.23) (-0.06) (2.35) (2.58) (5.28) 
ΔSlope_yield -10.35*** -21.23*** -9.50** -26.64*** -5.06*** -13.26*** 
    (4.79) (-9.63) (-1.97) (-5.32) (-3.88) (-8.37) 
ΔMkt_volatility 0.97*** 0.93*** 1.73*** 1.71*** 0.64*** 0.55*** 
    (6.41) (7.02) (8.23) (7.93) (9.01) (7.71) 
Crisis -3.73*** -3.90*** -5.45*** -5.49*** -2.11*** -2.27*** 
    (-6.20) (-6.81) (-4.40) (-4.66) (-5.68) (-6.19) 
Stock_return*Crisis 0.34* 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.08 0.03 
    (1.65) (1.23) (0.70) (0.33) (0.76) (0.29) 
ΔVolatility*Crisis -0.03 0.55 -0.66 0.09 -0.84 -0.39 
    (-0.02) (0.44) (-0.37) (0.05) (-0.76) (-0.34) 
ΔEquity_BAS*Crisis 1.26 1.30 3.04 3.05 -5.49 -4.45 
    (0.35) (0.37) (0.74) (0.72) (-0.52) (-0.42) 
ΔCDS_BAS*Crisis 2.92*** 3.09*** 2.64** 2.84** 3.22*** 3.55*** 
    (3.54) (3.74) (2.33) (2.50) (3.89) (4.20) 
ΔEuTed*Crisis -22.11***   -32.95***   -8.83***   
    (-7.60)   (-5.40)   (-3.89)   
ΔEuRepo*Crisis   -44.40***   -59.37***   -34.14*** 
      (-7.00)   (-5.14)   (-6.92) 
ΔRisk-free *Crisis -27.19*** -33.17*** -53.13*** -64.43*** -14.63*** -18.25*** 
    (-3.72) (-4.29) (-2.84) (-3.28) (-4.04) (-4.80) 
ΔSlope_yield *Crisis 22.54*** 34.04*** 36.91*** 54.17*** 9.06*** 17.09*** 
    (4.01) (5.46) (2.65) (3.52) (3.51) (6.51) 
ΔMkt_volatility*Crisis -0.49** -0.53** -0.96* -1.20** -0.08* 0.06 
    (-2.07) (-2.10) (-1.87) (-2.17) (-0.50) (0.46) 
N 4788 4788 1638 1638 1575 1575 
Adj. R2 38.99% 39.49% 42.56% 43.21% 45.41% 47.73% 
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Chapter 2: Funding Liquidity and 
the Cross-Section of European 
Stock Returns 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Financial crises highlight the central role that liquidity plays for financial markets. One of 
the most striking features that researchers and practitioners have noted with regards to these 
turbulent periods is that liquidity can suddenly dry up.1 Even prior to the global financial 
turmoil of 2007-2009, which marked one of the most severe and costly liquidity crises, a 
considerable amount of research investigated the drivers of both market and individual 
stocks’ liquidity.2  One such research stream investigates the degree to which individual 
stocks’ liquidity co-moves, being driven by a common factor, phenomenon also known as 
commonality in liquidity.3 The liquidity commonality literature can be divided in two broad 
strands offering insights into what triggers stocks’ liquidity co-movement. These include 
demand-side explanations focusing on correlated trading behaviour of institutional investors 
(Koch et al. 2016) and level of institutional ownership (Kamara et al. 2008) as well as 
supply-side explanations centred around the provision of liquidity and funding liquidity (see 
                                                            
1 Examples of stock market liquidity dry-ups during financial crisis periods include Russia’s default in 1998 
which led to a large drop in global financial market liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, the LTCM crisis of 1998 (Hameed et al. 2010) and the 2007-2009 Global Financial 
Crisis, when subprime losses of levered financial institutions led to significant bank losses, a deterioration of 
banks’ balance sheets, panic asset sales, liquidity dry-ups and losses of more than 8 trillion dollars (see 
Brunnermeier, 2009; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Naes et al., 2011).  
2 For an overview of the determinants of liquidity see Amihud et al. (2005).  
3 Commonality in liquidity has been studied extensively since its discovery. Notable research documenting 
the presence of commonality in the U.S. market includes Chordia et al. (2000), Huberman and Halka (2001), 
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and, more recently, Koch et al. (2016). Winter (2012) finds positive evidence of 
commonality in liquidity in the context of the European market. Galariotis and Giouvris (2007) and Gregoriou 
et al. (2011) document the presence of commonality in the context of the U.K. market, while Karolyi et al. 
(2012) and Brockman et al. (2009) offer international evidence. 
 
 
61 
 
Comerton-Forde et al. 2010; Hameed et al. 2010; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; 
Coughenour and Saad, 2004). 
In this study, we focus on the liquidity provision of market makers, and more 
specifically on the predictions of the theoretical model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009) that links market liquidity and funding liquidity. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) 
theorize that, under certain conditions, markedly during periods when capital availability is 
scarce, a deterioration of funding liquidity, defined by Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) as 
the ease and costs of access to capital and ability to settle obligations with immediacy, 
negatively impacts investors’ willingness and ability to invest in high margin securities and 
in stocks that co-move with funding conditions as they add on more risk – a flight to quality 
effect4. These changes in investment patterns can lead to deleveraging, market liquidity dry-
ups, increased market volatility, and lower contemporaneous returns, effects which are more 
evident as traders operate closer to their funding constraint (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 
2009; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Gromb and Vayanos, 2010; Comerton-Forde et al. 2010; 
Adrian et al. 2014). Moreover, the theoretical model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) 
indicates that available speculator capital, which is tightly linked to funding conditions, 
leads to the presence of a funding risk premium, where securities that co-vary more strongly 
with funding conditions have a higher risk premium.  
These theoretical predictions have been empirically confirmed in the context of U.S. 
market in several studies. Fontaine, Garcia and Gungor (2016), FGG hereafter, the paper 
closest to ours in terms of empirical approach, empirically document the effects of 
worsening funding conditions on illiquidity, volatility and returns.  Firstly, they find that the 
illiquidity and volatility of illiquidity and volatility sorted portfolios worsen in periods of 
                                                            
4 The flight to quality hypothesis is also theoretically proposed by Vayanos (2004) and empirically 
documented by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). 
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high funding risk, providing evidence of commonality, and that illiquid and volatile 
portfolios see their illiquidity increase the most during bad funding conditions, thus 
evidencing flight to quality. A similar flight to quality phenomenon is reported by 
Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) whereby the liquidity of high volatility stocks displays more 
sensitivity to larger inventories and trading losses than that of low volatility stocks.  FGG 
further document an asymmetric response of illiquidity to funding illiquidity shocks, 
whereby the level and dispersion of portfolio illiquidity increases following a funding shock 
particularly when the level of funding illiquidity was already high. In line with these results, 
Boudt et al. (2017) find that a regime switch occurs near a TED spread level of 48 bps 
whereby financiers may destabilize market liquidity by increasing rates in periods 
characterized by low market liquidity, leading traders to sell off positions at low prices to 
be able to pay off the interest payments on their loans. Moreover, FGG evidence that the 
decrease in the returns of illiquid and volatile stocks when funding becomes constrained is 
stronger in periods of low market liquidity. Lastly, FGG and Adrian et al. (2014) present 
evidence of a funding liquidity risk premium in the cross-section of U.S. stock returns.  
Despite the empirical support found for the theoretical predictions of Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009) in the U.S. context, European evidence is rather scarce. Notably, using 
a data set of 135 main refinancing operation auctions in the Euro area, Drehmann and 
Nikolaou (2013) find that higher funding liquidity risk corresponds to periods of lower 
market liquidity, effect which is only present during financial turmoil. Moreover, Moinas et 
al. (2017) provide evidence that a relaxation of funding constraints improves bond market 
liquidity while also documenting a positive feedback effect where an improvement in the 
liquidity of Treasury bond markets leads to an improvement in funding liquidity. 
Furthermore, despite the high correlation between similarly constructed measures of 
funding liquidity such as the U.S. TED spread (i.e. the differential between the three-month 
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USD LIBOR and three-month Treasury Bill) and European TED spread (i.e. the differential 
between the three-month EURIBOR and three-month German Government BuBill) of 0.55 
during our sample period (January 2009 – December 2014), the European TED spread peaks 
much more during late 2011 and early 2012, reaching a spread more than three times wider 
during November 2011 (1.605% for the European TED spread compared to a value of just 
0.46% for the U.S. TED spread), indicating much tighter funding conditions during this 
period in the European market as opposed to the U.S. market, as presented in Figure 2.1. 
Therefore, the differences in the levels of funding liquidity between the U.S. and European 
markets and the slightly thin European-focused literature make the European market an 
interesting setting for testing the presence of commonality, flight to quality and funding risk 
premium following funding liquidity shocks.  
This paper tests the theoretical predictions (the presence of commonality, flight-to-
quality, asymmetry and funding risk premium) outlined in Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009) in the context of a highly liquid European market, the universe of stocks included in 
the European iTraxx index, consisting of the most liquid single-name credit default swaps 
(CDS) in the European market. Novel to this study is the sorting of portfolios of stocks 
according to their CDS spreads, besides sorting portfolios according to illiquidity and 
volatility as per FGG. Using these portfolios, we newly test whether the commonality, flight 
to quality and asymmetric effects of funding illiquidity shocks on illiquidity and 
contemporaneous returns extend to CDS spreads. The rationale for investigating the effect 
of funding liquidity changes on CDS spreads is that CDS spreads are used as a measure of 
default risk conveying information relating to the underlying entities’ illiquidity, volatility 
and credit risk. CDS spread measures have been documented to be highly sensitive to equity 
illiquidity (Das and Hanouna, 2009), CDS and CDS market illiquidity (Tang and Yan, 2008; 
Coro et al. 2013), equity volatility (Bystrom, 2008; Ericsson et al. 2009), credit risk factors 
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such as leverage (Ericsson et al. 2009; Coro et al. 2013) and credit ratings, more particularly 
downgrades (Daniels and Jensen, 2005; Hull et al. 2004). Therefore, if tightening of funding 
constraints has a positive effect on portfolio and market illiquidity and volatility as 
evidenced by FGG, due to the inherent sensitivity of CDS spreads to illiquidity and volatility 
variables, these effects should extend to CDS spreads. This is of interest to market 
participants and regulators as it would imply that CDS spreads also depend on the harshness 
of funding constraints, in addition to the perceived credit risk of the market and of 
underlying entities and individual stock, CDS or CDS market liquidity. Moreover, by 
focusing our funding liquidity analysis on the European market, we can make a comparison 
between the level of commonality, flight to quality and funding risk premium found in the 
European context to previous U.S. focused studies.  
Therefore, following the theoretical predictions of Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009) and extending these illiquidity, volatility and returns linkages to CDS spreads, we 
test the following hypotheses:  
i) Commonality: Funding conditions co-move with illiquidity, volatility and CDS 
spreads. 
ii) Flight to quality: During tight funding conditions, risky securities become 
especially illiquid.  
iii) Asymmetric effect of funding illiquidity on CDS spreads: The asymmetric 
relationship between changes in funding illiquidity and changes in illiquidity, 
which increases in magnitude and significance if funding conditions are already 
constrained, as documented by FGG, extends to CDS spread changes. 
iv) Asymmetric effect of funding illiquidity on returns: Returns are sensitive to 
positive changes in funding illiquidity (worsening of funding conditions), 
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whereas negative changes in funding illiquidity (loosening of funding 
conditions) do not affect returns.  
v) Funding risk premium: Funding shocks are priced and securities which strongly 
co-vary with funding conditions exhibit a higher risk premium.  
Our results empirically confirm, in a European setting, the theoretical predictions 
proposed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) outlined above. Specifically, we find 
compelling evidence of commonality in the level and dispersion of liquidity, volatility and 
CDS spreads across tight and relaxed funding conditions for portfolios sorted by illiquidity, 
volatility and CDS spread levels. Secondly, we provide evidence of flight-to-quality as 
portfolios comprising of entities with the highest illiquidity and volatility see their illiquidity 
increase the most. A similar, albeit weaker, result is also found for high default risk 
portfolios. Thirdly, we document an asymmetric relationship between changes in funding 
conditions and changes in CDS spreads, whereby the positive relationship is larger in 
magnitude and statistically significant if speculators operate close to their funding 
constraint. Fourthly, we find new evidence of an asymmetric relationship between funding 
shocks and returns. Tighter funding conditions significantly decrease contemporaneous 
returns, whereas looser funding conditions have no influence on returns. Lastly, we evidence 
the presence of a funding risk premium in the cross-section of illiquidity-sorted portfolios 
and some evidence, albeit weaker, of a funding liquidity premium in the cross-section of 
illiquidity, volatility and CDS spread sorted portfolios taken together. The prices of risk are 
negative and significant. The point estimates of the funding risk factors in the case of 
illiquidity-sorted portfolios range between -1.81 and -1.92, when funding liquidity risk 
factors are considered alone, and -2.42 when the Fama-French 3 factor model is augmented 
with the funding risk factor. This generates a return spread between the most and least 
illiquid portfolios of 1.21% annually. When considering portfolios sorted by illiquidity, 
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volatility and CDS spreads together, the point estimates of the prices of risk range between 
-0.75 and -0.76 when the funding risk factor is considered alone and -0.86 when added to 
the specification including the three Fama-French factors. These results are qualitatively 
similar to those found by FGG using illiquidity and volatility sorted portfolios in the context 
of the U.S. market, who evidence a point estimate of the price of funding risk as measured 
by the TED spread of -1.82, when considering the funding risk factor alone.5  
We contribute to the existing literature in several respects. Firstly, to the best of our 
knowledge, we provide a first empirical study of the effect of funding liquidity shocks on 
the illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads of European stocks. To this end, we note that we 
newly use in the context of studies investigating the cross-section of stock returns, data on 
firms included in the Markit European iTraxx index comprising of the most liquid single-
name CDS entities. Secondly, after newly sorting stocks into portfolios according to CDS 
spread levels, additionally to sorting by illiquidity and volatility levels, this study documents 
that commonality and flight to quality are also related to default risk, besides illiquidity and 
volatility.6 Thirdly, we document that the asymmetric positive relationship between changes 
in funding liquidity and illiquidity and volatility changes, respectively, empirically 
documented by FGG for the U.S. market, extends to CDS spreads. CDS contract sellers 
have to bear an added cost of hedging their portfolios in periods characterised by tight 
funding conditions which will be captured by an increase in CDS spread.  As CDS spreads 
are documented to be sensitive to changes in volatility and illiquidity (see Ericsson et al. 
2009; Das and Hanouna, 2009; Coro et al. 2013), and since the effect of funding shocks on 
                                                            
5  FGG use as their main funding liquidity proxy a measure based on the differential between on-the-run and 
off-the-run securities. The estimates of the price of risk using this funding measure are approximately a third 
higher than those found in our study.  
6 The theoretical predictions of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) have received empirical support from FGG 
using assets sorted with respect to illiquidity and volatility levels, illiquidity, volatility and funding illiquidity 
betas and double sorts. 
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illiquidity and volatility changes is larger when funding is scarce, as evidenced by FGG, we 
test and empirically show that funding illiquidity shocks impact CDS spreads positively, 
particularly when speculator capital is already tight. Fourthly, using the theoretical 
predictions and empirical findings outlined in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005) and Amihud (2002), we newly show that only tightening of funding 
conditions significantly decreases contemporaneous returns, whereas an improvement of 
funding conditions has no effect on returns. Therefore, we provide evidence of an 
asymmetric effect of funding shocks on market returns. Lastly, we find new evidence of a 
funding risk premium in the context of the European market, confirming previous findings 
from U.S. based studies such as FGG and Adrian et al. (2014).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the data, 
variables employed and portfolio formation procedure, section 2.3 presents the empirical 
methods used as well as the results obtained for the five hypotheses tested, section 2.4 
investigates the robustness of results, while section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Data and portfolio formation 
2.2.1 Data description 
Our sample consists of all non-financial companies included in the European iTraxx index 
on March 2013 (index roll 19) for which data referring to stock price, volume and CDS 
spread is available from Thomson Reuters Datastream for the entire time-series.7 The use 
of the iTraxx Europe CDS index data is novel in the literature investigating the cross-section 
                                                            
7 The Markit iTraxx Europe Index comprises of 125 investment grade rated entities with the most liquid CDSs 
in the European market. The constituent list includes 100 non-financial companies and 25 entities operating 
in the financial sector. De Haan and Vlahu (2016) and references therein highlight important differences in 
terms of regulation, funding methods, corporate governance, agency problems, capital structure and leverage 
levels between financial and non-financial companies. 
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of stock returns, but well-established in credit default swap research8. Our sample covers a 
period of 6 years, from January 2009 to December 2014. Data availability restrictions for 
the iTraxx non-financial entities yield a total sample of 80 companies.9 Daily stock price, 
turnover volume and CDS spread data for each entity as well as the 3-month Euribor rates 
are collected from Datastream. The 3-month Eurepo rates are collected from the European 
Money Market Institute (EMMI) website. The European TED spread funding illiquidity 
measure is collected from Bloomberg, while the U.S. TED spread is obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis economic data depository (FRED).  
 
2.2.2 Measuring funding illiquidity 
Recent studies investigating the effects of funding liquidity on financial markets measure 
funding liquidity through a wide variety of measures extracted from several markets and 
assets.10 Measures of funding liquidity previously employed in equity, Treasury bond, hedge 
fund and private equity markets include: the TED spread (Boudt et al. 2017; Boyson et al. 
2010; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011), the Euribor-OIS spread, 
the Euribor-Eurepo spread and the differential between the ECB main refinancing operation 
rate and the OIS rate (Moinas et al. 2017), the price differential between on-the-run and off-
the-run securities (Fontaine and Garcia, 2012), the broker-dealer leverage factor of Adrian 
et al. (2014), broker-dealer asset growth (Adrian and Shin, 2010), the 3-month Libor rate, 
                                                            
8 Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) investigate the determinants of CDS 
spreads via the European iTraxx CDS index, while Berndt and Obreja (2010) use the index to construct a new 
factor mimicking economic catastrophe risk 
9 The European Markit iTraxx index constituent list is reviewed with respect to liquidity and investment grade 
of entities every six months. To preserve the number of companies in our cross-section, we also include any 
entities which were listed as part of the Markit iTraxx index as of March 2013, but which have been moved 
to the Markit iTraxx Crossover Index encompassing the 75 most liquid sub-investment grade entities due to a 
rating downgrade event occurring during our sample period. It is worth noting that throughout the time frame 
of the study, the constituent list of the European iTraxx index changes are minor, with most of the companies 
that are delisted from the index being reincluded in one of the consequent index rolls.  
10 An outline of funding liquidity proxies used in literature is presented in Massa et al. (2016).  
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the term spread and the VIX volatility index (Ang et al. 2011), the aggregate amount of 
outstanding repos (Banti and Phylaktis, 2017), the cash collateral ratio of Massa et al. 
(2016), the betting against beta (BAB) factor of Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), and the 
changes in credit standards (Franzoni et al. 2012). 
Given our emphasis on the European market and to add robustness to our results we 
use two measures of funding illiquidity that are linked to the European interbank market. 
The central funding illiquidity measure employed in this study is the European TED spread 
(𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡) which measures the differential between secured and unsecured money market 
transactions and is calculated as the difference between the three-month Euribor rate and 
the rate on the German Government BuBill maturing in 3 months. This is the European 
equivalent of the U.S. TED spread measure which is widely used to measure interbank 
funding conditions (e.g. Boudt et al. 2017). Additionally, for robustness purposes, we also 
measure funding illiquidity through the 3-month spread between the Euribor rate and the 
European repo market reference rate or Eurepo (𝐸𝐸𝑡).
11 As Moinas et al. (2017) argue, the 
Euribor-Eurepo spread measures the level of funding conditions for secured European 
money market transactions.    
The ease with which traders can access funds and settle obligations with immediacy 
varied widely throughout our sample. We note that, for example, the European TED spread 
(𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡) fluctuated from lows of 0.17% in September 2014 to highs of 1.605% in 
November 2011. Figure 2.2 plots the three-month European TED spread alongside the 
three-month Euribor - Eurepo spread (𝐸𝐸𝑡). We evaluate the commonality, flight to quality 
                                                            
11 Moinas et al. (2017) measure funding conditions via the Euribor-Eurepo spread in a study on European 
Treasury bond market liquidity, while Fecht et al. (2014) employ the Euribor-Eurepo spread to measure 
counterparty credit risk.  
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and asymmetry results following shocks to the Euribor-Eurepo rate in the robustness section 
presented in Section 2.4. 
Adapting the procedure outlined in FGG using U.S. based funding liquidity 
measures to our European based funding liquidity measure, changes in funding illiquidity 
are obtained via the first difference of the two funding illiquidity risk variables: 
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 =  𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 −  𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡−1                                              (2.1) 
𝛥𝐸𝐸𝑡 =  𝐸𝐸𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡−1                                                                  (2.2) 
To isolate the unexpected component of changes in funding illiquidity and add 
robustness to our asset pricing results, we construct a third proxy for funding conditions, 
namely innovations in funding liquidity (𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣), by adapting the procedure outlined 
in Banti and Phylaktis (2015) for the computation of unexpected changes in FX market 
illiquidity to our main funding illiquidity risk measure. Therefore, we identify funding 
shocks as the residual from an AR (1) model of the changes in the European TED spread.                            
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 = 𝛾0  +  𝛾1𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡                                          (2.3) 
From equation (2.3), 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣 is the estimate of 𝜀𝑡. The funding illiquidity innovations 
measure also helps eliminate any potential serial correlation from the residuals. 12 
 
                                                            
12 We perform autocorrelation checks on the funding illiquidity measures examined and conclude that there 
is no evidence of serial correlation for any of the funding proxies. The p-values of 0.24 and 0.06 for the 𝑁𝑅2 
statistic of the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test for 𝛥𝐸𝐸𝑡 and 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 respectively, do not reject 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 5% significance level. To complement these results, we 
also perform a visual inspection of the residuals and examine the Ljung-Box Q statistics. We confirm the 
absence of serial correlation for the two measures, all Q-statistics having associated p-values larger than 0.1 
up to the 12th lag. 
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2.2.3. Measuring illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads 
We estimate illiquidity through the illiquidity ratio developed by Amihud (2002).13 The 
Amihud illiquidity measure is well-established in the market microstructure literature and 
in research investigating illiquidity impacts on the cross-section of stock returns (e.g. 
Amihud, 2002; Chordia et al. 2009). For an individual security i, the monthly Amihud 
illiquidity ratio ( 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡) is obtained by averaging throughout month t the daily ratio 
(multiplied by 106) of the absolute stock return (|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑑|) over the product of the number 
of shares traded (𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑡𝑑) and stock price (𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑑), as outlined in (2.4): 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖.𝑡 =  
1
𝐷𝑖𝑡
∑
|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑑|
 (𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑑) 𝑥 (𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑡𝑑)
𝐷𝑖𝑚
𝑑=1                                                   (2.4) 
We also derive a market illiquidity measure (𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑡
𝑚𝑘𝑡) which is computed as the 
median monthly Amihud illiquidity measure across the entire sample of stocks. Monthly 
stock volatility (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖.𝑡) is calculated as the standard deviation of stock returns over the 
current month (realized volatility). The monthly CDS spread values (𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖.𝑡) are given by 
the monthly average of the daily mid-spreads on the 5-year CDS contracts of each 
underlying entity.14  
 
2.2.4 Portfolio sorting procedure 
Using the monthly illiquidity, volatility and CDS spread variables described above, we 
follow the method outlined in FGG and construct portfolios by sorting stocks into deciles 
based on their previous year-end illiquidity, volatility and CDS spread values, respectively. 
                                                            
13 Goyenko et al. (2009) and Fong et al. (2017) perform horseraces between illiquidity variables and find that 
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure captures well the price impact of trades, placing tied first as the best 
monthly cost-per-dollar volume proxy. 
14 Ramchander et al. (2011) document that CDS contracts with five-year maturity represent the most liquid 
CDS contracts. 
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We track portfolio returns, illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads throughout the following 
year and rebalance portfolios at the end of each year. As in FGG, the monthly illiquidity 
ratio of portfolio p (𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑝,𝑡) is calculated as the median monthly Amihud illiquidity ratio 
( 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡) across all entities in portfolio p.
15 The monthly volatility of portfolio p (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑝,𝑡) is 
given by the equally-weighted average monthly standard deviation (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖.𝑡) of the stocks 
included in portfolio p. Similarly, the monthly CDS spread of portfolio p (𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑝,𝑡) is 
calculated as the equally-weighted average monthly CDS spread (𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖.𝑡) across all entities 
in portfolio p.  
2.3 Empirical strategy and results 
2.3.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics across the Amihud illiquidity-sorted, volatility-sorted 
and CDS spread-sorted portfolios in Panels (a), (b) and (c), respectively. We first examine 
the illiquidity-sorted portfolios and find that stocks in illiquid portfolios are on average 
more volatile and display higher CDS spreads. Moreover, sorting by illiquidity creates an 
annual return spread of approximately 7.8% between the five portfolios comprising the 
most illiquid stocks and the five portfolios including the most liquid entities. Furthermore, 
we find that there is a 3% annual return differential between the two extreme portfolios. 
Interestingly however, we find that the widest return differential is between the 8th and 3rd 
decile portfolios. The result of a positive return differential between illiquid and liquid 
stocks is in line with findings of Amihud (2002) and FGG and can be linked to the fact that 
                                                            
15 To compute the monthly portfolio illiquidity ratio (as well as the monthly market illiquidity), we use the 
median rather than the average of entities’ monthly stock illiquidity ratios due to the wide differences in the 
values of the illiquidity ratio for each company. This is in line with the procedure outlined in FGG.. 
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investors require a higher rate of return for taking on the additional risk of investing in 
illiquid securities.  
Secondly, analyzing volatility-sorted portfolios, we find that the portfolios 
containing the most volatile stocks exhibit higher illiquidity and have higher average CDS 
spreads. We also find evidence of a return spread between the five most volatile and five 
least volatile portfolios of 5.5% annually. Additionally, we document a large return spread 
of 12.6% annually between the most volatile and least volatile portfolios. The results 
concerning the positive relation between volatility and returns contradict the findings of 
Ang et al. (2006) who note that high volatility portfolios earn low average returns, but 
confirm the finding of a positive return differential documented by FGG. As our 
methodology and portfolio sorting procedure is akin to FGG, our study differs in several 
respects to Ang et al. (2006). Firstly, we annually form equally-weighted portfolios, rather 
than monthly value-weighted portfolios. Secondly, we consider portfolios of stocks sorted 
by realized volatility rather than ΔVIX loadings. Lastly, we use European data compared 
to U.S. data and analyze a different and shorter sample period (2009-2015 compared to 
1986-2000) which includes some of the most turbulent part of the recent financial crisis, 
marked by severe illiquidity and high volatility. Thus, we find it reasonable that investors 
require compensation for holding the most volatile stocks. 
Thirdly, investigating the year-end CDS spread-sorted portfolios, we find that 
stocks in high CDS spread portfolios exhibit greater illiquidity and volatility while also 
earning higher returns. The magnitude of the return differential between the five portfolios 
with the highest and those with the lowest average CDS spread is 3.29% annually, while 
the return spread between the top and bottom CDS spread portfolios is 6.45% annually. As 
with the illiquidity-sorted results, the highest return differential does not occur between the 
two extreme portfolios, but between the 10th and 7th deciles. However, a general pattern of 
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increasing return from the portfolios with the smallest CDS spreads to those with the largest 
CDS spreads can be distinguished. Therefore, investors require a higher return to 
compensate for the added risk of investing in a stock with a higher default risk as measured 
by the CDS spread. This is in line with the positive relationship in levels between the 
natural logarithm of CDS spreads and required returns documented by Da Fonseca and 
Gottschalk (2015) for the Asia-Pacific markets between September 2007 and December 
2010. The positive CDS-return relation is not straightforward at first. However, as 
Ramchander et al. (2011) document, the positive CDS-return relationship can be explained 
under turbulent credit market conditions, consistent with the view that equity holders do 
not consider widening of CDS spreads as “value deteriorating”. Instead, equity markets 
anticipate such “debt deteriorating” events and react positively to them (Ramchander et 
al., 2011). Since our data sample includes the most recent financial turmoil and because 
recovery from the crisis was slow, our result confirms recent empirical works investigating 
the CDS-return relationship during and after the crisis period.  
Comparing our summary statistics results to those in FGG, we observe similar 
illiquidity, volatility and return patterns across portfolios. Using either one of the three 
sorting criteria, results suggest that illiquidity, volatility and returns generally increase, 
albeit with some variability, from the portfolio with the smallest value of the sorting criteria 
to the one with the highest value. We also note that the illiquidity and return of portfolios 
in our study are economically smaller, compared to those presented in FGG, which is 
expected since the entities in our dataset are highly graded while also having the most 
liquidly traded CDSs. Moreover, we document a positive CDS spread differential between 
the more illiquid (volatile) portfolios and those with lower illiquidity (volatility), result 
which confirms the findings of Das and Hanouna (2008), using U.S. data, that equity 
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illiquidity is positively related to CDS spreads and those of Ericsson et al. (2009) that stock 
volatility is positively linked to CDS spreads. 
2.3.2 Commonality and flight to quality 
We test for commonality in the level and dispersion of illiquidity, volatility and CDS spread 
portfolio values during good and bad funding regimes. We expect that all portfolios sorted 
per the three criteria will evidence higher illiquidity, increased volatility and wider CDS 
spreads during times of funding liquidity tightness due to the risk aversion of 
intermediaries particularly when funding is scarce and their tendency to shift their 
allocations to safer assets in periods when funding is constrained.  To investigate the 
presence of commonality, we follow the procedure outlined in FGG and divide our sample 
into three subsamples according to the yearly average level of the lagged funding liquidity 
measure, and track the illiquidity, volatility and CDS spread of each sorted portfolio 
throughout the year. We then focus on the subsamples exhibiting the tightest and loosest 
funding illiquidity. 
Table 2.2 presents the average illiquidity, volatility and CDS spread of each 
portfolio throughout the tight (panel (a)) and loose (panel (b)) funding illiquidity 
subsamples as well as differences between these two subsamples (panel (c)). Eyeballing 
the results presented in panels (a) and (b), we find that during the tight funding regime, 
portfolio illiquidity, volatility and CDS spread are larger in size compared to the loose 
funding liquidity period. Examining the differences between these two subsamples 
presented in panel (c), we note that all but four differences in the three variables are 
positive, indicating larger portfolio illiquidity, volatility and CDS spread in a tight funding 
environment. All but four of the 86 positive differences are statistically significant at the 
10% level and all but six are significant at the 5% level. Only two of the four negative 
differences are statistically significant.  
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Additionally, we note an asymmetric effect of funding conditions on illiquidity and 
volatility, with the most illiquid portfolios seeing their illiquidity increase the most and the 
most volatile portfolios seeing their volatility increase the most when funding is tight. We 
do not find the same dispersion in commonality result for CDS spreads. Overall, these 
results provide compelling evidence of commonality confirming that an exogenous 
negative shock to speculator capital will induce an increase in market illiquidity, market 
volatility and market CDS spreads. Moreover, the illiquidity and volatility dispersion result 
empirically confirms the theoretical prediction outlined in Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009) stating that tightening of speculator capital increases market illiquidity, through an 
effect which is stronger for illiquid securities.  
Furthermore, by exploring the relationship between illiquidity and volatility, we 
observe a ‘flight-to-quality’ effect predicted, among others, by Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009), high volatility and high CDS spread portfolios seeing their illiquidity increase 
during tight funding conditions. In the case of illiquidity and volatility-sorted portfolios, 
the largest illiquidity differential is captured by the 10th decile portfolio (59.79 and 5.02, 
respectively), whereas in the case of CDS spread portfolios, the largest illiquidity 
differentials are recorded by the 8th and 7th decile portfolios (3.69 and 2.33 respectively) 
Therefore, flight-to-quality evidence is stronger for the more illiquid and volatile stocks. 
Notably, the difference between the illiquidity of the most volatile portfolio (5.02) during 
bad and good funding conditions is almost two and a half times the average illiquidity of 
the highest volatility portfolio for the whole sample (2.08), reported in Table 2.1. 
Considering CDS spreads as proxy for default risk, we also find evidence of flight-to-
liquidity as the illiquidity of volatile and high CDS spread portfolios increases as 
speculators’ funding becomes constrained.  
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 Overall, we find strong support for the commonality in the level and dispersion of 
illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads, as well as some evidence backing the flight-to-
quality effect theoretically proposed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for our sample 
of highly liquid European stocks. This confirms the findings of commonality and flight to 
quality previously documented by FGG for a large sample of U.S. stocks.  Interestingly, 
when comparing our liquidity and volatility differentials between the two subsamples to 
the U.S. market based results of FGG, we note that the illiquidity differentials are lower in 
our case, which is to be expected as our sample contains highly liquid European entities. 
However, the volatility differentials are slightly larger in our study, possibly due to the 
much smaller sample period studied in our case (January 2009 to December 2014) 
compared to the FGG study (January 1986 – December 2015) and because a considerable 
part of our sample includes the recent Global Financial Crisis period which marked a period 
of increased stock volatility.  
 
2.3.3 Asymmetric relationships 
2.3.3.1 The response of CDS spreads to changes in funding illiquidity, when funding is 
constrained 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) postulate that a downward shift in speculators’ capital 
increases market illiquidity as speculators reduce their positions. Their study also argues 
that this effect is nonlinear, being more pronounced if capital is already scarce and for 
securities with high margin. FGG empirically test this prediction and document a positive 
impact of funding shocks on illiquidity and volatility changes, respectively. 
We extend these empirical findings by testing whether funding illiquidity changes 
are correlated with changes in default risk as captured by the CDS spread. Considering that 
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CDS spread levels and changes are positively related to equity volatility (Ericsson et al. 
2009) and that equity illiquidity is a determinant factor of CDS spreads (Das and Hanouna, 
2009), we expect funding shocks to be positively related to shifts in CDS spreads, as they 
exacerbate the illiquidity and volatility of entities and thus add to the overall default risk 
of the entity.16 Moreover, corresponding to the nonlinearity predictions of Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009), we expect this relationship to be stronger for the more illiquid, 
volatile and high CDS portfolios when capital availability is already tight.  
To test our hypothesis, we employ a similar methodology to that outlined in FGG 
and estimate regressions of funding illiquidity changes on portfolio CDS spread changes 
using the following model:  
           ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛼0,𝑝 + 𝛼1,𝑝∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼2,𝑝∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡𝟏𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑝,𝑡             (2.5) 
In equation (2.5), ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑝,𝑡 is the change in the CDS spread of portfolio p in month 
t, ∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 represents the change in funding illiquidity in month t and 𝟏𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 is an 
indicator function equal to ‘1’ when the lagged funding illiquidity is in the top one-third of 
its sample distribution indicating a period of capital scarcity. If funding shifts positively 
influence CDS spread changes, we expect both estimates of 𝛼1,𝑝 and 𝛼2,𝑝 to be positive. 
Moreover, if the relationship is stronger when speculators operate closer to their funding 
constraint, following FGG, we expect estimates of 𝛼2,𝑝 to be larger in magnitude and 
significant since 𝛼2,𝑝 measures sensitivity to funding liquidity changes when capital is 
scarce. 
Table 2.3 presents the estimation results of the model outlined in equation (2.5). 
Firstly, except for one insignificant estimate of 𝛼2,𝑝 for the least illiquid portfolio, all 
                                                            
16 It is important to note that Coro et al. (2013) document that liquidity risk factors are more important than 
credit risk factors in explaining CDS price changes, irrespective of market conditions. However, the influence 
of credit (default) risk factors increases after the financial crisis, the period investigated in our sample. 
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estimates of 𝛼1,𝑝 and 𝛼2,𝑝 are positive. Secondly, as expected, estimates of 𝛼2,𝑝 are larger 
and more statistically significant, particularly for the more illiquid, volatile and large CDS 
spread portfolios (with one notable exception for the highest CDS spread portfolio) as these 
are the most sensitive to funding shocks when capital is already tight. Estimates of 𝛼1,𝑝 are 
mostly insignificant indicating the smaller effect of funding shocks on spreads during 
‘ordinary’ funding regimes when speculators are not funding constrained. What is 
surprising is the large explanatory power of our model, funding shocks predicting up to 
45.16% of the CDS spread changes. This is in contrast with the weak explanatory power 
of up to 6.09% of the similarly constructed model regressing funding shocks on illiquidity 
changes found by FGG using U.S. stock market data. Therefore, we provide evidence of a 
nonlinear, positive impact of changes in funding illiquidity on CDS spread changes.  
. 
2.3.3.2 The return response to positive and negative changes in funding illiquidity 
We investigate separately the impact on contemporaneous returns of positive and negative 
changes in funding illiquidity. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) hypothesize that positive 
funding illiquidity shocks (tightening of funding liquidity) increase market illiquidity, 
which due to its persistence, predicts high future illiquidity causing the required return 
demanded by investors to increase, which in turn lowers contemporaneous prices as per 
the models of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Amihud (2002). Negative funding 
illiquidity shocks (relaxation of funding constraints) are expected to have a weaker effect, 
since they decrease market illiquidity and increase the available investor capital.   
Therefore, we expect a tightening of funding liquidity to decrease significantly 
contemporaneous returns, while an improvement in funding conditions should have a 
weaker effect on returns as market participants become less funding constrained. 
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We proceed by constructing two dummy variables: 𝛿+, taking the value of 1 when 
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 is positive and 0 otherwise, and 𝛿
−, taking the value of 1 when 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 is 
negative and 0 otherwise. We then compute the positive (𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
+ ) and negative 
(𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
− ) changes in funding illiquidity by interacting the two dummy variables, in turn, 
with the changes in funding illiquidity, as shown in equations (2.6) and (2.7): 
               𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
+ =  𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 ∗  𝛿
+                                                               (2.6) 
               𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
− =  𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 ∗  𝛿
−                                                               (2.7) 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate separately the following two regression models, 
depicted in (2.8) and (2.9) on portfolios sorted by illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads: 
      𝑟𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑+∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
+ + 𝛽𝑝
𝑚𝑘𝑡_𝑙𝑖𝑞𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑚𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡                       (2.8) 
       𝑟𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑−∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
− + 𝛽𝑝
𝑚𝑘𝑡_𝑙𝑖𝑞𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑚𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡                       (2.9)     
We expect estimates of 𝛽𝑝
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑+to be negative and significant as it measures return 
sensitivity to funding shocks under worsening funding conditions. Similarly, we expect 
estimates of 𝛽𝑝
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑− to be insignificant as they measure return sensitivity under 
improving funding conditions.  We add to our models the overall market illiquidity level 
to isolate the effect of funding shocks and control for the overall level of liquidity. 
Table 2.4 presents the results. Across the three portfolio sorts, all but one estimate 
of 𝛽𝑝
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑+are negative. All except four coefficient estimates are also statistically 
significant. Moreover, estimates of 𝛽𝑝
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑− are small and statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, we provide evidence of an asymmetric relationship between funding shocks and 
contemporaneous returns, a tightening of funding liquidity having a negative and 
statistically significant effect on contemporaneous returns, whereas the impact of an 
improvement in funding conditions on returns is largely insignificant.  
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2.3.4 Asset pricing tests 
We employ a two-stage Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure to test whether funding shocks 
are priced in the cross-section of illiquidity-sorted portfolios and to verify the existence of 
a funding risk premium. In the first step, a contemporaneous time series model is estimated, 
where each portfolio return is regressed against the risk factors’ time series. In the second 
stage, we regress the cross-section of monthly portfolio returns against the monthly factor 
exposures from the first stage at each time point, yielding a time-series risk premium for 
each factor. We then average these coefficients over time to obtain the factor premia. We 
present two sets of asset pricing results, one for the 10 illiquidity-sorted portfolios, 
presented in Table 2.5 and, following FGG, one for the 30 illiquidity, volatility and CDS 
spread sorts combined, presented in Table 2.A4. The latter results are discussed in the 
robustness section (Section 2.4). As in FGG, on both occasions, we perform eight 
estimations incorporating the following risk factors: the market risk premium (MKT_RF) 
by itself, the Fama-French (1993) three factors (the market risk premium (MKT_RF), the 
size premium (SMB) and book-to-market (HML)), the funding illiquidity risk (ΔEuTed) 
and the innovations in funding illiquidity factor (𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣) by themselves, and the 
market risk premium and Fama-French three factors augmented by the two funding 
illiquidity proxies. We report results using Fama-Macbeth (1973) standard errors as well 
as standard errors that correct for the errors-in-variables problem following the Shanken 
(1992) approximation, since the funding illiquidity risk betas are estimated.  
Investigating the results for the illiquidity-sorted portfolios, presented in Table 2.5, 
we find that the CAPM and FF3 models have very weak power in explaining the cross-
sectional variation of expected returns, with R2 values of 9.67% and 10.10%, respectively 
and negative adjusted R2 values. Moreover, the prices of risk for the market risk premium 
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(MKT-RF), size premium (SMB) and value risk premium (HML) are insignificant. The two 
funding illiquidity factors are both significant and explain around 42% of the cross-
sectional variation alone. The point estimates for the prices of risk corresponding to 
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣 and 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑 are -1.81 and -1.92, respectively. Moreover, the estimated 
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣 betas range between -1.04 and -1.60, while the 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑 betas range between 
-1.03 and -1.66, implying an annual return spread between the most and least illiquid 
portfolios of 1.02% when considering funding shocks measured by 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣 and 
1.21% when measuring funding shocks via 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑. Comparing our results to those found 
by FGG using an alternative funding risk measure based on differentials between on-the-
run and off-the-run securities, in the context of the U.S. market, we note that: the 
explanatory power of the model incorporating the funding risk factor alone is higher in our 
study (42.4% compared to 24.3%) and the point estimates of the price of risk are a third 
smaller in our case (-1.81 and -1.92 compared to -3.38). However, when funding liquidity 
is measured via the U.S. TED spread in FGG, our results are almost identical to those found 
by FGG, who document a point estimate for the price of funding liquidity of -1.82.  
The estimated intercept is insignificant both when considering the CAPM and Fama 
and French (1993) factors as well as when we use the funding risk factors by themselves. 
When using the funding risk factors, the estimated intercept is reduced to a third compared 
to the CAPM and Fama-French model. When we augment the CAPM and Fama French 3-
factor model with the funding illiquidity risk proxies, the estimated intercepts increase 
considerably, but remain insignificant, when using t-statistics based on Shanken (1992) 
standard errors. Augmenting the CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor models with the 
funding liquidity risk factor results in a large explanatory power, with adjusted R2 values 
ranging between 51.2% and 66.6%. The prices of risk of the funding illiquidity factors 
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increase slightly in magnitude to point estimates ranging between -2.06 and -2.42 annually 
and remain statistically significant. 
To examine pricing errors, we present the mean absolute pricing errors (MAPE) 
associated with the two asset pricing tests. When investigating the ten illiquidity sorted 
portfolios, we note that the MAPE values decrease by at least one third when considering 
the funding illiquidity factor by itself, while when augmenting the CAPM and FF3 
specifications with the funding illiquidity factor, we note a small increase in MAPE, 
compared to the CAPM and FF3 factors specifications.   
2.4 Robustness checks 
We provide robustness to our commonality, flight to quality and asymmetry results by 
investigating an alternative European funding liquidity measure, the Euribor - Eurepo 
spread (EE). Firstly, we find qualitatively similar commonality results, presented in Table 
2.A1, to those using the European TED spread measure as our funding liquidity proxy, 
when evaluating funding liquidity by the yearly average lagged Euribor - Eurepo spread to 
create the high and low funding illiquidity subsamples. All but five differences are positive, 
indicating that the illiquidity, volatility and average CDS spread of portfolios increases 
during tight funding conditions. However, we do not find robust evidence for a flight-to-
quality phenomenon. Secondly, in Table 2.A2, we present results for the asymmetric effect 
of changes funding illiquidity, measured using the change in the Euribor-Eurepo spread 
(ΔEEt), on CDS spread changes when funding conditions are already constrained, as 
outlined in Section 3.3.1. We note that coefficient estimates of 𝛼1,𝑝 and 𝛼2,𝑝 are positive, 
except for a small insignificant estimate for the portfolio with the lowest CDS spread. The 
estimate of 𝛼2,𝑝 is significant in most of the regressions on illiquidity and CDS spread 
portfolios. However, counterintuitively, these are insignificant except for one portfolio 
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when analyzing volatility-sorted portfolios. Thirdly, we investigate the effect on returns of 
positive and negative funding shocks following the same procedure outlined in Section 
2.3.3.2. Results are presented in Table 2.A3. All positive funding illiquidity changes are 
negative and highly significant, indicating a strong relationship with contemporaneous 
returns. Three of the negative funding illiquidity changes are also marginally significant 
and negative. The coefficients measuring the sensitivity of returns to market illiquidity are 
insignificant.  
Moreover, when evaluating the presence of a funding risk premium, besides the 
results for the ten illiquidity sorted portfolios, we present results for the 30 illiquidity, 
volatility and CDS spread sorted portfolios together in Table 2.A4. Inspecting these results, 
we note that the CAPM by itself has improved the explanatory power to over 20% 
compared to the illiquidity-sorted portfolios results. The estimated intercepts for all models 
are insignificant. The prices of risk for the funding illiquidity factors have decreased to -
0.75 and -0.76 when considering the funding risk factors alone and between -0.59 and -
0.86 when added to the CAPM and Fama-French models. The estimates for the prices of 
risk of funding risk factors are significant at the 10% level when considered alone and at 
the 5% significance level when added to the Fama-French 3-factor model. MAPE is again 
lowest when analysing the funding illiquidity factor alone. However, the differentials 
compared to the other specifications are lower. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper tests and confirms the theoretical predictions outlined by Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) in the context of a highly liquid European market, the non-financial stocks 
included in the European iTraxx index. Differently from previous studies, we newly sort 
stocks according to their CDS spread level, alongside the previously documented volatility 
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and illiquidity sorts. Moreover, we extend the previous U.S. findings to the European 
market and to CDS spreads. Specifically, we find compelling evidence of commonality in 
the level and dispersion of liquidity, volatility and CDS spreads across tight and relaxed 
funding conditions for portfolios sorted by illiquidity, volatility and CDS spread. Secondly, 
we provide evidence of flight-to-quality as portfolios comprising of entities with the 
highest illiquidity, volatility and default risk as measured by the CDS spread see their 
illiquidity increase the most. Thirdly, we document a significant asymmetric relationship 
between changes in funding illiquidity and changes in CDS spreads, whereby the 
relationship is larger in magnitude and statistically significant if speculators operate close 
to their funding constraint. Fourthly, we evidence an asymmetric relationship between 
funding shocks and returns. Positive changes in funding illiquidity significantly decrease 
contemporaneous returns, whereas negative funding illiquidity shocks have no influence 
on returns. Finally, we document the presence of a funding risk premium in the cross-
section of illiquidity-sorted portfolios which creates a return spread between the most and 
least illiquid portfolios of 1.21% annually. 
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Figure 2.1: The U.S. TED Spread and European TED Spread (EuTed) 
Figure 2.1 presents the time-series variability of the U.S TED spread (black line) and the European TED spread (EuTed) (grey line). 
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Figure 2.2: The European TED spread (EuTed) and the Euribor-Eurepo Spread (EE) 
Figure 2.2 presents the time-series variability of the European TED spread (EuTed) (grey line) and the Euribor-Eurepo Spread (EE) (black line). 
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Table 2.1 – Summary Statistics – Illiquidity, Volatility and CDS Spread Portfolios 
Time-series average sample statistics of decile portfolios of equities. Panels (a), (b) and (c) present results using illiquidity-sorted, volatility-sorted and CDS 
spread sorted portfolios, respectively. The illiquidity proxy used is Amihud illiquidity measure, calculated as median of all stocks in a portfolio (x100). The 
volatility, CDS spread and return measures are calculated as equal-weighted averages across all stocks in a portfolio (annualized % or natural logarithm). 
The last column in each of the panels presents the differences between the extreme portfolios, while the second to last column presents differences between 
the average statistics across portfolios 6 to 10 and portfolios 1 to 5, respectively.  Results obtained using monthly data between January 2009 - December 
2014. 
Panel (a): Illiquidity-sorted portfolios 
  Least 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Most  P6-10 - P1-5  P10 – P1  
Illiquidity 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.21 0.30 0.36 0.44 0.65 8.12 87.91 19.33 87.86 
Volatility  21.32 23.20 24.26 26.09 27.78 27.94 28.34 27.55 26.70 28.82 3.34 7.50 
CDS spread 4.30 4.35 4.50 4.60 4.66 4.62 4.67 4.62 4.48 4.50 0.10 0.20 
Return  2.90 2.28 2.23 8.10 10.52 9.42 18.65 20.52 10.70 5.88 7.83 2.98 
Panel (b): Volatility-sorted portfolios 
  Least 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Most  P6-10 - P1-5  P10 – P1  
Illiquidity 0.20 1.34 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.89 0.35 0.35 0.79 2.08 0.39 1.88 
Volatility  21.34 22.66 23.43 23.53 24.84 26.18 26.91 27.30 31.07 34.73 6.08 13.39 
CDS spread 4.30 4.41 4.41 4.37 4.44 4.59 4.59 4.60 4.73 4.86 0.29 0.56 
Return  0.46 6.43 7.42 13.19 3.97 10.02 10.17 11.59 14.10 13.06 5.49 12.60 
Panel (c): CDS spread-sorted portfolios 
  Least 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Most  P6-10 - P1-5 P10 – P1   
Illiquidity 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.26 1.62 0.30 1.31 1.58 0.34 0.34 0.24 0.11 
Volatility  21.09 21.24 23.39 24.36 25.63 25.98 28.00 30.26 30.61 31.43 6.11 10.34 
CDS spread 3.82 4.07 4.22 4.34 4.50 4.59 4.66 4.85 4.99 5.26 0.68 1.44 
Return  9.49 6.50 3.50 9.40 8.20 11.87 -0.10 10.14 15.67 15.94 3.29 6.45 
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Table 2.2 – Portfolio Illiquidity, Volatility and CDS Spread Conditional on the Level of 
Funding Illiquidity 
 
Average illiquidity (x100), volatility (annualized %) and CDS spread (natural logarithm) of 
illiquidity-sorted, volatility-sorted and CDS spread-sorted portfolios in subsamples conditional on 
the yearly average of the lagged funding illiquidity 𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡−1. Panel (a) reports averages when 
𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 is in the top one-third of its sample distribution, indicating high funding illiquidity. Panel 
(b) reports averages when 𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 is in the bottom one-third of its sample distribution, indicating 
low funding illiquidity. EuTed is the European TED spread measure (3-month Euribor rate – 3 month 
German Government Bond rate). Panel (c) reports differences between the averages of the two 
samples, with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Results obtained using monthly data between 
January 2009 and December 2014. 
Panel (a): Tight funding conditions (High EuTedt-1) 
  Illiquidity Portfolios Volatility Portfolios CDS spread Portfolios 
 Illiquidity Volatility CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Least 0.05 25.15 4.43 0.24 25.87 4.58 0.44 25.33 3.96 
2 0.11 26.32 4.45 3.63 29.07 4.49 0.25 26.13 4.21 
3 0.18 28.98 4.58 0.39 28.61 4.54 0.27 29.22 4.39 
4 0.27 32.95 4.80 0.48 27.81 4.63 0.39 29.32 4.52 
5 0.38 33.70 4.73 0.45 30.33 4.64 0.34 30.62 4.59 
6 0.45 36.46 5.01 0.27 33.06 4.66 0.32 32.12 4.66 
7 0.55 35.75 4.67 0.37 32.49 4.73 2.55 33.87 4.74 
8 0.82 31.28 4.63 0.42 33.31 4.73 4.07 38.57 4.99 
9 9.69 34.61 4.76 0.69 37.85 4.82 0.38 37.46 5.17 
Most 125.75 35.36 4.64 5.36 42.17 4.88 0.40 37.91 5.47 
 
Panel (b): Loose funding conditions (Low EuTedt-1) 
  Illiquidity Portfolios Volatility Portfolios CDS spread Portfolios 
 Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Least 0.04 18.40 4.00 0.16 19.80 3.98 0.08 18.08 3.55 
2 0.09 20.42 4.11 0.17 20.31 4.33 0.24 18.11 3.85 
3 0.13 19.93 4.28 0.37 20.61 4.14 0.27 20.28 4.04 
4 0.17 21.20 4.37 0.20 20.75 4.13 0.16 20.58 4.13 
5 0.23 24.69 4.59 0.31 21.14 4.27 4.17 22.10 4.27 
6 0.33 23.52 4.30 1.98 21.49 4.26 0.28 21.96 4.44 
7 0.35 22.38 4.44 0.37 21.80 4.35 0.23 24.60 4.47 
8 0.46 23.55 4.55 0.17 21.88 4.41 0.39 25.46 4.69 
9 7.84 21.27 4.15 0.28 22.13 4.62 0.28 23.92 4.67 
Most 65.95 25.03 4.32 0.34 21.80 4.63 0.30 25.31 5.00 
 
 
90 
 
 
Table 2.2 – Portfolio Illiquidity, Volatility and CDS Spread Conditional on the Level of 
Funding Illiquidity (cont’d) 
 
 
 
Panel (c): High EuTedt-1 - Low EuTedt-1 
  Illiquidity Portfolios Volatility Portfolios CDS spread Portfolios 
 Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Least 0.01 6.75 0.42 0.08 6.07 0.60 0.36 7.24 0.41 
  (2.72) (3.78) (4.85) (1.83) (3.32) (8.66) (8.21) (4.20) (8.65) 
2 0.02 5.90 0.34 3.46 8.76 0.16 0.00 8.02 0.36 
  (2.67) (3.28) (6.02) (4.36) (4.36) (2.06) (0.22) (4.82) (8.32) 
3 0.05 9.05 0.30 0.01 8.00 0.40 0.00 8.94 0.35 
  (4.12) (4.51) (4.39) (0.28) (3.97) (5.04) (-0.03) (4.70) (5.31) 
4 0.10 11.75 0.43 0.28 7.07 0.50 0.23 8.74 0.39 
  (4.62) (4.54) (4.67) (4.08) (3.47) (7.29) (7.38) (4.16) (7.61) 
5 0.15 9.00 0.13 0.13 9.19 0.37 -3.83 8.52 0.32 
  (4.93) (3.73) (1.78) (3.57) (4.05) (6.32) (-4.37) (3.83) (4.86) 
6 0.12 12.94 0.71 -1.71 11.57 0.39 0.04 10.17 0.22 
  (3.44) (4.56) (9.01) (-4.52) (4.95) (4.57) (1.22) (4.34) (3.08) 
7 0.20 13.37 0.24 0.00 10.68 0.38 2.33 9.27 0.27 
  (4.23) (4.48) (2.66) (-0.13) (4.53) (5.95) (4.34) (3.98) (3.50) 
8 0.36 7.73 0.08 0.25 11.43 0.32 3.69 13.11 0.30 
  (7.82) (3.97) (1.29) (6.43) (5.13) (3.76) (4.22) (4.11) (3.44) 
9 1.85 13.35 0.61 0.41 15.72 0.20 0.11 13.54 0.50 
  (1.66) (5.55) (6.72) (8.19) (6.02) (2.31) (2.49) (5.00) (4.98) 
Most 59.79 10.33 0.32 5.02 20.36 0.25 0.10 12.61 0.47 
  (3.67) (4.41) (5.05) (4.68) (5.90) (2.90) (2.27) (3.94) (4.36) 
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Table 2.3 – CDS Spreads and Funding Illiquidity Changes 
Regression results of CDS spread changes of each portfolio on funding illiquidity changes: ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛼0,𝑖 + 𝛼1,𝑝∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼2,𝑝∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡𝟏𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 +
𝑒𝑝,𝑡, where 𝟏𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡−1  is an indicator function equal to 1 when the value of  𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 is in the top one-third of its sample distribution indicating a period of 
high funding illiquidity. Panels (a), (b) and (c) present results for illiquidity-sorted, volatility-sorted and CDS spread-sorted portfolios, respectively. 
Estimations performed using Newey-West standard errors. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes 
significance at 5% level and *** denotes significance at 1% level. Results obtained using monthly data between January 2009 and December 2014. 
  Least 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Most 
  Panel (a): Illiquidity Portfolios 
α1 70.84*** 20.98 20.55* 13.72 31.28* 13.61 16.49 10.93 -1.63 18.56 
  (2.80) (1.24) (1.79) (1.52) (1.78) (0.89) (1.12) (1.15) (-0.13) (1.61) 
α2 -20.28 27.57 41.44*** 60.37*** 27.69 71.77*** 44.47** 38.08*** 34.68 47.28*** 
  (-0.69) (1.48) (3.19) (3.88) (1.13) (3.46) (2.43) (2.92) (1.15) (3.19) 
R2 21.64% 27.23% 40.85% 40.79% 24.98% 38.20% 29.03% 30.99% 8.41% 40.20% 
  Panel (b): Volatility Portfolios 
α1 28.85* 18.84 34.59 15.64 15.72 16.45 13.29 27.96*** 19.74 28.24 
  (1.91) (1.56) (1.52) (1.30) (1.27) (0.91) (0.83) (2.82) (1.424) (1.46) 
α2 17.10 36.92*** 12.54 16.91 28.21 35.04 60.73*** 40.21** 0.57*** 68.64*** 
  (0.95) (2.73) (0.50) (0.61) (1.49) (1.52) (3.25) (2.62) (3.52) (2.99) 
R2 28.94% 40.26% 18.40% 10.54% 23.97% 20.69% 39.13% 35.89% 36.58% 43.31% 
  Panel (c): CDS spread Portfolios 
α1 17.16 6.13 8.51 4.12 32.29* 15.86 14.36 17.31 38.73 64.85** 
  (1.07) (0.75) (1.29) (0.51) (1.69) (1.40) (1.15) (1.14) (1.94) (1.96) 
α2 0.41 20.83** 30.85*** 25.02** 10.67 50.40*** 58.65*** 77.14*** 70.16** 28.92 
  (0.02) (2.34) (3.63) (2.50) (0.48) (4.02) (4.66) (3.73) (2.38) (0.52) 
R2 8.20% 34.00% 36.81% 24.67% 22.58% 45.16% 44.62% 43.70% 36.18% 15.84% 
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Table 2.4: Equity Returns and Positive and Negative Changes in Funding Illiquidity  
Regression results of returns on positive and negative changes in funding illiquidity controlling for the level of market liquidity, as measured by the average Amihud illiquidity 
measure in the current month. Panels (a), (b) and (c) present results for illiquidity-sorted, volatility-sorted and CDS spread-sorted portfolios, respectively. Model 1: 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 +
𝛽𝑝
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑+∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
+ + 𝛽𝑝
𝑚𝑘𝑡_𝑙𝑖𝑞𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑚𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 , presents results using positive changes in funding illiquidity, indicating a tightening of funding liquidity (∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
+), while 
Model 2: 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝
𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑−∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
− + 𝛽𝑝
𝑚𝑘𝑡_𝑙𝑖𝑞𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑚𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 presents results using negative changes in funding illiquidity, indicating a relaxation of funding conditions 
(∆𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡
−).  𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑚𝑘𝑡 is the market illiquidity computed as the median monthly Amihud illiquidity measure across the entire sample of stocks. Estimations performed using 
Newey-West standard errors. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *** denotes significance at 
1% level. Results obtained using monthly data between January 2009 and December 2014. 
 
Panel (a): Illiquidity portfolios 
    P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Model 1  
𝛽𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑
+
 -0.08** -0.07** -0.09*** -0.11** -0.18*** -0.12* -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.10 
  (-2.45) (-2.16) (-2.78) (-2.63) (-4.61) (-1.89) (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.67) (-1.58) 
𝛽𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞
𝑚𝑘𝑡
 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 
  (-1.03) (-1.58) (-0.34) (-0.59) (-0.79) (-0.47) (0.31) (-0.40) (-0.60) (-0.53) 
Model 2  
𝛽𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑
−
 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.07** -0.01 -0.02 
  (0.02) (-0.02) (-0.74) (-0.42) (-1.43) (0.31) (-1.42) (-2.26) (-0.17) (-0.41) 
𝛽𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞
𝑚𝑘𝑡
 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 
  (-1.27) (-1.63) (-0.64) (-0.97) (-1.44) (-0.53) (-0.21) (-0.90) (-0.76) (-0.68) 
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Table 2.4: Equity Returns and Positive and Negative Changes in Funding Illiquidity (cont’d) 
 
 
Panel (b): Volatility portfolios 
   P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Model 1  
𝛽𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑
+
 -0.05** -0.06* -0.15*** 0.00 -0.05 -0.1*** -0.08* -0.13*** -0.16** -0.17*** 
 (-2.16) (-1.80) (-4.76) (0.14) (-1.43) (-2.81) (-1.67) (-3.23) (-2.60) (-2.71) 
𝛽𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞
𝑚𝑘𝑡
 -0.08* -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
 (-1.80) (-0.14) (-0.60) (-0.30) (-1.21) (-0.33) (-0.20) (-0.46) (-0.25) (-0.48) 
Model 2  
𝛽𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑
−
 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.10* -0.09 -0.04 
 (1.14) (-0.03) (-1.13) (0.29) (-0.66) (-1.01) (0.74) (-1.73) (-1.08) (-0.48) 
𝛽𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞
𝑚𝑘𝑡
 -0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
 (-1.54) (-0.24) (-1.05) (-0.23) (-1.44) (-0.70) (-0.13) (-1.25) (-0.79) (-0.79) 
 
 
 
Panel (c): CDS spread portfolios 
   P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Model 1  
𝛽𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑
+
 -0.06* -0.05* -0.12*** -0.03 -0.08*** -0.08** -0.11** -0.15*** -0.17** -0.11 
 (-1.80) (-1.72) (-4.03) (-1.12) (-2.76) (-2.39) (-2.50) (-2.88) (-2.57) (-1.66) 
𝛽𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞
𝑚𝑘𝑡
 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06* -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 
 (-0.36) (-0.56) (-1.77) (-0.48) (-0.53) (-0.01) (-1.43) (0.08) (-0.52) (-0.58) 
Model 2  
𝛽𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑
−
 -0.03* 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 
 (-1.85) (-0.31) (-0.94) (-0.95) (0.19) (-0.90) (-1.33) (-0.45) (-0.73) (0.25) 
𝛽𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞
𝑚𝑘𝑡
 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09** -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11* -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 
 (-0.72) (-0.71) (-2.03) (-0.78) (-0.65) (-0.42) (-1.76) (-0.26) (-0.84) (-0.61) 
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Table 2.5: Asset Pricing Tests – Illiquidity-Sorted Portfolios 
 
Results of two-step Fama-MacBeth regressions for ten portfolios of equities sorted by their year-
end illiquidity. The intercept and prices of risk are annualized (multiplied by 12). T-statistics using 
Fama-MacBeth standard errors and standard errors calculated using the Shanken (1992) correction 
are also reported.   Results obtained using monthly data between January 2009 and December 2014.  
 
 
            Augmented by ∆EuTedinnov   Augmented by ∆EuTed 
  CAPM FF3 ∆EuTedinnov ∆EuTed   CAPM FF3   CAPM FF3 
α -6.54 -6.04 -2.74 -1.85   -17.11 -29.40   -13.91 -26.70 
t-FM -0.83 -0.57 -0.48 -0.34   -2.08 -2.23   -1.71 -2.04 
t-Sh  -0.41  -0.38 -0.38   -0.30    -0.44  -0.44    -0.44  -0.45  
                     
∆EuTedinnov     -1.81     -2.06 -2.39       
t-FM     -3.35      -3.69  -3.76       
t-Sh     -3.18       -3.48  -3.52       
                     
∆EuTed       -1.92         -2.06 -2.42 
t-FM        -3.45          -3.59  -3.74 
t-Sh        -3.27          -3.39  -3.50 
                     
MKT-RF 2.72 2.87       4.62 4.82   3.96 4.07 
t-FM 1.11  1.29       1.84 2.04    1.59  1.76 
t-Sh  1.06   1.23        1.63   1.78     1.45  1.59 
                     
SMB   0.87         0.33     0.20 
t-FM   1.03         0.37      0.23 
t-Sh    0.92           0.35       0.22 
                     
HML   1.68         2.45     2.08 
t-FM    1.42         2.02     1.73 
t-Sh    1.23         1.66     1.46 
                     
R2 9.67% 10.10% 48.84% 49.32%   65.85% 81.44%   62.05% 80.38% 
Adj. R2 -1.62% -34.85% 42.44% 42.99%   56.09% 66.59%   51.21% 64.69% 
MAPE 0.36 0.43 0.25 0.24   0.38 0.56   0.37 0.55 
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Table 2.A1 – Portfolio Illiquidity, Volatility and CDS Spread Conditional on the Level of 
Funding Illiquidity 
 
Average illiquidity (x100), volatility (annualized %) and CDS spread (natural logarithm) of 
illiquidity-sorted, volatility-sorted and CDS spread-sorted portfolios in subsamples conditional on 
the yearly average of the lagged funding illiquidity 𝐸𝐸𝑡−1. EE represents the 3-month Euribor-
Eurepo spread. Panel (a) reports averages when 𝐸𝐸𝑡−1 is in the top one-third of its sample 
distribution, indicating high funding illiquidity. Panel (b) reports averages when 𝐸𝐸𝑡−1 is in the 
bottom one-third of its sample distribution, indicating low funding illiquidity. Panel (c) reports 
differences between the averages of the two samples, with t-statistics presented in parentheses. 
Results obtained using monthly data between January 2009 and December 2014.  
Panel A: Tight funding conditions (High EEt-1) 
  Illiquidity Portfolios Volatility Portfolios CDS spread Portfolios 
Pno Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Least 0.05 22.50 4.29 0.11 22.00 4.29 0.41 22.53 3.89 
2 0.11 25.66 4.58 3.70 24.87 4.47 0.39 23.25 4.15 
3 0.18 27.02 4.62 0.35 24.28 4.51 0.18 24.03 4.30 
4 0.26 30.43 4.84 0.51 26.77 4.62 0.36 27.13 4.48 
5 0.36 29.39 4.61 0.38 28.65 4.60 0.36 29.92 4.61 
6 0.42 31.92 4.93 0.27 30.54 4.96 0.41 29.58 4.70 
7 0.56 35.82 4.86 0.36 32.64 4.85 1.16 31.86 4.81 
8 0.77 33.41 4.74 0.54 32.51 4.67 4.03 36.91 5.07 
9 10.01 31.68 4.82 1.54 35.42 4.83 0.44 35.48 5.28 
Most 114.49 35.36 4.64 0.48 41.83 5.12 0.44 38.81 5.63 
 
 
Panel B: Loose funding conditions (Low EEt-1) 
  Illiquidity Portfolios Volatility Portfolios CDS spread Portfolios 
Pno Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Least 0.04 18.40 4.00 0.16 17.72 3.98 0.08 18.08 3.55 
2 0.09 20.42 4.11 0.17 19.20 4.33 0.24 18.11 3.85 
3 0.13 19.93 4.28 0.37 20.39 4.14 0.27 20.28 4.04 
4 0.17 21.20 4.37 0.20 21.59 4.13 0.16 20.58 4.13 
5 0.23 24.69 4.59 0.31 21.45 4.27 4.17 22.10 4.27 
6 0.33 23.52 4.30 1.98 21.31 4.26 0.28 21.96 4.44 
7 0.35 22.38 4.44 0.37 23.00 4.35 0.23 24.60 4.47 
8 0.46 23.55 4.55 0.17 21.51 4.41 0.39 25.46 4.69 
9 7.84 21.27 4.15 0.28 25.61 4.62 0.28 23.92 4.67 
Most 65.95 25.03 4.32 0.34 28.63 4.63 0.30 25.31 5.00 
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Table 2.A1 – Portfolio Illiquidity, Volatility and CDS Spread Conditional on the Level of 
Funding Illiquidity (cont’d) 
 
 
 
Panel C: High EEt-1 - Low EEt-1 
  Illiquidity Portfolios Volatility Portfolios CDS spread Portfolios 
Pno Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Illiquidity Volatility 
CDS 
spread 
Least 0.01 4.10 0.29 -0.05 4.28 0.31 0.33 4.44 0.34 
  (2.46) (2.47) (4.57) (-1.20) (3.20) (5.00) (6.84) (2.53) (7.52) 
2 0.02 5.24 0.46 3.53 5.67 0.14 0.15 5.14 0.31 
  (3.34) (3.23) (8.99) (8.79) (2.82) (1.99) (4.99) (3.07) (8.33) 
3 0.05 7.09 0.34 -0.03 3.89 0.37 -0.09 3.75 0.26 
  (4.73) (4.19) (5.80) (-0.24) (2.00) (5.47) (-4.21) (2.42) (5.29) 
4 0.08 9.23 0.47 0.31 5.18 0.49 0.20 6.56 0.34 
  (4.83) (3.59) (5.58) (2.61) (2.52) (7.52) (5.84) (3.03) (7.38) 
5 0.13 4.69 0.02 0.07 7.20 0.33 -3.81 7.83 0.34 
  (6.19) (2.13) (0.29) (0.62) (3.16) (5.74) (-4.34) (3.96) (5.83) 
6 0.10 8.40 0.63 -1.72 9.24 0.70 0.14 7.62 0.26 
  (3.26) (2.87) (8.30) (-6.07) (4.19) (6.63) (5.41) (3.68) (4.36) 
7 0.20 13.44 0.42 -0.01 9.64 0.51 0.94 7.26 0.34 
  (4.61) (4.65) (4.45) (-0.15) (4.24) (8.33) (5.00) (3.69) (4.85) 
8 0.31 9.86 0.19 0.37 11.00 0.27 3.65 11.45 0.39 
  (8.96) (5.85) (3.01) (4.24) (5.27) (3.45) (4.14) (3.55) (4.94) 
9 2.17 10.42 0.68 1.27 9.81 0.21 0.16 11.56 0.61 
  (2.19) (4.48) (8.53) (6.06) (4.43) (2.77) (4.80) (4.80) (6.77) 
Most 48.54 10.33 0.32 0.14 13.20 0.49 0.14 13.51 0.63 
  (2.81) (4.41) (6.41) (1.54) (4.13) (7.31) (4.26) (4.66) (6.51) 
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Table 2.A2. CDS spreads and Funding Illiquidity Changes 
Regression results of CDS spread changes of each portfolio on funding illiquidity changes: ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛼0,𝑝 + 𝛼1,𝑝∆𝐸𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼2,𝑝∆𝐸𝐸𝑡𝟏𝐸𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑝,𝑡, where 
𝟏𝐸𝐸𝑡−1  is an indicator function equal to 1 when the value of  𝐸𝐸𝑡−1 is in the top one-third of its sample distribution indicating a period of high funding 
illiquidity. Panels (a), (b) and (c) present results for illiquidity-sorted, volatility-sorted and CDS spread-sorted portfolios, respectively. Estimations performed 
using Newey-West standard errors. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *** 
denotes significance at 1% level. Results obtained using monthly data between January 2009 and December 2014. 
  Least 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Most 
  Illiquidity Portfolios 
α1 86.85*** 38.62** 56.38 44.55** 81.39** 61.01*** 40.04 17.03 38.80 30.13 
  (2.85) (2.02) (1.52) (2.30) (2.49) (3.12) (1.33) (0.88) (1.35) (1.17) 
α2 15.86 48.09* 41.65 77.14** 37.92 79.54** 49.11 67.99*** 54.00 76.51** 
  (0.48) (1.91) (1.04) (2.36) (1.00) (2.48) (1.50) (3.40) (1.38) (2.48) 
R2 22.13% 28.49% 34.96% 33.15% 34.50% 35.24% 20.94% 30.66% 22.71% 34.68% 
  Volatility Portfolios 
α1 60.35** 55.82** 42.93* 48.38** 46.99** 45.25 45.40 61.86** 24.08 63.72 
  (2.56) (2.08) (1.95) (2.56) (2.37) (1.26) (1.57) (2.19) (0.90) (1.59) 
α2 22.02 31.88 41.53* 39.02 37.38 59.97 60.43 57.16 118.43*** 80.08 
  (0.72) (1.07) (1.75) (1.55) (1.40) (1.59) (1.61) (1.90) (3.72) (1.64) 
R2 31.01% 34.52% 18.18% 25.17% 30.03% 28.84% 27.16% 36.53% 41.45% 32.02% 
  CDS spread Portfolios 
α1 -3.27 18.08 16.18* 17.42 57.76* 30.34 34.90 47.17 96.5** 179.71*** 
  (-0.24) (1.19) (1.80) (0.97) (1.88) (1.31) (1.36) (1.55) (2.17) (2.90) 
α2 35.44** 29.52* 53.01*** 39.31* 22.07 77.64** 78.18** 85.27** 95.23* 32.15 
  (2.50) (1.76) (3.21) (1.92) (0.67) (2.58) (2.65) (2.02) (1.72) (0.45) 
R2 7.41% 35.54% 37.51% 31.32% 25.04% 39.65% 35.66% 28.85% 37.71% 27.33% 
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Table 2.A3. Equity Returns and Positive and Negative Changes in Funding Illiquidity 
Regression results of returns on positive and negative changes in funding illiquidity controlling for the level of market liquidity, as measured by the average 
Amihud illiquidity measure in the current month. Panels (a), (b) and (c) present results for illiquidity-sorted, volatility-sorted and CDS spread-sorted 
portfolios, respectively. Model 1: 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝
𝛥𝐸𝐸+∆𝐸𝐸𝑡
+ +  𝛽
𝑝
𝑚𝑘𝑡_𝑙𝑖𝑞𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑚𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡  presents results using positive changes in funding illiquidity (∆𝐸𝐸𝑡
+), while 
Model 2: 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝
𝛥𝐸𝐸−∆𝐸𝐸𝑡
− + 𝛽𝑝
𝑚𝑘𝑡_𝑙𝑖𝑞𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑚𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 presents results using negative changes in funding illiquidity (∆𝐸𝐸𝑡
−). Estimations performed using 
Newey-West standard errors. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *** 
denotes significance at 1% level. Results obtained using monthly data between January 2009 and December 2014. 
Panel A: Illiquidity Portfolios 
    P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Model 1 
(ΔEEt+ ) 
βΔEE+ -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.2*** -0.28*** -0.33*** -0.19** -0.21*** -0.36*** -0.28** 
  (-5.16) (-3.07) (-2.69) (-3.58) (-4.68) (-4.07) (-2.51) (-3.06) (-2.97) (-2.29) 
βMkt_Liq -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-0.32) (-1.11) (-0.01) (-0.31) (-0.30) (-0.04) (0.59) (-0.01) (-0.12) (-0.2) 
Model 2 
(ΔEEt- ) 
βΔEE- -0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.08 -0.12* -0.08 -0.16* -0.19* -0.22* -0.2** 
  (-1.08) (0.07) (-0.78) (-0.90) (-1.86) (-0.72) (-1.77) (-1.84) (-1.77) (-2.03) 
βMkt_Liq -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 
  (-1.43) (-1.59) (-0.65) (-0.95) (-1.37) (-0.77) (-0.17) (-0.95) (-1.09) (-1.05) 
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Table 2.A3. Equity Returns and Positive and Negative Changes in Funding Illiquidity (cont’d) 
 
 
Panel B: Volatility Portfolios 
    P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Model 1 
(ΔEEt+ ) 
βΔEE -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.26*** -0.08* -0.14*** -0.23*** -0.20*** -0.27*** -0.40*** -0.34*** 
  (-3.20) (-3.46) (-4.81) (-1.85) (-2.18) (-2.93) (-2.38) (-4.60) (-3.72) (-3.61) 
βMkt_Liq -0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
  (-1.08) (0.41) (-0.24) (-0.04) (-0.89) (0.19) (0.04) (0.03) (0.32) (-0.14) 
Model 2 
(ΔEEt- ) 
βΔEE -0.01 -0.04 -0.14* 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.2* 
  (-0.20) (-0.61) (-1.79) (0.05) (-0.61) (-1.23) (-0.02) (-4.41) (-2.69) (-1.82) 
βMkt_Liq -0.09* -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 
  (-1.80) (-0.37) (-1.04) (-0.27) (-1.34) (-0.73) (-0.32) (-1.58) (-1.07) (-1.04) 
 
 
Panel C: CDS spread Portfolios 
    P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Model 1 
(ΔEEt+ ) 
βΔEE -0.15** -0.16*** -0.24*** -0.10** -0.17*** -0.31*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.36*** -0.34*** 
  (-2.18) (-3.02) (-3.59) (-2.32) (-2.99) (-3.67) (-2.67) (-3.53) (-3.73) (-4.07) 
βMkt_Liq 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
  (0.05) (-0.17) (-0.98) (-0.19) (-0.25) (0.58) (-1.05) (0.32) (-0.11) (-0.23) 
Model 2 
(ΔEEt- ) 
βΔEE -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.24*** -0.14 -0.21* -0.18* -0.12 
  (-0.88) (-0.95) (-1.64) (-0.45) (-0.27) (-3.35) (-1.33) (-1.9) (-1.71) (-0.90) 
βMkt_Liq -0.03 -0.04 -0.09** -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.11* -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 
  (-0.63) (-0.77) (-2.09) (-0.62) (-0.70) (-0.75) (-1.83) (-0.44) (-1.02) (-0.92) 
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Table 2.A4. Asset Pricing Tests - Illiquidity, Volatility and CDS Spread Sorted Portfolios 
Results of two-step Fama-MacBeth regressions for thirty sorted portfolios (ten portfolios sorted by 
year-end illiquidity, ten portfolios sorted by year end volatility and ten portfolios sorted by year-end 
CDS spread). The intercept and prices of risk are annualized (multiplied by 12). T-statistics 
calculated using Fama-MacBeth standard errors and standard errors calculated using the Shanken 
(1992) correction are reported. Results obtained using monthly data between January 2009 and 
December 2014. 
 
           Augmented by ∆EuTed
innov   Augmented by ∆EuTed 
  CAPM FF3 ∆EuTedinnov ∆EuTed   CAPM FF3   CAPM FF3 
α -3.91 -5.03 1.04 1.58   -4.40 -9.26   -4.03 -10.22 
t-FM -0.75 -0.65 0.21 0.31   -0.84 -1.11   -0.77 -1.20 
t-Sh  -0.61  -0.54 0.20  0.29    -0.67   -0.79    -0.63  -0.80 
                      
∆EuTedinnov     -0.76     -0.60 -0.86       
t-FM     -1.78     -1.59 -2.23       
t-Sh      -1.74      -1.56 -2.17        
                      
∆EuTed       -0.75         -0.59 -0.84 
t-FM        -1.74         -1.56  -2.17 
t-Sh        -1.70          -1.53   -2.12 
                      
MKT-RF 2.02 1.72       1.90 0.95   1.86 0.81 
t-FM 1.19  0.98       1.13 0.57   1.10 0.49 
t-Sh 1.16  -0.88        1.10   0.57   1.08  0.49  
                      
SMB   0.13         -0.66     -0.83 
t-FM    0.16         -0.79     -1.01 
t-Sh   0.16          -0.72       -0.91 
                      
HML   1.02         0.77     0.65 
t-FM    1.16         0.89     0.77 
t-Sh    1.06           0.83       0.72 
                      
R2 20.24% 22.11% 15.83% 15.95%   27.81% 39.78%   27.99% 41.96% 
Adj. R2 17.39% 13.12% 12.82% 12.95%   22.47% 30.15%   22.66% 32.68% 
MAPE 0.24 0.32 0.22 0.23 
 
0.24 0.34 
 
0.24 0.35 
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Chapter 3: Monetary Policy and 
Stock Liquidity. Evidence from the 
U.K. market. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Stock liquidity is a central characteristic of financial markets. Despite the multitude of 
research focusing on the determinants of liquidity and its relevance for market participants, 
liquidity remains an elusive concept as it displays different facets which cannot be captured 
using one liquidity measure.1  
The importance of liquidity for financial markets is exemplified by its effect on 
required returns (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002) and its implications 
for asset pricing (e.g. Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). Moreover, recent financial crises and 
especially the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, have shown that during market downturns, 
liquidity decreases or even completely dries up (Chordia et al. 2005; Naes et al. 2011). A 
separate research stream documents that liquidity displays commonality across individual 
assets. Chordia et al. (2000), Huberman and Halka (2001) and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) 
document commonality in liquidity in the context of the U.S. market, Galariotis and 
Giouvris (2007) and Foran et al. (2015) provide U.K. based evidence, while Karolyi et al 
(2012) and Brockman et al. (2009) offer international evidence. These studies suggest that 
individual asset liquidity is driven by (at least) one common macroeconomic factor. Several 
studies identify different common drivers of liquidity such as: the business cycle (e.g. 
Eisfeldt, 2004; Naes et al. 2011), negative market returns (Hameed et al. 2010), monetary 
                                                            
1 See Amihud et al. (2005) for an overview of liquidity literature.  
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conditions (Jensen and Moorman, 2010), mutual funds’ flows (Massa, 2004), yield 
differences between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds (Fontaine and Garcia, 2012), funding 
liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) and trader leverage (Kahraman and Tookes, 
2017). In this paper, we investigate whether a common determinant of individual stock 
liquidity is monetary policy.  
Several theoretical models suggest that capital constraints are connected to market 
liquidity (e.g. Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2007; Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009; Kondor and Vayanos, 2016). In these models, traders’ ability to access 
funds to invest in risky assets and thus supply liquidity to the market is dependent on market 
frictions such as the costs associated with raising funds. In a margin trading setting, among 
others, Weill (2007) documents that margin traders provide ‘’socially optimal’’ liquidity to 
the market during regular economic periods when access to capital is sufficient, whereas 
they become liquidity demanders during severe market crashes, not maintaining price 
continuity due to a risk of welfare loss. This argument is in line with the theoretical model 
of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) whereby constraints in traders’ ability to raise funds 
leads to market illiquidity, which in turn diminishes funding liquidity, leading to a liquidity 
loss spiral.  Moreover, the inventory paradigm of market microstructure (e.g. Demsetz, 
1968; Stoll, 1978a) suggests that traders’ ability to provide liquidity is dependent, among 
other factors, on the opportunity costs and risks associated with holding securities. Taken 
together, these theoretical findings suggest that market liquidity is dependent on the costs 
and associated risks of holding assets.  
In this paper, we investigate whether monetary policy (or monetary stance) is a 
determinant of individual stock liquidity of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(L.S.E.), when monetary policy is measured through short-term interest rates, as in the study 
of Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) focusing on the Euro-zone market. 
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Previous literature studying the effect of monetary policy on stock (il)liquidity is 
rather thin and provides mixed evidence. In the context of the U.S. market, Fujimoto (2003) 
employs a vector autoregressive approach and documents that the influence of monetary 
policy, as measured through a positive shock to non-borrowed reserves and a negative shock 
to the federal funds rate, on liquidity is significant only before the mid-1980s. Chordia et al. 
(2005) finds that monetary expansions are linked to increased liquidity only during crisis 
periods. Separately, Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) and Jensen and Moorman (2010) provide 
strong evidence to support the positive effect of expansionary monetary policy on aggregate 
(market-wide) stock liquidity, while Chiu (2014) documents that monetary policy shocks 
do not significantly impact market liquidity. In the context of the Scandinavian market, 
Soderberg (2008) examines the in-sample and out-of-sample predictability of fourteen 
macroeconomic variables providing ambiguous evidence, while, for the Euro zone 
(German, French and Italian) market, Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013), the study that is most 
closely linked to ours from a methodological standpoint, provides strong evidence of a 
positive (negative) effect of expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy on stock 
liquidity. In the context of the U.K. market, Florackis et al. (2014) document that macro-
liquidity shocks’ effect on returns is significantly stronger for the most liquid stocks and 
that trading cost increases slightly while trading activity increases significantly on Monetary 
Policy Committee meeting days. 
Therefore, the direct relationship between monetary policy and stock (il)liquidity 
has not been sufficiently addressed in the context of the U.K. market. Considering the varied 
results obtained in previous studies investigating this relationship throughout the different 
markets and time-frames and the important role of London as a global financial market, the 
investigation of the effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity in the context of the U.K. 
market emerges as an interesting research question. Monetary policy through its effect on 
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interest rates, influences both the costs of holding assets as well as the perceived risk of 
holding risky assets and should, therefore, affect stock liquidity (Fernandez-Amador et al. 
2013).  
Following this reasoning, our first and main hypothesis suggests that a tightening 
(relaxation) of monetary policy (or monetary stance) through a higher (lower) short-term 
interest rate leads to an increase (decrease) in borrowing costs, thus reducing (increasing) 
funding liquidity and stock liquidity. 
To test our main hypothesis, we employ a panel data setting and examine whether 
expansionary (restrictive) monetary policy impacts positively stock liquidity (illiquidity). 
Results suggest that for two of the five (il)liquidity measures investigated (Amivest liquidity 
ratio and proportion of days with zero returns), we find a significant and positive, in-sample 
predictive relationship between monetary tightening and stock illiquidity, while for the 
remaining three measures (traded volume, turnover price impact and relative bid-ask spread) 
we could not find a statistically significant relationship. Therefore, the effect of monetary 
policy on stock liquidity is significant when liquidity is measured via price impact of 
transactions measures, but insignificant when volume-related or transaction costs liquidity 
measures are employed. This highlights the importance of investigating the effects of 
monetary policy on multiple aspects of liquidity such as trading activity, price impact of 
transactions and transaction costs.  
 A separate research strand investigates whether monetary policy has a differential 
effect on small companies as opposed to large firms. To this end, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994) and Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013) document that small companies should be more 
sensitive to increases in short-term interest rates as they have less protection against adverse 
changes in economic conditions. There are several reasons why we would expect a stronger 
effect of monetary policy on small caps: Firstly, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) document 
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that a monetary contraction leads to a decline in aggregate bank lending, thus reducing the 
supply of money available for companies to finance their business. Bernanke et al. (1994) 
and Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013) argue that small companies cannot afford optimal risk 
management strategies and are less well collateralized, being more prone to the negative 
effects of ‘flight to quality lending’. Secondly, besides reducing bank lending, Kashyap et 
al. (1993) documents that a monetary contraction also increases commercial paper volume. 
Since the ability to issue commercial paper is far more limited for small caps than large 
caps, small caps find it more difficult and expensive to raise new funds. Thirdly, monetary 
policy contractions exacerbate liquidity constraints of small firms, reducing their 
creditworthiness and their capacity to access funds from any external provider (Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1994; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and Stein, 2000).2 Fourthly, as Jensen 
and Moorman (2010) document, a tightening of monetary policy leads to increased 
illiquidity, which according to Amihud (2002) would impact more severely small, illiquid 
stocks which see their illiquidity decrease the most, while larger stocks become 
comparatively more attractive during periods of low market liquidity. This hypothesis is 
also supported by the findings of Nyborg and Ostberg (2014) based on the ‘liquidity pull-
back’ hypothesis, the authors documenting that tightening in the interbank market leads to 
more trading volume in liquid stocks compared to illiquid stocks.  
Similarly, a monetary policy tightening should have a stronger effect on volatile 
stocks, compared to less volatile stocks. An increase in short-term interest rates would 
increase the cost of funds, thus increasing funding illiquidity. Following the theoretical 
predictions of Proposition 6(iv) from Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), after a decrease 
in funding liquidity, which can be interpreted through monetary tightening, illiquidity 
increases the most for volatile stocks as investors rush to rebalance their portfolios towards 
                                                            
2 For more details, see the discussion in Kashyap and Stein (2000).  
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safer investments – a flight to quality effect. This prediction has been empirically proven in 
the context of the U.S. market by Fontaine et al. (2016), in their study of the effect of funding 
shocks on the cross section of asset returns. However, Fontaine et al. (2016) do not directly 
investigate any monetary policy variable, but rather examine funding liquidity shocks 
extracted from the funding liquidity measure developed by Fontaine and Garcia (2012) 
based on Treasury securities.  
Considering the above arguments, the second hypothesis that we investigate is 
whether the effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity is stronger for small market 
capitalization stocks and high-volatility stocks. 
 To test our second hypothesis, we construct interaction terms between monetary 
policy and, in turn, market capitalization and volatility, measured as the monthly standard 
deviation of stock returns. Panel regression coefficient estimates for the interaction terms 
suggest that the effect of monetary policy on individual stock liquidity decreases with firm 
market capitalization, confirming the findings of Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) that small 
caps are more sensitive to monetary policy. Similarly, this paper newly provides empirical 
evidence that the impact of monetary policy on liquidity is increasing with stock volatility 
as per the theoretical predictions of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Kondor and 
Vayanos (2016). 
 Moreover, recent studies (e.g. Basistha and Kurov, 2008; Kontonikas et al. 2013; 
Florackis et al. 2014) provide evidence that monetary policy shocks affect stock market 
returns differently during market recessions, especially during the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis. Since the recent financial crisis represented a period marked by severe market 
illiquidity, compared to ‘ordinary’ market periods, illiquidity should be more tightly related 
to monetary policy during this turmoil period.  
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Therefore, our third hypothesis is whether the effect of monetary policy on stock 
liquidity is more pronounced during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. To test this hypothesis, 
we use interaction terms between a crisis dummy and the monetary policy measures to 
investigate whether there is a differential effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity during 
the recent financial crisis, a period marked by severe market illiquidity, when compared to 
‘ordinary’ market periods. Indeed, we document that the effect of monetary policy on stock 
liquidity is more significant during the recent financial crisis compared to the rest of the 
sample. However, depending on which measure of illiquidity is employed, we also find 
evidence of a positive effect of monetary relaxation on stock liquidity outside the financial 
crisis. We also document that the larger effect of monetary policy on the liquidity of small 
firms is consistent in both regimes, while the stronger impact of monetary policy on high 
volatility firms is only significant outside the financial crisis period.   
 We contribute to existing research in several ways. Firstly, we provide (to the best 
of our knowledge) the first study of the direct impact of Bank of England monetary policy 
on individual stock liquidity of entities listed on the London Stock Exchange. Secondly, we 
confirm, in the context of the U.K. market, the findings of Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013), 
based on Euro zone data, of a stronger effect of monetary policy on small market 
capitalization firms. Adding to the results of Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013), we also find 
empirical evidence that monetary policy has a larger effect on firms with higher volatility 
of stock returns. This result also confirms the theoretical predictions of Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) and Kondor and Vayanos (2016). Thirdly, we extend the findings of 
existing research evidencing differential impacts of monetary policy on stock returns during 
crisis periods, by documenting the stronger effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity 
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, compared to the rest of the sample. Moreover, we 
newly find that the differential response of stock liquidity to monetary tightening due to size 
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holds both during and outside the financial crisis, while the stronger effect for high volatility 
firms is significant only outside the financial crisis period.   
It is important to highlight that this study does not specifically look at monetary 
policy changes (or shocks), but rather at the overall monetary policy stance, as measured by 
short-term interest rate levels. To this end, this paper employs the panel framework used by 
Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) to reach conclusions. Noteworthy, a vast literature 
investigating monetary policy (shocks) on asset prices, stock returns or liquidity, uses 
different methodologies to isolate monetary conditions and disentangle expected and 
unexpected components of monetary shocks to reach conclusions. Such methodologies 
include: VAR analysis procedure (e.g. Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009; Fujimoto, 2003), event 
study approach (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Kontonikas et al. 2013), linear regression 
(Nyborg and Ostberg, 2014) or dynamic copulas (Chu, 2015). 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the data 
and variables employed in our analysis. Section 3.3 illustrates the empirical setting used. 
Section 3.4 evidences the results of the panel estimations, section 3.5 covers the robustness 
checks of our results, while Section 3.6 concludes.  
3.2 Data and description of variables  
 
3.2.1 Data 
We evaluate the effect of monetary policy on the illiquidity of individual stocks during the 
period from January 1999 to December 2015.3 As in the study of Fernandez-Amador et al. 
                                                            
3 We choose to start our sample period in 1999 in line with closely related studies investigating the effects of 
monetary policy on stock illiquidity (Fernandez-Amador et al, 2013) and on stock returns (Florackis et al, 
2014).  
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(2013), we investigate this relationship at a monthly frequency (204 months) using a sample 
represented by all stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange at the end of our sample 
period. In line with previous literature, to avoid the impact of very thinly traded stocks and 
outliers, we exclude stocks with a share price of less than one pound sterling and fewer than 
10 observations of the individual illiquidity measures in the respective month. Daily capital 
market data relating to close, bid and ask share prices, trading volume and number of shares 
outstanding is collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream and used to compute the 
monthly illiquidity measures as well as the monthly stock return, monthly standard 
deviation of daily returns and market capitalization. Macroeconomic indicators such as U.K. 
industrial production, consumer price index and MSCI stock market index are also 
constructed using data collected from Datastream. The U.K. short-term interest rates used 
in our analysis, i.e. the Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA), the Bank of England 
Base Rate (BankRate), the 3-month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and 2-week repo 
rate (Repo). 
 
3.2.2 Measures of stock (il)liquidity 
Stock liquidity is a multi-dimensional concept related to notions of transactions costs, ease 
of trading, breadth, settlement time, trading activity and price impact.4 In this respect, an 
asset is considered liquid if market participants can buy and sell large amounts of the 
respective asset quickly, at a low cost and with little impact on the market price.5 As Amihud 
(2002) and Amihud et al. (2005) argue, there is no single measure or definition 
encapsulating all the different facets of liquidity. Moreover, since we use low-frequency 
                                                            
4 Goyenko et al. (2009) and Fong et al. (2017) present overviews of different measures of liquidity. 
5 For a more detailed discussion see, for example: Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Sarr and Lybek (2002) 
and Amihud et al. (2005).  
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data to compute liquidity measures, the measurement noise increases when compared to 
high-frequency liquidity proxies (Amihud et al. 2005). For these reasons, we employ five 
different (il)liquidity measures, namely: the traded volume (TV), the Amivest liquidity ratio 
(Amivest), the turnover price impact ratio (TPI), the proportion of days with zero returns 
(Zeros) and the relative bid-ask spread (BAS). These measures are chosen due to their design 
reflecting various dimensions of liquidity such as trading activity, market price impact and 
transaction costs and are discussed in detail below. It is worth noting that the first two 
proxies measure liquidity (TV and Amivest), while the latter three measures can be 
considered illiquidity ratios (TPI, Zeros and BAS). 
The first liquidity measure examined, the trading volume (TV) in Sterling is 
considered a measure of trading activity. Following Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013), 
trading volume for stock i in month m is calculated as the natural logarithm of the monthly 
sum over 𝐷𝑖𝑚 days of the daily product between the number of traded shares (𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑚𝑑) and 
the stock price (𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑑) , as described in equation (3.1):  
                                       𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑚 = ln (∑ (𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑚𝑑
𝐷𝑖𝑚
𝑑=1 𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑑))                                         (3.1) 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) postulate that investors with short holding periods 
prefer liquid assets, thus these assets have a higher trading activity. Moreover, as Sarr and 
Lybek (2002) argue, volume-based measures of liquidity, such as the trading volume are 
good estimators of market depth, i.e. the existence of numerous trades and market 
participants. Stoll (1978b) and Glosten and Harris (1988) determine that trading volume is 
tightly related to the bid-ask spread and market liquidity, whereas Brennan et al. (1998) 
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argues that the traded volume may be a better liquidity proxy than the bid-ask spread, with 
a higher traded volume indicating an increase in liquidity.6  
Given that trading volume may be high at times of low market liquidity, especially 
during crisis episodes, when actual price impact of transactions is high, we consider the 
return dimension and investigate the price impact of transactions via three liquidity 
measures, namely the Amivest liquidity ratio, the turnover price impact ratio and the 
proportion of days with zero returns.  
The Amivest liquidity ratio (Amivest) is calculated for each stock i in month m 
containing 𝐷𝑖𝑚 days as the monthly average of the daily ratio of the product of the number 
of shares traded (𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑚𝑑) and stock price (𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑑) to the absolute stock return (|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑑|), as 
presented in equation (3.2). The ratio is not defined on zero return days and due to its size, 
is commonly multiplied by 10-6.  
                             𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚 =  
1
𝐷𝑖𝑚
∑
10−6 𝑥 (𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑑) 𝑥 (𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑚𝑑)
|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑑|
𝐷𝑖𝑚
𝑑=1                                 (3.2) 
Amivest has been previously used to measure liquidity in studies such as Amihud et 
al. (1997) and Jensen and Moorman (2010) and, by construction, is closely related to the 
popular Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, the only difference stemming from the states 
when the two measures are undefined (zero volume days for the Amihud illiquidity ratio 
and zero return days for the Amivest illiquidity ratio). Amivest measures price impact or 
market depth, with a higher Amivest value indicating that large quantities of the respective 
stock can be traded without generating large price movements, implying low price impact 
and therefore increased liquidity (Goyenko et al. 2009, Jensen and Moorman, 2010). 
                                                            
6 Despite that several papers (e.g. Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Brennan et al. 1998) have confirmed 
the validity of using traded volume as a measure of liquidity, it is important to also note that other research 
(e.g. Fleming, 2003) found the traded volume to not be related to price impact measures of liquidity or the 
bid-ask spread, but rather to the variance of liquidity, or liquidity risk (Johnson, 2008).  
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The third illiquidity measure employed is the Turnover Price Impact ratio (TPI) 
proposed by Florackis et al. (2011) and empirically used to measure liquidity of European 
stocks in the work of Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013). The turnover price impact of firm i 
in month m is calculated as the monthly average of the daily ratio between the absolute 
return of stock i and its turnover rate calculated as the number of shares traded in day d over 
the number of shares outstanding. The construction of the TPI measure is presented in 
equation (3.3). To reduce concerns regarding the presence of large TPI values potentially 
influencing results, TPI is winsorized by the top one percent largest values of its distribution.  
                                                    𝑇𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑚 =
1
𝐷𝑖𝑚
∑
|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑑|
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑑
𝐷𝑖𝑚
𝑑=1                                         (3.3) 
As Florackis et al. (2011) argue, TPI has several advantages compared to the 
Amivest liquidity ratio or Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. Firstly, it allows for 
comparability across different markets as it does not require information on price levels or 
exchange-rate adjustments. Secondly, it is free from any bias related to firms’ market 
capitalization as turnover ratios should not be linked to a company’s size, whereas trading 
volume which is used in place of the turnover ratio in Amivest and Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
ratio is higher for large companies. Lastly, it controls for trading costs as well as trading 
frequency, two important determinants of liquidity.   
The fourth illiquidity measure investigated is the proportion of days with zero 
returns (Zeros) proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999) and employed by Bekaert et al. (2007) 
to measure illiquidity in their study on expected returns in emerging markets. Zeros is easily 
constructed as the number of days with zero returns for stock i in month m divided by the 
number of trading days in month m, as shown in equation (3.4).  
                     𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑚 =  
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑚
                                       (3.4) 
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As Goyenko et al. (2009) explain, Zeros can be considered a measure of illiquidity 
as stocks with lower liquidity are more subject to having zero-volume days and thus having 
zero-return days. Moreover, Bekaert et al. (2007) documents, in the context of the U.S. 
market, that Zeros has a positive correlation of 0.3 with the bid-ask spread, a measure of 
transaction costs and a correlation of 0.91 with the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, thereby 
indicating that Zeros is tightly related to the time series-variation of other well-established 
illiquidity measures, especially price impact proxies.  
The fifth and final illiquidity measure investigated is the relative bid-ask spread 
(BAS), one of the most well established and widely used measures of trade transaction costs 
(Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud et al. (2005)). The relative bid-ask spread for 
stock i in month m is computed as the monthly average of the daily ratio of the difference 
between ask and bid quotes divided by the mid-point of the bid and ask quotes, as described 
in equation (3.5).  
                                    𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑚 =
1
𝐷𝑖𝑚
∑
𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑚𝑑−𝑃𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑑
(𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑚𝑑+𝑃𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑑)
2
𝐷𝑖𝑚
𝑑=1                                         (3.5) 
Besides computing monthly averages of the illiquidity measures for each individual 
stock in our sample which are used as dependent variables, we also compute equally-
weighted cross-sectional averages of our illiquidity measures to control for the overall level 
of market liquidity in our panel estimations.7   
 
                                                            
7 In line with previous papers (e.g. Fontaine et al. 2016), we use the cross-sectional median of Amivest and 
TPI to obtain the corresponding market liquidity variables, while for the other three measures we compute 
equally-weighted cross-sectional averages. This is due to the very high range of values obtained for Amivest 
and TPI due to their calculation, outliers potentially distorting the relevancy of cross-sectional averages.  
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3.2.3 Monetary policy variables 
In line with previous studies (e.g. Sauer and Sturm, 2007; Fernandez-Amador et al. 2013; 
Jimenez et al. 2014), we measure monetary policy (monetary stance) through the means of 
the short-term interest rates. Our main monetary policy variable is Sterling Overnight Index 
Average (SONIA). For robustness, we also estimate our models using the Bank of England 
Base Rate (BankRate), the 3-month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and the 2-week 
repo rate (Repo) as monetary policy variables.  
Although the proposed interest rates display very high pairwise correlations between 
0.98 and 0.99 throughout our sample period, it is interesting to investigate them separately, 
due to differences in their maturity and risks that they capture. Specifically, SONIA reflects 
banks’ overnight funding rate in the Sterling unsecured market and is recommended by the 
Working Group on Sterling Risk-Free Reference Rates as the preferred near-risk free 
interest rate benchmark (Bank of England, 2017; Joyce et al. 2008). In contrast, the three-
month LIBOR rate represents the interest rate over unsecured deposits that a bank is willing 
to offer to another bank over a 3-month period. Moreover, as Moinas et al (2017) describe, 
LIBOR can increase due to default or counterparty risk or due to poor interbank liquidity 
conditions. Finally, the two-week repo rate indicates the rate at which one bank lends funds 
to another bank for two weeks against an asset of suitable quality (General Collateral), 
thereby measuring the cost of secured lending (Moinas et al. 2017). Throughout this paper, 
we focus our attention on the results relating to the SONIA interest rate. However, for 
robustness, we also present results for the other three interest rates. A higher (lower) level 
of the proposed interest rates indicate a tightening (relaxation) of monetary policy. The 
interest rates are used as explanatory variables in our panel estimations. In this context, we 
expect interest rates to have a negative relationship with the liquidity variables (TV, Amivest) 
and a positive relationship with illiquidity variables (TPI, Zeros, BAS). 
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3.2.4 Differential effects of short-term interest rates on illiquidity 
We investigate whether short-term interest rates impact illiquidity differently depending on 
individual stocks’ market capitalization and volatility. Moreover, we also explore whether 
the magnitude and significance of these relationships changes before and after the financial 
crisis. Literature predicts that a monetary tightening, measured through a higher SONIA rate, 
would lead to higher levels of illiquidity for stocks with small market capitalization and 
high volatility. To empirically test these predictions, we employ two interaction terms. 
Firstly, to measure the differential impact of monetary policy on liquidity that is due to size 
we interact the natural logarithm of market value with our monetary policy variable 
(𝑀𝑃 ×  ln (𝑀𝑉)). Secondly, the asymmetric relationship driven by volatility is tested by 
interacting the monthly standard deviation of stock returns, with the monetary policy 
variable (𝑀𝑃 ×  𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣). Lastly, to investigate whether the dynamics of the relationship 
between monetary policy and illiquidity change during the financial crisis, we construct a 
dummy variable (𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) taking the value of 1 between September 2007 and March 2009 
and 0 otherwise. We then interact 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 and its correspondent for the non-crisis period (1- 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠), in turn, with the monetary policy measure and the two interaction terms. The 
delimitation of the financial crisis to this time-frame is in line with Kontonikas et al. (2013).  
 
3.2.5 Control variables 
The panel regression models which are employed in the empirical analysis control for both 
macroeconomic and individual stock variables which are known determinants of monetary 
policy or stock liquidity. In line with Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013), we include the 
monthly stock return, the monthly standard deviation of daily returns and the natural 
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logarithm of market capitalization as individual stock variables. The inclusion of the 
monthly stock return (Ret) is motivated by the findings of Hameed et al. (2010) who 
document that negative returns increase stock illiquidity, especially during tight funding 
periods. We include the standard deviation of daily stock returns (Std. Dev.) because among 
others Stoll (2000) document that volatility of stock returns is positively related to 
illiquidity. Moreover, we include the natural logarithm of market value (ln(MV)) in line with 
the arguments of Amihud (2002) that stocks’ market capitalization is a determinant of 
illiquidity. With respect to macroeconomic controls, we follow Goyenko and Ukhov (2009), 
Naes et al. (2011) and Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) and include the rolling twelve-month 
growth rates of the U.K. industrial production (gIP) and consumer price index (gCPI) to 
control for inflation and the U.K.  MSCI stock market index (MSCI) to control for stock 
market cyclicality. Differently from Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) and in line with the 
theoretical predictions of mutual reinforcement of funding liquidity and market liquidity 
documented by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and to control for any other possible 
common factors determining liquidity for which we do not directly account, we also include 
the level of funding liquidity proxied by the U.K. TED spread (TED), measured as the 
difference between the three-month LIBOR rate and the three-month Sterling T-bill rate, 
and the level of market liquidity (Mkt. Liq.) measured, in turn, by the cross-sectional average 
of the five (il)liquidity variables.  
3.3 Empirical setting  
3.3.1 The effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity 
To examine the influence of monetary policy on the illiquidity of individual stocks as well 
as the differential dispersion of illiquidity related to size and volatility, our baseline model 
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follows the predictive panel data framework presented by Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) 
and is presented in equation (3.6).  
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛾4𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×
 𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛾5𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                                             (3.6) 
Equation (3.6) models the stock liquidity of stock i in month t (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡) as a function of the 
following one-month lagged monthly variables: the (il)liquidity measure investigated 
(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1), the monetary policy measure examined (𝑀𝑃𝑡−1), interaction between monetary 
policy and market capitalization (𝑀𝑃𝑡−1×𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1), interaction between monetary 
policy and volatility (𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1), microeconomic controls such as stock return 
(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1), standard deviation of daily returns (𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1) and natural logarithm of 
market capitalization (𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1) represented by the vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 and macroeconomic 
controls such as twelve month growth rates of industrial production (𝑔𝐼𝑃𝑡−1), inflation 
(𝑔𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1), the U.K. MSCI stock market index (𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡−1), the level of funding liquidity 
(𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1) and level of market liquidity (𝑀𝑘𝑡. 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑡−1) represented by the vector 𝑌𝑡−1.
8 
Estimations are performed using cross-section fixed effects (ci) and time-clustered standard 
errors9,10,11,12.  
                                                            
8 We note that the model of Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) is augmented by the interaction between monetary 
policy and standard deviation of daily stock returns and additionally controls for the levels of funding and 
market liquidity.  
9 We keep the lag length equal to one, as in Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013). Visual inspection of the residuals 
does not indicate the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals. 
10 We test for stationarity of the variables by applying the panel unit root test of Levin et al. (2002) and the 
ADF unit-root test of Dickey and Fuller (1979).  
11 We are aware that causation may run in the opposite direction, from stock liquidity to monetary policy. 
However, Fernandez-Amador et al (2013) finds very little evidence to support this hypothesis, causation 
predominantly running from monetary policy to stock liquidity.  
12 We are aware that by estimating a panel model including cross-section fixed effects and a lagged dependent 
variable, the estimates of the coefficients could potentially be biased, as indicated by Nickell (1981). However, 
the bias decreases as the number of time periods becomes large, going to zero as the time dimension becomes 
infinite (Nickell, 1981). Judson and Owen (1999) show that when using a panel fixed effects estimator in a 
panel setting with a time-dimension of 10 waves the bias can be as large as 23%. Judson and Owen (1999) 
further show that the bias is lowered considerably when considering longer time-dimensions; for example, 
with a time-dimension of 30, the bias can only be as large as 6%. These results are confirmed by Beck and 
Katz (2011), who find that the Nickell (1981) bias gets smaller as the time-dimension is increased; while the 
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3.3.2 The effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity during and outside the financial 
crisis period 
In a second step, we augment our baseline model (3.6) to disentangle the effects of monetary 
policy on liquidity during and outside of the financial crisis period. To do this, we interact 
our lagged crisis dummy (𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1) and its correspondent for the period excluding the 
financial crisis (1- 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1) with our monetary policy variable and interaction terms. The 
resulting model, presented in (3.7), enables us to examine whether the dynamics of the 
monetary policy – stock liquidity relationship changed during the recent financial crisis.  
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  ln(𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1  +
𝛾4𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛾5(1 − 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1) × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛾6(1 − 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1) ×
𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  ln(𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾7(1 − 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1) × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛾8𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾9𝑌𝑡−1 +
𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡              (3.7) 
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the variables included in the panel estimations.  
Panel (a) presents descriptive statistics for the liquidity measures employed and individual 
stock related controls, while Panel (b) describes the macroeconomic variables (monetary 
policy and controls). It is interesting to note that among the liquidity measures, Amivest and 
TPI vary widely throughout the sample compared to the other three liquidity measures, 
while the U.K. monetary policy variables display very similar statistics.  
                                                            
bias term is extremely large for two or three wave panels, this drops to below 3% when considering a time-
dimension of 40 waves. Considering that, in this study, we use a time-dimension of 204 waves (months), we 
argue that this is large enough to ignore a possible Nickell (1981) bias. However, several alternative 
methodologies are available to estimate this relationship, such as using instrumental variables, as suggested 
by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991), a corrected least-squares dummy variable 
estimator proposed by Kiviet (1995), or estimating the relationship in first-differences, if the estimate of the 
lagged dependent variable is not close to unity (Abonazel, 2016) 
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Table 3.2 presents pairwise correlations between the individual stock related 
variables. Noteworthy, as expected, we find a negative relationship between the liquidity 
variables (Amivest and TV) and the illiquidity variables (TPI, Zeros and BAS). Additionally, 
bi-variate correlations between the five (il)liquidity variables do not exceed +/- 0.633, 
highlighting the different features of liquidity that they measure and reinforcing the notion 
that unless one’s focus is to isolate one aspect of liquidity, multiple measures examining 
liquidity should be taken into consideration (Fernandez-Amador et al. 2013). We also find 
that the natural logarithm of market value has a positive (negative) correlation with liquidity 
(illiquidity) variables and the standard deviation of daily stock returns has a negative 
(positive) correlation with (il)liquidity variables, as suggested by previous research. The 
correlations between (il)liquidity measures and stock returns are also as expected, except 
for the result for Zeros. 
 
3.4.2 Results of panel regressions 
3.4.2.1 Effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity  
We start by estimating the model presented in equation (3.6) for each of the five (il)liquidity 
measures and four monetary policy variables considered.13 We focus our analysis on the 
results of the impact of monetary policy (stance) measured by the 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 interest rate 
on the (il)liquidity of individual stocks. However, for completeness, we also report results 
for the other three interest rates considered and discuss these results in the robustness section 
                                                            
13 We also estimated the original model of Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013), without the inclusion of the 
interaction term between volatility and monetary policy and the market and funding liquidity measures. In 
unreported results, we find that all monetary policy variables and interaction terms between market 
capitalization and monetary policy are highly significant (5% significance level or higher), except for the 
monetary policy variable in the model where liquidity is measured by the traded volume (TV). The magnitudes, 
signs and significance of all estimated coefficients are closely comparable to the results of Fernandez-Amador 
et al. (2013). Therefore, we obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results for the U.K. market as for 
the German market, when using an identical model to that of Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013). 
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(section 3.5). Empirical results for the estimations using 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 as the monetary policy 
variable are presented in Table 3.3. 
Investigating the results presented in Table 3.3, we note that a tightening of monetary 
policy measured by a higher 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 rate is associated with a significant decrease in 
liquidity as measured by 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 and a significant increase in illiquidity as measured by 
𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡. Therefore, a higher 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 rate decreases stock liquidity, as proxied by the two 
price impact measures. We find insignificant results of the effect of monetary policy on 
(il)liquidity when the latter is measured through 𝑇𝑉𝑡, 𝑇𝑃𝐼𝑡 and 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡. Moreover, by 
examining the results of the interaction term (𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 * 𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1), we note that except for 
the results concerning the bid-ask spread 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡, we document a statistically significant 
stronger effect of monetary policy on small firms, the impact of monetary policy on liquidity 
decreasing with firm size. This result is in line with empirical evidence provided by 
Fernandez-Amador et al (2013) for the Euro zone market. Additionally, by investigating the 
second interaction factor (𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1), we document that the effect of 
monetary policy on (il)liquidity significantly increases with firm volatility, when measuring 
(il)liquidity with 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡, 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡.  Therefore, the results corresponding to the 
second interaction term suggest that a tightening of monetary policy leads to increased 
illiquidity, the effect being stronger for high volatility firms. This empirical result is novel 
and in line with the theoretical predictions of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and 
Kondor and Vayanos (2016). The results for the selected control variables are, in large, as 
predicted by literature, the lagged stock return and lagged stock market capitalization having 
a positive effect on liquidity, while the standard deviation of daily stock returns has a 
negative effect on liquidity when measured by 𝑇𝑉𝑡. All in all, the hypothesis that a tightening 
(relaxation) of monetary policy increases (decreases) the illiquidity of individual stocks is 
generally confirmed, this effect being particularly significant when liquidity is measured 
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through price impact of trade proxies such as 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡. Unlike results for the 
European market presented by Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013), we do not find a significant 
relationship between monetary policy and volume-related or transaction cost measures of 
liquidity. Results also confirm that monetary policy has a stronger effect on small stocks, as 
also found by Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) and newly documents that monetary policy 
has a larger impact on high-volatility firms. 
 
3.4.2.2 Effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity during and outside the 2007-2009 
financial crisis 
In the next step, we investigate whether the relationships found by evaluating the model 
presented in (3.6) change during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This investigation is 
motivated by the results of Gregoriou et al. (2009), Kontonikas et al. (2013) and Florackis 
et al. (2014) which document that the effect of monetary policy on stock returns changes its 
expected sign during the recent financial crisis, highlighting the ineffectiveness of 
conventional monetary policy (interest rate changes) during the crisis period. To check 
whether there is a differential impact of monetary policy on stock illiquidity during the 
financial crisis, we estimated the model presented in equation (3.7).  
Table 3.4 presents results when evaluating monetary policy with the 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 rate. 
The results paint a mixed picture of the effect of monetary policy on stock illiquidity during 
and outside the financial crisis. Overall, we find that monetary policy generally proves 
effective in impacting stock liquidity, more so during the financial crisis period. More 
specifically, we find that during the financial crisis, the 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 interest rate has a 
negative (positive) effect on the liquidity (illiquidity) measures. This suggests that a 
monetary tightening (relaxation) measured through a higher (lower) 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 decreases 
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(increases) the liquidity of individual stocks. This result is statistically significant for all 
(il)liquidity variables, except for 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡. In contrast, outside the financial crisis, 
monetary policy has the expected effect on liquidity only when the latter is measured 
through 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡. We also note a significant, counter-intuitive result with 
respect to the effect of monetary policy on the bid-ask spread outside the financial crisis, 
where a higher 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 rate reduces transaction costs. In terms of magnitude of 
coefficients, the effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity is larger outside the financial 
crisis when measuring liquidity through 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡, while the effect is larger 
during the financial crisis, when measuring liquidity through 𝑇𝑉𝑡, 𝑇𝑃𝐼𝑡 and 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡. We also 
document that the effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity is significantly larger for 
small stocks both during and outside the financial crisis. This result is in line with previous 
literature suggesting that small caps are more affected by monetary shocks (Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995), Kashyap and Stein (2000)). Moreover, we find that the effect of monetary 
policy on stock liquidity is stronger for volatile stocks only outside the financial crisis. This 
result is surprising as, among others, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) suggest that 
particularly in periods of low funding liquidity, such as during the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis, illiquidity increases the most for volatile stocks.  
3.5 Robustness checks  
To provide robustness to our results, we re-estimate models (3.6) and (3.7) proxying the 
monetary policy variable alternatively with the other three U.K. short-term interest rates 
investigated (the Bank of England Base Rate (BankRate), the 3-month London Interbank 
Offer Rate (LIBOR) and the 2-week repo rate (Repo)). Summary results for the main 
variables of interest (𝑀𝑃𝑡−1, 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1and 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1* 𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1)  when 
estimating model (3.6) are presented in Table 3.5. Examining Table 3.5, we note that the 
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results obtained when proxying monetary stance by 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 are, in large, confirmed for 
the other three alternative short-term interest rates. A tightening of monetary policy is 
associated with an increase in illiquidity as measured by 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡. However, 
we do not find a significant impact of monetary policy on stock liquidity when evaluating 
liquidity via the trading volume, turnover price impact or the bid-ask spread. Monetary 
policy has a significant impact on illiquidity as measured by 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 only when we use 
the two-week repo rate as monetary policy measure. We also find robust evidence that the 
effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity is stronger for small firms, indifferent of the 
liquidity proxy chosen, and for high volatility firms, when evaluating (il)liquidity by 
𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 , 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡.  
Table 3.6 presents summary results for the main variables of interest (𝑀𝑃𝑡−1, 
𝑀𝑃𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1and 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1* 𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1) during and outside the financial crisis, 
when evaluating 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 with the three alternative short-term interest rates (𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1, 
𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−1). Results suggest that, during the crisis, a monetary tightening 
(relaxation) decreases (increases) the liquidity of individual stocks. This relationship is 
significant when examining all liquidity measures except when evaluating illiquidity via 
𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡. Outside the financial crisis period, monetary tightening has a positive effect on 
stock illiquidity only when the latter is measured by 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡. The results 
obtained when evaluating transaction costs as measured by the bid-ask spread are counter-
intuitive. The stronger monetary policy effect on small firms is present both during and 
outside the financial crisis, while the stronger effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity 
of volatile firms is more pronounced outside the financial crisis.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
The present study uses a panel setting to explore the effect of monetary policy on the 
liquidity of individual stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange. We examine this 
relationship by employing five different measures of (il)liquidity quantifying the different 
aspects of liquidity such as trading activity, price impact and transaction costs. Monetary 
policy (monetary stance) is measured through short-term interest rates. We investigate 
whether monetary tightening (relaxation) as measured through a higher (lower) level of 
short-term interest rates induces a reduction (increase) in stock liquidity. Additionally, we 
analyse whether the impact of monetary policy on liquidity depends on individual stock 
characteristics such as market capitalization and volatility as measured by the monthly 
standard deviation of daily stock returns. Furthermore, we explore whether the effect of 
monetary policy on stock liquidity differs during the financial crisis, a period marked by 
severe reductions in market and funding liquidity. 
We present evidence that: (1) monetary tightening (relaxation) is associated with an 
increase (decrease) in individual stock illiquidity, in line with previous findings for the Euro 
zone market presented by Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013); (2) the impact of monetary 
policy depends on stocks’ market capitalization and volatility, a monetary tightening having 
a stronger effect on small market capitalization stocks and stocks with high volatility; (3) 
the effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity is more significant during the recent 
financial crisis compared to the rest of the sample. The asymmetric impact of monetary 
policy on stock liquidity associated with firm size is statistically significant in both regimes, 
while the asymmetric relationship due to volatility is only significant outside the financial 
crisis. 
Although the models are estimated using cross-section fixed effects and include two 
monetary policy interaction terms, with market capitalization and volatility, respectively, as 
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well as control for the overall level of market liquidity and funding liquidity this may not 
be enough to account for all possible forms of cross-sectional heterogeneity and future work 
could account differently for the potential problem of cross-sectional heterogeneity which 
may not be sufficiently addressed. Moreover, future research could investigate the effect of 
monetary policy on bond market liquidity and hedge fund liquidity.  
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel (a): Panel Variables TV AMIVEST TPI ZEROS BAS RET STDEV MV 
 Mean of monthly means 14.135 202.782 126.672 0.174 0.026 0.004 0.025 5.750 
 Median of monthly means 13.975 6.769 5.697 0.100 0.014 0.006 0.020 5.676 
 Maximum monthly mean 22.399 25347.900 9099.128 0.565 1.737 2.520 1.464 12.272 
 Minimum monthly mean 2.763 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -4.397 0.001 -4.605 
Mean of monthly standard deviation 2.544 819.887 559.353 0.163 0.043 0.154 0.021 2.112 
Mean of monthly skewness 0.180 9.698 8.973 0.859 8.655 -0.338 8.466 0.105 
                  
Panel (b): Time variables SONIA BankRate LIBOR Repo TED gCPI gIP 
Mean 2.488 2.528 2.743 2.481 0.333 0.021 -0.006 
Median 0.536 0.500 1.206 0.541 0.194 0.020 -0.001 
Maximum 6.126 6.038 6.581 5.872 2.268 0.052 0.057 
Minimum 0.410 0.500 0.484 0.415 0.063 -0.001 -0.113 
Standard Deviation 2.207 2.195 2.226 2.174 0.348 0.012 0.031 
Skewness 0.279 0.267 0.280 0.278 3.035 0.306 -1.396 
 
Notes: Panel (a) provides descriptive statistics of the five illiquidity measures (traded volume (TV), Amivest measure of liquidity (AMIVEST), turnover price 
impact (TPI), proportion of days with zero returns (ZEROS) and relative bid-ask spread (BAS)), stock return (RET), standard deviation of stock returns 
(STDEV) and the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (MV) for all stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange as of December 2015. Panel (b) 
provides summary statistics for the five monetary policy measures (Sterling mean overnight interbank lending rate (SONIA), official Bank of England Bank 
Rate (BANKRATE), three-month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and two-week Repo rate (Repo)), the U.K. TED spread (TED), rolling 12-month 
inflation rate (gCPI) and rolling 12-month growth rate of U.K. industrial production (gIP). Time span: January 1999 - December 2015. 
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Table 3.2: Correlation matrix of time-series means of the monthly bivariate cross-sectional correlations 
 
 
  AMIVEST TV TPI ZEROS BAS RET STDEV MV 
AMIVEST 1 0.454 -0.051 -0.181 -0.139 0.000 -0.116 0.473 
TV   1 -0.191 -0.633 -0.503 0.029 -0.231 0.903 
TPI     1 0.104 0.199 -0.036 0.164 -0.054 
ZEROS       1 0.425 0.020 0.101 -0.634 
BAS         1 -0.002 0.379 -0.541 
RET           1 -0.023 0.029 
STDEV             1 -0.383 
MV               1 
 
Notes: Table 3.2 presents pairwise cross-sectional correlations between the five (il)liquidity variables (traded volume (TV), Amivest measure of liquidity 
(AMIVEST), turnover price impact (TPI), proportion of days with zero returns (ZEROS) and relative bid-ask spread (BAS)), stock return (RET), standard 
deviation of stock returns (STDEV) and the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (MV) for all stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange as of 
December 2015. Time span: January 1999 - December 2015. 
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Table 3.3: The effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity - SONIA 
            
  Liquidity measures Illiquidity measures 
  Trading activity Price impact  Transaction costs 
Dep. Var. (𝐿𝑖𝑞. 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡) TV Amivest TPI Zeros BAS 
𝐿𝑖𝑞. 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.538*** 0.536*** 0.467*** 0.598*** 0.840*** 
  (107.848) (16.627) (32.913) (121.122) (57.322) 
𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 -0.010 -20.122* 3.010 0.010*** 0.000 
  (-0.652) (-1.716) (1.101) (6.367) (0.09) 
𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.012*** 5.622*** -0.739** -0.001*** -0.000 
  (9.318) (2.893) (-2.128) (-3.085) (-1.617) 
𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.081 -130.357*** 7.296 0.033** 0.026*** 
  (-0.707) (-2.958) (0.534) (2.046) (3.575) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.016 9.780 -8.545 -0.018*** -0.029*** 
  (-0.489) (1.109) (-0.594) (-3.324) (-17.227) 
𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.999*** 137.162 -19.882** -0.100** -0.105*** 
  (-2.645) (1.349) (-0.331) (-2.093) (-4.855) 
𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.396*** 23.457*** -7.367*** -0.040*** -0.004*** 
  (43.472) (5.364) (2.915) (-37.918) (-8.418) 
𝑔𝐼𝑃𝑡−1 -1.166** -300.859*** -115.673 0.029 0.006 
  (-2.233) (-2.629) (-1.579) (0.311) (0.779) 
𝑔𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 0.125 375.264 619.634*** -0.357 0.010 
  (0.093) (1.056) (3.019) (-1.265) (0.382) 
𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 0.145 80.245*** -2.513 -0.044** 0.000 
  (1.542) (3.562) (-0.188) (-2.335) (-0.16) 
𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 -0.144*** -42.036** 20.842*** -0.024* 0.003 
  (-2.591) (-2.497) (2.737) (-1.774) (1.486) 
𝑀𝑘𝑡. 𝐿𝑖𝑞.𝑡−1 -0.122 -3.192** 0.001 -0.259*** 0.054*** 
  (-1.279) (-2.123) (0.641) (-4.319) (2.984) 
N 1196 1092 1188 1232 1232 
Adj.R2 0.928 0.759 0.466 0.839 0.877 
 
 
Notes: Table 3.3 presents results for the estimation of the baseline model presented in (3.6): 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾0 +
𝛾1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  ln(𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛾4𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛾5𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑖 +
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 . The five (il)liquidity measures tested are: traded volume (TV), Amivest measure of liquidity (Amivest), 
turnover price impact (TPI), proportion of days with zero returns (Zeros) and relative bid-ask spread (BAS). 
Monetary policy is measured by the Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA). Ret is the monthly stock 
return. Std.Dev. is the monthly standard deviation of stock returns. ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market 
value. gIP is the growth in industrial production. 𝑔𝐶𝑃𝐼 is the growth in the consumer price index. MSCI is the 
U.K. MSCI stock market index. TED is the U.K. TED spread. Mkt.Liq. represents the market liquidity. 
Estimation is performed using cross-section fixed effects and period-clustered standard errors.  t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses.  ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Time span: 
January 1999 – December 2015. 
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Table 3.4:  Effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity during and outside the financial crisis - SONIA 
 
 Liquidity Measures Illiquidity Measures 
 
Trading 
activity 
Price impact 
Transaction 
costs 
Dep. Var. (𝐿𝑖𝑞. 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡) TV Amivest TPI Zeros BAS 
𝐿𝑖𝑞. 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.537*** 0.534*** 0.467*** 0.595*** 0.839*** 
 (108.705) (16.597) (32.887) (124.748) (57.620) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1*𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 -0.061*** 2.877 14.139*** 0.006** 0.002** 
 (-3.632) (0.147) (3.081) (2.237) (2.027) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1*𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.019*** 0.859 -1.979*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (11.127) (0.243) (-2.753) (-2.848 (-2.669) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1*𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.129 11.375 4.964 0.036 0.024 
 (-0.986) (0.216) (0.253) (1.306) (1.575) 
(1 − 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 0.018 -27.798** -0.850 0.011*** -0.001** 
 (1.137) (-2.052) (-0.323) (6.914) (-2.494) 
(1 − 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.009*** 7.478*** -0.247 -0.001** 0.000 
 (7.106) (3.385) (-0.826) (-2.511 (0.913) 
(1 − 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.038 -173.569*** 7.426 0.043** 0.028*** 
 (-0.310) (-2.977) (0.538) (2.403 (4.223) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.024 16.938** -6.625 -0.019*** -0.029*** 
 (-0.726) (2.105) (-0.456) (-3.542) (-18.067) 
𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 -1.06*** 142.703 -15.469 -0.13*** -0.104*** 
 (-2.807) (1.344) (-0.258) (-2.735) (-4.827) 
𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.403*** 23.062*** -8.662*** -0.039*** -0.004*** 
 (45.588) (5.257) (-3.416) (-37.720) (-9.029) 
𝑔𝐼𝑃𝑡−1 -0.972* -287.851** -152.282** 0.063 0.005 
 (-1.838) (-2.393) (-2.156) (0.689) (0.705) 
𝑔𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 -0.114 333.614 645.744*** -0.373 0.009 
 (-0.087) (0.944) (3.278) (-1.371) (0.367) 
𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 0.194** 84.5*** -7.793 -0.039** 0.000 
 (2.063) (3.854) (-0.598) (-2.078) (-0.176) 
𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 -0.065 -39.15** 1.128 -0.003 0.002 
 (-0.994) (-2.442) (0.124) (-0.224) (1.359) 
𝑀𝑘𝑡. 𝐿𝑖𝑞.𝑡−1 -0.193** -4.293** 0.002 -0.287*** 0.055*** 
 (-1.989) (-2.385) (0.799) (-4.643) (3.131) 
N 1196 1092 1188 1232 1232 
Adj.R2 0.928 0.759 0.466 0.839 0.877 
 
Notes: Table 3.4 presents results for the estimation of the model presented in (3.7): 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾0 +
𝛾1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  ln(𝑀𝑉) .𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×
 𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛾5(1 − 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1) × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛾6(1 − 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1) × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  ln(𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾7(1 −
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1) × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛾8𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾9𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. The five (il)liquidity measures tested 
are: traded volume (TV), Amivest liquidity (Amivest), turnover price impact (TPI), proportion of days with 
zero returns (Zeros) and relative bid-ask spread (BAS). Ret is the monthly stock return. Std.Dev. is the monthly 
standard deviation of stock returns. ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market value. gIP is the growth in 
industrial production. 𝑔𝐶𝑃𝐼 is the consumer price index growth. MSCI is the MSCI stock market index. TED 
is the U.K. TED spread. Mkt.Liq. represents the market liquidity. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, 
** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Time span: January 1999 - December 2015. 
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Table 3.5: The effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity - Alternative monetary policy measures 
 
 Liquidity Measures Illiquidity Measures 
  
Trading 
activity 
Price impact  
Transaction 
costs 
Dep. Var. (𝐿𝑖𝑞. 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡) TV Amivest TPI Zeros BAS 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 -0.011 -17.170 2.883 0.010*** 0.000 
  (-0.721) (-1.458) (1.036) (6.48) (0.213) 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.012*** 5.069*** -0.725** -0.001*** -0.000* 
  (9.245) (2.599) (-2.061) (-3.087) (-1.734) 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.068 -136.218*** 7.922 0.033** 0.026*** 
  (-0.594) (-3.137) (0.574) (2.025) (3.673) 
𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 -0.013 -13.361 4.404 0.010*** 0.000 
  (-0.783) (-1.144) (1.630) (6.196) (0.812) 
𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.012*** 4.465** -0.943*** -0.001*** -0.000** 
  (10.181) (2.268) (-2.650) (-3.388) (-2.187) 
𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 0.019 -109.671*** 4.705 0.034** 0.025*** 
  (0.181) (-2.613) (0.371) (2.017) (3.432) 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−1 -0.011 -19.989* 3.100 0.010*** 0.000 
  (-0.723) (-1.676) (1.106) (6.301) (0.183) 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.012*** 5.618*** -0.755** -0.001*** -0.000* 
  (9.401) (2.836) (-2.119) (-3.11) (-1.662) 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.068 -131.529*** 7.842 0.033** 0.026*** 
  (-0.594) (-2.96) (0.564) (1.994) (3.567) 
N 1196 1092 1188 1232 1232 
Adj.R2 0.93 0.76 0.47 0.84 0.88 
 
Notes: Table 3.5 presents summary results for the main variables of interest (MPt-1, MPt-1*MVi,t-1 
and MPt-1* Std.Dev.i,t-1) of the estimations of the baseline model presented in (3.6): 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾0 +
𝛾1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  ln(𝑀𝑉) .𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  ×  𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛾5𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛾6𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. The five (il)liquidity measures tested are: traded volume (TV), Amivest measure 
of liquidity (Amivest), turnover price impact (TPI), proportion of days with zero returns (Zeros) and 
relative bid-ask spread (BAS). The alternative monetary policy (MP) measures are the Bank of 
England Base Rate (BankRate), the 3-month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), the two-week 
repo rate (Repo). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Estimations are performed using cross-section fixed effects and period-
clustered standard errors. Time span: January 1999 – December 2015. 
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Table 3.6: The effect of monetary policy on stock liquidity during and outside the financial crisis – 
Alternative monetary policy measures 
 
  Liquidity Measures Illiquidity Measures 
  
Trading 
activity 
Price impact  
Transaction 
costs 
Dep. Var. (𝐿𝑖𝑞. 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡) TV Amivest TPI Zeros BAS 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1*𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 -0.063*** 6.115 14.259*** 0.007** 0.002** 
  (-3.643) (0.315) (3.065) (2.296) (2.132) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1* 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.020*** 0.355 -1.987*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
  (11.258) (0.101) (-2.772) (-2.884) (-2.769) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1* 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.114 2.363 5.213 0.036 0.025* 
  (-0.862) (0.046) (0.270) (1.284) (1.669) 
(1-𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 0.015 -25.118* -1.064 0.011*** -0.001** 
  (0.968) (-1.845) (-0.400) (7.043) (-2.391) 
(1-𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.009*** 6.894*** -0.223 -0.001** 0.000 
  (7.080) (3.111) (-0.737) (-2.51) (0.742) 
(1-𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.037 -184.67*** 8.613 0.042** 0.028*** 
  (-0.297) (-3.244) (0.616) (2.279) (4.352) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1*𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 -0.049*** 9.015 13.337*** 0.006** 0.002** 
  (-2.961) (0.533) (3.226) (2.388) (2.431) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1* 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.018*** 0.073 -1.844*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
  (12.183) (0.024) (-3.038) (-3.118) (-3.033) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1* 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 0.020 0.066 1.504 0.035 0.021* 
  (0.171) (0.001) (0.096) (1.326) (1.757) 
(1-𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 0.016 -24.806* 0.063 0.011*** -0.001** 
  (1.000) (-1.762) (0.025) (6.913) (-2.246) 
(1-𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 * 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.01*** 7.003*** -0.397 -0.001*** 0.000 
  (7.589) (3.046) (-1.318) (-2.708) (0.353) 
(1-𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 *𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 0.030 -178.83*** 7.405 0.042** 0.029*** 
  (0.241) (-3.000) (0.556) (2.202) (4.508) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1*𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−1 -0.062*** 2.519 14.205** 0.006** 0.002** 
  (-3.593) (0.125) (4.629) (2.226) (2.069) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1* 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−1* 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.02*** 0.825 -1.986*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
  (11.331) (0.234) (-2.753) (-2.875) (-2.691) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1* 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−1*𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.111 14.961 4.705 0.036 0.024 
  (-0.862) (0.29) (-0.241) (1.294) (1.578) 
(1-𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−1 0.017 -32.837** -0.931 0.011*** -0.001** 
  (1.081) (-2.554) (-0.346) (6.896) (-2.437) 
(1-𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−1 * 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑉)𝑖,𝑡−1 0.009*** 7.501*** -0.244 -0.001** 0.000 
  (7.163) (3.323) (-0.801) (-2.53) (0.878) 
(1-𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)* 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−1 *𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.025 -160.68*** 8.424 0.043** 0.028*** 
  (-0.208) (-2.894) (0.596) (2.333) (4.257) 
Notes: Table 3.6 presents summary results for the main variables of interest (MPt-1, MPt-1*MVi,t-1 and MPt-1* 
Std.Dev.i,t-1) during the financial crisis (interactions with (𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)) and outside of the financial crisis 
(interactions with (1 − 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1)) of the estimations of the model presented in equation (3.7) The five 
(il)liquidity measures tested are: traded volume (TV), Amivest measure of liquidity (Amivest), turnover price 
impact (TPI), proportion of days with zero returns (Zeros) and relative bid-ask spread (BAS). The alternative 
monetary policy (MP) measures are the Bank of England Base Rate (BankRate), the 3-month London 
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), the two-week repo rate (Repo). t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, 
** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Estimations are performed using cross-section 
fixed effects and period-clustered standard errors. Time span: January 1999 – December 2015.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The liquidity of financial markets has been an important topic of investigation in the finance 
literature throughout the past decades. The multitude of research investigating the effects of 
liquidity on financial markets highlights the multiple dimensions of liquidity. One of these 
aspects is market liquidity, defined as the ease with which market participants can transact 
or the capability of markets to handle large transactions without a large impact on prices. 
Market liquidity is itself a multi-faceted concept, referring to aspects such as market depth, 
resiliency and tightness; no one measure being able to encompass all the features comprising 
liquidity.  
Another dimension of liquidity relates to funding liquidity, defined as the ease with 
which traders can finance their operations. Despite receiving more attention from 
researchers over the past decade, the effect of funding liquidity on financial markets remains 
a relatively less studied research area, albeit one of key significance for traders and policy 
makers alike. As shown, among others, in the models of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) 
and Gromb and Vayanos (2002), funding liquidity and market liquidity are inherently 
linked. These studies suggest that, as trading requires capital, when the funding available to 
traders is tight, traders change their investment patterns becoming reluctant to take on large 
positions in high-margin securities. This leads to a deterioration of market liquidity and 
increased volatility. In turn, the decline in market liquidity further reduces traders’ funding 
liquidity through higher margin requirements, potentially leading to a liquidity loss spiral. 
This thesis builds upon these theoretical insights and empirically investigates the effects of 
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funding constraints in the context of the credit default swap (CDS) market and stock market, 
highlighting their implications for illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads.  
The first study investigates the effect of funding liquidity on the corporate CDS 
market, by examining the impact of changes in funding illiquidity on CDS spread changes. 
By employing panel estimation methods on a sample of European entities with the most 
liquid CDSs, the paper evidences a positive relationship between changes in funding 
illiquidity and credit default swap changes; a deterioration of funding conditions widening 
CDS spreads. Distinguishing between high and low default risk entities, as measured by the 
average CDS spread level, the study newly finds that the effect of changes in funding 
liquidity on CDS spread changes is approximately three times larger in magnitude when 
examining high-CDS entities compared to low-CDS entities.  
Furthermore, by separating the recent financial crisis period from the post-crisis 
period, results suggest that the positive relation between funding illiquidity changes and 
CDS spread changes is mostly driven by the post-crisis period, with results for the crisis 
period being largely insignificant. Coincidentally, the post-crisis period also overlaps with 
the period following the introduction of a set of contractual and convention changes 
affecting the European CDS market, collectively known as the ‘CDS Small Bang’. In the 
pursuit of standardizing CDS contracts, among other regulatory innovations, the CDS Small 
Bang conventions restrict coupon rates to be fixed at one of four levels. However, the 
introduction of fixed coupons gave rise to upfront fees that need to be exchanged between 
CDS buyers and sellers, with the size of the fee depending on how far away the CDS spread 
level is from the fixed coupons at inception. Therefore, the paper attributes the increased 
effect, in terms of magnitude and significance, of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread 
changes to the introduction of upfront fees for trading CDSs, following the ‘CDS Small 
Bang’ conventions. 
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The second study empirically examines the connection between funding illiquidity, 
market illiquidity, volatility and returns in the cross-section of European stock returns, 
following the theoretical framework proposed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and 
extends these linkages to CDS spreads. Theory suggests that under certain conditions, 
markedly when funding is tight, traders shift their allocations towards low risk securities, 
displaying a reluctance to invest in high margin assets. This change in investment patterns 
leads to lower market liquidity, increased volatility, de-leveraging, lower contemporaneous 
returns and the presence of a funding risk premium. The rationale for extending the effects 
of funding shocks to CDS spreads is motivated by recent findings documenting that spreads 
are highly sensitive to equity illiquidity and equity volatility, an increase in these variables, 
due to a tightening of funding constraints, leading to increased default risk which would be 
captured through CDS spreads.  
Newly using, in the context of studies investigating the cross-section of stock 
returns, a sample of firms which are part of the European iTraxx index containing entities 
with the most liquid CDSs, the first piece of evidence presented is that funding conditions 
co-move with illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads; a decrease in funding liquidity thus 
increasing portfolio illiquidity, volatility and CDS spreads. Secondly, this chapter provides 
evidence of flight-to-quality following a funding shock; the most volatile portfolios seeing 
their illiquidity increase the most. Thirdly, this study documents that the positive 
relationship between funding illiquidity changes and CDS spread changes is asymmetric, 
the impact of funding illiquidity shocks on CDS spreads increasing in magnitude and 
significance if speculators are already funding constrained. Fourthly, the paper provides 
new evidence of an asymmetric relationship between funding conditions and 
contemporaneous returns. Differentiating between positive and negative funding illiquidity 
changes, this study documents that only a tightening of funding liquidity significantly 
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decreases contemporaneous returns, whereas an improvement of funding conditions has no 
effect on returns. Lastly, this chapter documents the presence of a funding risk premium in 
the cross-section of equity returns, generating a return spread between the most and least 
illiquid portfolios of 1.21% annually.  
The third study examines the relationship between monetary policy, measured 
through short-term interest rates and stock liquidity, in the context of the U.K. market. The 
inventory paradigm of market microstructure suggests that stock liquidity is dependent on 
traders’ perceived risk of holding assets and the cost of financing their holdings. Since 
monetary policy affects both aspects, stock liquidity should display sensitivity to monetary 
policy. Moreover, the literature on funding constraints suggests that as funding becomes 
tight, traders find it difficult to meet margin requirements, dampening the liquidity of the 
market. Since monetary policy increases the cost of borrowing, this induces traders to 
operate closer to their funding constraint, leading to a reduction of liquidity provision. 
Therefore, the central hypothesis investigated in this study is that a restrictive 
(expansionary) monetary policy, by increasing (lowering) short-term interest rates, leads to 
an increase (decrease) in borrowing costs, thus reducing (improving) stock liquidity.  
Indeed, in line with the above arguments, we find that a contractionary 
(expansionary) monetary policy reduces (increases) stock liquidity. However, this effect is 
significant only when investigating price impact of trades measures, whereas liquidity 
measures related to trading volume or transaction costs appear to not be impacted by 
monetary policy shifts, highlighting the importance of investigating the different facets of 
liquidity. This study also documents that the impact of monetary policy on stock liquidity 
is larger in magnitude for small and volatile stocks; these securities seeing their illiquidity 
increase the most following an increase in short-term rates. Moreover, by investigating 
separately the 2007-2009 financial crisis period, the paper documents that the ‘monetary 
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policy – stock liquidity’ relationship is larger in magnitude, more significant and it affects 
all three facets of stock liquidity during the crisis period, whereas outside the crisis period, 
the relationship is significant only when investigating price impact of trade measures of 
liquidity.   
This thesis provides contributions to the increasing literature documenting the 
effects of funding constraints on financial markets, illustrating the influence of these 
constraints in the context of the credit default swap market, within chapter one, and stock 
market, within chapters two and three. This thesis fills in gaps in the liquidity literature and 
extends previous studies focusing on the understanding of market liquidity, funding 
liquidity and their linkages throughout different markets and documents the importance of 
these findings for market participants and policy makers.  
  This thesis presents multiple avenues for future research. Within chapter one, the 
finding that funding illiquidity changes influence CDS spread changes mostly after the 
introduction of the CDS Small Bang regulations affecting the European CDS market can be 
investigated further by measuring the actual increase in the CDS spreads that is due to the 
introduction of upfront fees for trading CDSs. Moreover, future research can provide 
additional evidence as to whether the largely insignificant results found between funding 
liquidity and CDS spreads during the 2008-2009 period extend previously in time, thus 
clearly evidencing that the introduction of upfront fees, after June 2009, is the factor that 
determines the effect of funding liquidity on CDS spreads. Regarding chapter two, a 
possible theme of further investigation is whether the extension of the linkages between 
funding liquidity, market liquidity and volatility to CDS spreads hold for a sample of all 
stocks traded on a large stock market, rather than focusing only on a sample of stocks 
containing the European entities with the most liquid CDSs. Finally, within chapter three, 
the influence of monetary policy on stock liquidity could be further investigated by 
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employing alternative measures of monetary policy, besides short-term interest rates, or by 
investigating this relationship within a different methodology, such as an event study. 
Moreover, future research could examine the effect of monetary policy on bond market 
liquidity and hedge fund liquidity as well as the impact of foreign monetary policy on 
liquidity.  
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